'The situation at the LAC is unlikely to improve and may well worsen in coming days'

Picture Credit: National Herald

Srinath Raghavan is an Indian historian of contemporary history and one of the leading commentators on strategic affairs. He is a professor of history and international relations at Ashoka University and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He also had a short stint in the Indian Army. Raghavan has authored several books, including “War and Peace in Modern India”, in which he details India-China relations and their dispute over the unsettled boundary. He spoke to Pranay Sharma on the recent clashes at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the current strains in India-China relations. Edited excerpts:

Last week there were reports of Indian and Chinese troops clashing with each other in the Ladakh (Arunachal Pradesh) sector of the LAC. We had another such clash in Galwan in 2020. Why are they happening so frequently?

India and China have differing interpretations of where the LAC runs and these tend to overlap in several places. Both sides also send military patrols up to the LAC as claimed by them, so there are situations where their troops run up against each other. This is the basic, underlying reason for such face-offs.

Are there other reasons too?

Each specific instance will, of course, have other causes too. In the spring of 2020 in the Ladakh sector, the PLA (People’s Liberation Army, China’s military force) moved in a premeditated fashion into areas claimed by India as falling on its side of the LAC in a clear bid to challenge and change the Indian interpretation of the status quo prevailing in these parts. This led to the clash in Galwan and the situation in Ladakh remains unresolved to a considerable extent even now.

The Indian government claims the clashes happened because the Chinese soldiers were trying to enter Indian territory. Is that how you see it?
Insofar as Chinese troops were trying to evict an Indian post in areas that India deems as falling within its conception of the LAC in the area, this is obviously right. The Chinese, of course, have their own reading of the LAC. Even so, this was another instance where the Chinese had sought to change the status quo on the ground.

What exactly is the LAC and what value does it have on the international stage?

The Line of Actual Control between India and China is the line up to which each side exercises control on the ground. The fundamental problem is that this line has never been formally agreed upon by the two sides, in contrast, say, to the Line of Control between India and Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir.

Why has such a long border not been clearly delineated for so many years?
It is important to distinguish between the boundary dispute and the dispute over interpretations of the LAC, though the two are linked. India and China have had a dispute over their international borders since the 1950s. This also led to a war in 1962. But the boundary dispute remains unresolved.

What about the LAC?

The Line of Actual Control is a concept advanced by China in 1959. The idea was that in order to manage conflict, both sides should stay within the limits of the line up to which they exercise de facto control. The idea of the LAC was also incorporated in the border peace and tranquility agreements signed by the two countries in the 1990s. These stipulated that the two sides should clarify the LAC and agree upon a shared conception of the line. This exercise began in the late 1990s, but China walked back from it and has consistently refused to clarify the LAC.

Despite the unsettled border, India and China have gone to war only once, in 1962. Why has the border that remained stable for so many years turned hot in recent years?

The border remained mostly stable after 1962, though there were significant standoffs in 1967 at Nathu La (Sikkim sector) and in 1986-87 in Sumdorong Chu (Arunachal Pradesh sector). The agreements of the 1990s introduced formal protocols for maintenance of peace and stability along the LAC. By the early 2000s, however, China had embarked on massive infrastructure development in Tibet and along the border areas. This posed a novel security challenge to India's positions along the LAC. Later in the decade, India began its own attempt to catch up on infrastructure development. Enhanced infrastructure also led to more frequent patrolling up to their LAC by both sides and more frequent face-offs. This is the underlying cause. Add to this the PLA’s desire to permanently change the status quo in key areas on the LAC and you have a recipe for more turbulence.

Much of the transgression at the LAC has also been happening since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and consolidated his position. Are they linked?

China’s attempts to create new facts on the ground, as it were, can be traced back to 2013. But you’re right, since the advent of Xi Jinping, China has been much more brazen in its actions along the LAC. Recall that such standoffs have happened at times when President Xi was meeting Prime Minister Modi. This is certainly part of a broader, muscular foreign policy undertaken by China in recent years.

Do India-US relations have anything to do with the Chinese action?
India’s relations with the United States have been a major factor in Sino-Indian relations. In 2005, China was keen on a strategic and cooperative partnership with India and was willing to move forward with the boundary negotiations (not to be confused with LAC clarification). But once Beijing understood the growing strategic proximity of New Delhi and Washington, it has sought to undermine this in different ways — for instance, by preventing India’s entry into nuclear and security groupings despite American sponsorship. More recently, China has sought to portray the Quad and Indo-Pacific security as akin to a NATO in Asia, clearly suggesting that India should be wary of an alignment with the United States.

Were they linked to the LAC developments as well?

The scale of Chinese military action and build-up in Ladakh in 2020 indicates that it was also an attempt to embarrass India and underscore the limitations of the tilt towards the United States. By the same token, it was also a signal to Washington that New Delhi might not be capable of standing up to China in a serious way.

Will this get worse in the coming days, remain like this, or improve?
The situation is unlikely to improve and may well worsen in the coming days. The Indian government’s approach since June 2020 has been to push for restoration of status quo on the ground in Ladakh and insist that this was a precondition for the resumption of normal political dialogue. The Indian foreign minister told Parliament recently that this has been conveyed clearly to China. Indeed, the top leadership of the two countries have not had a substantive meeting in almost three years now. What is equally clear from China’s refusal to pull back in Ladakh and its willingness to push India at other points on the LAC is that the Indian message is not landing effectively in Beijing.

So what does India do?

It is time for India to change course both by looking at options to add pressure on the LAC and simultaneously exploring the reopening of high-level political communication. These problems cannot be sorted out by military officials.