Pakistan is discussing a new regional bloc with China and Bangladesh: Can it survive without India?

South Asia is witnessing an ambitious but controversial diplomatic experiment, led by Islamabad. With SAARC frozen and India-Pakistan relations at a low point, Pakistan now wants to build a brand-new regional platform that deliberately leaves out New Delhi. The idea is bold enough to attract attention, yet risky enough to raise eyebrows. It comes at a time when China is aggressively expanding its influence, while Bangladesh under its new leadership appears to be drifting away from India.

The plan hints at a future where South Asian cooperation might be driven not by consensus, but by political opportunism and strategic dependence. The question is whether any country will risk joining a China-backed initiative that could deepen divisions rather than improve regional cooperation.

The proposal was highlighted last week by Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar. He said that discussions between Pakistan, China and Bangladesh could grow into a wider coalition of South Asian countries. Dar described the framework as a new form of cooperation based on “variable geometry,” meaning flexible participation in economic, connectivity and technology projects. He argued that it would enable countries to collaborate even if they do not agree on everything.

According to Dar, this grouping is not aimed at confrontation but at creating new regional options. He insisted it is about cooperation, not exclusion. Yet, the idea closely resembles a SAARC-like framework designed to function without the region’s largest economy and most powerful security actor.

Dar’s optimism stems from the paralysis of SAARC. For nearly a decade, the grouping has remained inactive. Pakistan has repeatedly obstructed summits, and India has refused to participate due to lack of security trust. A brief four-day military clash earlier this year deepened the divide further, virtually freezing all dialogue.

SAARC’s inability to move forward has left a vacuum in regional cooperation. Trade within South Asia remains shockingly low at barely 5 percent of the region’s combined commerce. Economists argue that hostility between India and Pakistan has cost the region billions in potential trade revenue, blocked infrastructure corridors and delayed energy cooperation.

What makes the proposal more controversial is the recent political shift in Bangladesh. After the fall of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina, Dhaka’s ties with India have deteriorated sharply. Critics say the interim government has taken a more confrontational tone toward New Delhi while simultaneously expanding engagement with Beijing.

China has already replaced India as Bangladesh’s largest investor in key infrastructure sectors. Analysts believe the timing of confidential three-party talks between Pakistan, China and Bangladesh was not accidental. The new Dhaka administration appears willing to distance itself from India if it gains economic protection from Beijing.

But such a shift risks entangling Bangladesh in deeper strategic debt. China’s track record in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Africa suggests that economic dependence often translates into political pressure. A China-backed bloc could force smaller nations to make choices that undermine their sovereignty rather than enhance it.

Pakistan hopes that Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives will show interest. These smaller states have long looked for cooperation on climate negotiations, infrastructure development and regional connectivity. Yet none of them can afford to antagonise India, which remains central to their tourism, trade, labor markets and security needs.

Any alliance perceived as Pakistan-led or China-funded carries significant diplomatic risk. Governments are wary of aligning themselves against New Delhi, and even more cautious about entering China’s strategic orbit. A grouping built on resentment rather than trust is unlikely to have long-term viability.

India faces a delicate situation, but not an imminent threat. The proposed bloc does not offer strong economic benefits to smaller South Asian countries without India’s market, workforce, manufacturing base and transit routes. No regional economy can rely solely on Chinese funding without risking dependency and loss of policy autonomy.

New Delhi’s biggest challenge is not the bloc itself, but the growing Chinese footprint in Bangladesh. If Dhaka continues pivoting away from India, it could affect trade routes, defense cooperation and the balance of power in the Bay of Bengal. India may need to strengthen engagement through trade incentives, infrastructure partnerships and people-led diplomacy to counter Beijing’s influence.

India’s strongest advantage remains stability. Countries may flirt with China, but they trade, migrate and invest with India because its economic ecosystem is far more sustainable than Pakistan’s political unpredictability or China’s debt-heavy strategic financing.

Islamabad believes it is well-positioned. With stronger ties to China, renewed outreach to the United States and support from Gulf nations, Pakistan sees a chance to leave behind its recent years of economic crisis and global isolation. The initiative is part of its attempt to rebrand itself as a regional influencer rather than a security burden.

Whether this ambition becomes reality depends on whether other states are willing to gamble their future on a bloc that excludes India. For now, South Asia is cautious. The region has watched China’s promises before, and many nations are wary of becoming another debt-dependent partner trapped in strategic alliances that benefit only Beijing and Islamabad.

The coming months will show whether Pakistan’s idea turns into a credible platform or fades like SAARC itself, trapped under the weight of regional mistrust.