What is Mitakshara Hindu Law? Chhattisgarh HC invokes it to hold daughter ineligible for inheriting father's property

The High Court framed substantial questions of law concerning whether the 1956 Act or its 2005 Amendment could be applied to the appellant’s claim, and whether she could inherit if partition had occurred before 1956.

The Chhattisgarh High Court has held that under the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, a daughter cannot claim a share in her father’s property if he died before 1956 and there is a surviving son. The Court clarified that such rights arise only in the absence of a male heir.

Delivering judgment in Smt. Ragmania (Deceased) through LRs Kariman Das v. Jagmet & Ors. (SA No. 178 of 2014), Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas dismissed a second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, observing that succession in this case had opened prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and therefore the old Mitakshara law governed inheritance.

In the 15-page judgment seen by Moneycontrol, the court said, “It is well settled legal position of law that as per Mitakshara Law, the daughter is not entitled to inherit the property of her father before the enactment of the Act, 1956"

The court observed, "Under the Mitakshara law, even the self-acquired property of a male devolved exclusively upon his male issue, and only in the absence of such male issue did it pass to other heirs.”

The dispute arose between siblings belonging to a Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law. The appellant, sister of the respondent’s father, claimed a share in the family land after learning that the respondent had applied to the Naib Tahsildar for mutation of the property in his name. Her objection was rejected, prompting her to file a civil suit seeking declaration of title and partition before the Civil Judge, Class-II, Sarguja.

The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that since the appellant’s father had died before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her rights were governed by the pre-1956 Mitakshara law. The Additional District Judge upheld this finding, after which the appellant approached the High Court in second appeal.

The High Court framed substantial questions of law concerning whether the 1956 Act or its 2005 Amendment could be applied to the appellant’s claim, and whether she could inherit if partition had occurred before 1956.

Upon examining the record, the Court noted that the appellant had not mentioned her father’s year of death in the plaint. The respondents specifically pleaded that he had died in 1950–51, and this assertion went unchallenged. A witness also testified that the death occurred about sixty years before 2008, confirming a pre-1956 timeline. Based on these facts, the Court held that succession had opened before 1956 and was governed entirely by Mitakshara principles.

Under the traditional Mitakshara system of Hindu law, succession and inheritance were based on male lineage. Property -- whether ancestral or self-acquired -- would pass to male heirs by survivorship. A daughter’s right to inherit arose only if there was no male issue.

In the judgment, the Court noted, “Under the Mitakshara law, even the self-acquired property of a male devolved exclusively upon his male issue, and only in the absence of such male issue did it pass to other heirs.”

It also drew from ancient commentaries summarised in Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur & Ors. (2019) and said: “A son, a grandson whose father is dead, and a great-grandson whose father and grandfather are both dead, succeed simultaneously as single heir to the separate or self-acquired property of the deceased with rights of survivorship.”

Before 1956, inheritance among Hindus was governed by two major traditional schools -- Mitakshara and Dayabhaga. The Mitakshara school, followed in most parts of India, was fundamentally patriarchal: property rights were held by male coparceners, and sons acquired an interest in the family property by birth. Daughters were excluded from the coparcenary unless there was no surviving male heir.

This framework changed with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which codified inheritance rules for Hindus and introduced statutory rights of succession. Later, the 2005 Amendment granted daughters equal coparcenary rights alongside sons. However, the judiciary has consistently maintained that the 1956 Act -- and by extension the 2005 Amendment -- applies only when succession opened after the Act came into force.

This means that the amendments did not apply retrospectively and rights already vested under Mitakshara law could not be reopened. Justice Vyas based his reasoning on two key Supreme Court rulings.

In Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur & Ors. (2019), the Supreme Court held that property inherited by a male Hindu from his paternal ancestors remains coparcenary property if succession opened before 1956.

Similarly, in Arunachala Gounder (Dead) by LRs v. Ponnusamy & Ors. (2022), it was held that under the pre-1956 Mitakshara law, a daughter could inherit her father’s separate property only if he died without a male child. The Chhattisgarh High Court quoted this exact principle: “From the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court… the wife or daughter of a male would inherit his separate property only if he died without a male child.”

The Court also examined the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929, which introduced certain female heirs (son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, and sister’s son) but did not disturb the male line of inheritance. Justice Vyas noted: “The purpose of the statute Act of 1929 was not to modify the fundamental concepts of Shastric Hindu law relating to inheritance. The only difference it introduced was that the chance of inheritance of a son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter, sister, etc., was recognized in a different capacity from that which prevailed earlier.”

The Court further referred to the full bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Ghurpatari & Ors. v. Sampati & Ors. (AIR 1976 All 195), which quoted Vijnyaneshwara in Mitakshara to highlight “let the widow succeed to her husband’s wealth, provided she be chaste; and in default of her let the daughter inherit if married.” The Allahabad HC had further said that the right of daughter and daughter’s son to succeed to the property was well recognized in the Mitakshara Law. "The daughter ranks fifth in the order of succession and the daughter’s son ranked sixth," it had said.

Applying these legal principles, Justice Vyas held that the appellant’s father, Sudhin, had died before 1956, and therefore, the succession to his property was governed entirely by Mitakshara law. The father’s self-acquired property devolved completely upon his son, Baigadas, leaving no share for the daughter.

As recorded in the judgment: “When a Hindu governed by Mitakshara law died before 1956, his separate property would completely devolve upon his son. A female child could claim a right in such property only in the absence of a male child.”

The Court concluded that there was “no illegality in mutating the suit property in favour of the defendants,” since inheritance had lawfully vested in the male heir at the time of the father’s death.

After reviewing the evidence, pleadings, and legal precedents, the High Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. It found that the 1956 Act and the 2005 Amendment could not retroactively confer inheritance rights on the appellant.

Accordingly, the second appeal was dismissed, with all substantial questions of law answered against the appellant. The Court directed that the decree be drawn and added that there would be no order as to costs.

The ruling draws a firm line between pre-1956 and post-1956 inheritance regimes. Where a Hindu male died before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, his property devolved strictly according to Mitakshara law, which prioritized male heirs.

Justice Vyas observed: “The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 did not affect the son’s absolute right to inherit his father’s property. It merely enlarged the circle of heirs who could succeed in default of male issue" and held daughter whose father died before 1956 cannot claim a share in his property if a son survives.