Afghanistan: Five top diplomats decode India’s options in a fast-developing situation

(Image: Reuters)

One of the six fundamental guiding principles of foreign policy enunciated by Chanakya in Arthashastra is described as 'Asana' – quite literally a state of prolonged waiting to consider the circumstances at hand before arriving at a policy decision.

In the fast-moving events in Afghanistan and Kabul, India has quietly adopted this policy’s modern variant, wait and watch.

The policy would seem particularly effective when the options are somewhat limited.

With no government in place as yet, accompanied by both real and fake images of the Taliban takeover in Kabul and the formation of a supposedly China-led triad of Beijing-Islamabad-Kabul, it makes great sense to open your cards as events unfold, rather than jumping the gun and revealing your hand.

By the looks of it, there could be quite a few surprises in the days ahead. Moneycontrol talked to five top diplomats to get a sense of what India should do next, given the somewhat limited options at her disposal. Most believe that New Delhi must talk to the Taliban, as they have in the recent past, consult with their allies and take one step at a time.

Headline: Let us wait and watch

I would say that we need to wait and watch, without taking any hasty decisions. We must go along with the global consensus. We will need to talk to Mullah Baradar, we have been talking to the Taliban and I don’t see any reason not to do so. We have engaged with the Taliban in Qatar (at the US-Taliban meeting). Indian channels of communication are open with the Taliban. So, the situation is fluid; no one can say anything for sure. Rest assured though that India is not in a hurry. It is best to observe right now and see how the situation pans out. It is also good to discern what our allies are doing, for instance our friends in Europe, the US or Russia. We can coordinate with them. Of course, there are issues peculiar to Afghanistan, like women empowerment that India cannot ignore.

I believe it was. Though there are genuine security concerns, and much can be said on both sides of the debate, it may have been okay to leave some consular staff behind in Afghanistan.

We would be going to Afghanistan at the invitation of the Taliban, not Pakistan.

Headline: Taliban today is not a unified entity

India has little choice except to wait and watch because unlike the West, we remain part of the region.

Like other countries, India too supported ‘an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned’ peace and reconciliation process. But while other countries did not let this prevent their contacts with the Taliban in Doha and elsewhere, India followed it in letter and spirit. Indian officials did participate in meetings where Taliban were present but refrained from exploring any direct engagement with the Taliban. With the US out and Ashraf Ghani gone, there was no option except to withdraw all diplomatic presence, closing the embassy for all practical purposes.

The key question is if there really is a Taliban 2.0 or just a more media savvy repackaged Taliban 1.0 that will create more regional instability… The Taliban today is not a unified entity. Mullah Barader is a co-founder of the Taliban and Mullah Omar was his brother-in-law. He was taken into custody by the ISI in 2010 to punish him for being in direct contact with (Afghan) President Hamid Karzai.

Eight years in ISI custody are unlikely to have left him with happy memories. The Doha negotiators (in February last year, US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad signed an agreement with the Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Barader in Doha, committing to US withdrawal) constitute the public face, but the fighting has been done by local commanders on the ground. The Quetta shura is headed by a cleric, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada and two deputies, Mullah Yaqub, son of Mullah Omar who has been overseeing military operations in the south and Sirajuddin Haqqani who heads the Haqqani network, operating in the east.

There are other groups as well – Al Qaeda, IS -Khorasan, Uighurs (ETIM), Uzbeks (IMU), Tajiks (Khatiba Imam al Bukhari) and Pakistani groups like the TTP, LeT, JeM, Jamaat ul Ahraar, Lashkar-e-Islam and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. All of them have linkages with Taliban fighters on the ground but power sharing negotiations may end up pitching them on opposite sides.

Headline: A lot of trigger-happy Haqqani network are out on the roads in Kabul

Well, I would describe it as a `lean patch’ in the relations between the two countries. We need to wait and watch and see what kind of government comes to power in Kabul. All depends on that.

Yes, Taliban at the top, but there are many groups and elements there. So, we don’t know the final composition of the government. Once it comes into place, then India will be able to play its cards well.

Why should it be different? There could be differences in nuances and approach, but the basic ideological standpoint has to be the same.

There are both arguments for and against leaving Kabul. But I am sure, the government had its own information about the security situation in that country. A lot of trigger-happy Haqqani network hitmen were out on the roads. They are not particularly well disposed towards India and work closely with Pakistan-based militant groups like Lashkar e Taiba (LeT). The government must have had a security assessment. But, of course, a delayed departure would have helped to pull out more Indians stuck in Afghanistan.

I don’t have exact numbers, but there are a few businessmen etc, who are stuck in places like Kandahar and Jalalabad. I understand that most Indians caught up in Kabul have been airlifted. I believe we would get all Indians out by August 31, when the deadline expires.

I believe we need to influence narrative building with our friends and allies in Kabul and elsewhere. We need to engage with the people.

He could have, we do not know for certain. But for the Indians to be evacuated from Kabul needed the assistance of some local groups manning the main thoroughfares and the roads leading up to the airport. We will know more as the scene clears up in the days ahead.

Headline: India had no good options in Afghanistan to begin with

Well, India had no good options in Afghanistan to begin with. India must wait and watch. You do not necessarily have to intervene in a neighbouring country. Countries must ultimately resolve their internal problems on their own, and foreign presence or military intervention has self-defining limitations and cannot continue in perpetuity.

In fact, I would further assert that military intervention in the end exacerbates problems and delays the solutions which countries can better arrive at as part of their autonomous evolution.

During the transition period, with the Taliban in power, the threats to India are very real. There are many advocates of greater activism on the part of India, including building bridges with the Taliban. I don’t think that is advisable, and we should act as per the options available to us. We should identify our feasible priorities, add our voice vehemently to international pressure on the Taliban, and look to what we need to do to protect our own interests: the evacuation of our remaining citizens from there; strengthening our defences (especially in Kashmir) against the possibility of greater terror emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan axis, and wait to see how the situation evolves in Afghanistan.

The Taliban, which has swept to power in the war-torn country, must never be left alone to run havoc. There can be no Taliban 2.0. The Taliban, by its very nature, is unlawfully violent, fanatically religious, repressive to women, compulsively terrorist, and insensitive to democratic governance. International pressure for it to behave must continue, and increase.

Headline: West has for years fought the wrong enemy. The real enemy is Pakistan

Look at it this way. All these years, the West has been fighting the wrong enemy, the Taliban. Whereas the real enemy is Pakistan. India’s role in Afghanistan was oriented towards peace and development. India’s investment of $3billion in Afghanistan was not aimed at returns but development and growth. This was an investment for goodwill. Indian policy has been steady over the years. We don’t pick and choose governments.

Why would the Taliban want to be antagonistic towards India? If India had stayed on a bit longer in Kabul, it could have recognised the Taliban, which would, if anything, have shored up the new dispensation in Kabul. The Afghan capital is not the war-ravaged city we once knew. It has developed a great deal in the last few years with first rate hotels, rollicking club life and great hospitals.

That’s the question to ask. It is a tactical pull out. They have pulled out because the Taliban is not their main enemy. Their main enemies are China, Russia and Iran, the sort of anti-American Quad. By leaving the way they have, it is an invitation to instability. Let the regional powers, China and Iran, who share borders with Afghanistan, handle the muck. Let us not forget that the Taliban are natural supporters of the Uyghurs facing Chinese repression in Xinjiang. During their first regime between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban had invited several Islamic groups from Central Asia to hold conferences on their soil.

These are difficult decisions. Suppose a diplomat had got killed; then everyone would have turned and asked why Indians had not pulled out in time!