BRICS To ‘BRICSAUSIEE’: A new architecture that will satisfy India

The BRICS plus nations can act collectively where their interests are aligned, for example in insisting that the rich nations meet their obligations in financing the fight against climate change

On August 24, BRICS admitted six new members – Argentina, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia – overcoming differences on criteria and modalities. India should be satisfied, since it has excellent relations with all of them.

The idea of BRICS expansion has been around for some time. But the stampede of recent applicants is unprecedented. Twenty-two countries applied for membership and another 20 made informal approaches.

Rush For BRICS Membership

The rush for membership has to be read as a response to the current global geopolitical flux, exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine and worsening US-China tensions. Countries are trying to insulate themselves from the potentially bruising impact of an impending US-China bipolarity that would undermine their political autonomy and circumscribe their economic options.

In various quarters, particularly in the western media, the call for multipolarity or for strategic autonomy is interpreted as a challenge to the US-led international order. In fact, it is more an effort to get interests accommodated in that order.

Speaking at the BRICS summit, the UN Secretary General (who can hardly be called an opponent of the US-led order) strongly espoused multipolarity in a reformed multilateral architecture that reflects today’s power and economic realities – not those of the post-Second World War world.

Momentum And Setbacks

The US National Security Strategy acknowledges the aspiration of countries to play a role in shaping a rules-based international order. If conditions are not created for this, the world will remain fragmented and (as the UN Secretary General hinted) countries will seek refuge in groupings like BRICS.

BRICS has changed composition, complexion and course since its inception in 2009. It started out as BRIC, inspired by an economist’s assessment that these four countries were headed for economic stardom by 2050. Its initial thrust was for a greater accommodation of its members in the West-dominated global economic and financial architecture.

It expanded to BRICS in 2011 and assumed a more political character with the Delhi summit in 2012. But as Russia-US relations went into freefall, India-China relations deteriorated and US-China tensions escalated, the political convergence contracted.

But There’s Economic Convergence

The funding activities of the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) and expanding intra-BRICS cooperation in socioeconomic sectors sustained its activities. The drafting skills of its diplomats ensured that summit communiques covered all the major international issues of the day, skilfully papering over differences of perspectives of member-states.

BRICS collectively represents over 40 percent of the world’s population and, with 32 percent of global GDP (PPP), has overtaken the G7. With the addition of the six new members, this asymmetry will increase.

However, this does not automatically translate into greater BRICS clout than G7, whose members have convergent political perspectives. But an expanded BRICS can command greater attention from the developed world to the concerns of the Global South.

The induction of new members will augment the capital base of NDB, which has a portfolio of 96 projects worth $33 billion, but needs to broaden its resource base to expand its footprint. It may be noted that Egypt, UAE, Bangladesh and Uruguay were inducted into NDB in 2021; the latter two are not yet BRICS members.

The expectation that BRICS could accelerate de-dollarisation is premature. Given their spatial dispersion and economic disparities, a BRICS currency is not a feasible proposition. Trade between BRICS countries in their respective currencies would be a significant first step, particularly if Saudi and UAE oil exports are brought within its purview.

Some mechanisms for local currency trade have long been available, through agreements between BRICS development banks, concluded at the Delhi Summit in 2012. They have not been fully activated.

Will Expansion Hurt Cohesion?

The significance of BRICS has not been in its statements or in a congruence of strategic vision (which its members do not have). It was that its members recognised its continued relevance, despite transformations in the global environment, changes in their domestic leaderships and recalibration of their inter se relationships.

That so many more countries want to join is a powerful statement. Again, they do not bring a congruence of perspectives into the group. They are looking for a framework within which they could join like-minded countries to promote initiatives of their interest, outside of their formal alliances.

Excessive expansion risks the incoherence of a too-large organisation. There is also the danger of it becoming a vehicle for the interests of its dominant member. So far, members have recognised the value of keeping BRICS intact and have followed the discipline of consensus, keeping conflicting issues for other forums.

It remains to be seen if BRICSAUSIEE (or whatever the new acronym) will inherit this maturity.

P.S.Raghavan is a former diplomat, now Distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.