Does money win the war — Inferences from the Russian push in defence expenditure

Russia has nearly doubled its defence expenditure target to more than $102 billion in the current year. (Source: AFP/File image)

As the Russia-Ukraine war continues unabated, both countries are exploring ways and means to gain an upper hand. The latest is the so-called quantum jump in Russia’s defence expenditure (defex). According to a recent Reuters report, Russia has nearly doubled its defex target to more than $102 billion in the current year. The announcement is not surprising since Russia is on a spending spree to finance its war activities and has apparently spent the allocated budget by June this year. However, it is debatable if a quantum jump alone would enable Russia to gain a decisive advantage over Ukraine.

War-led Spending

According to the 2023 SIPRI Factsheet on Trends in Military Expenditure, Russia emerged as the third largest spender (from fifth in 2021) after the US and China, spending more than $86 billion and accounting for 4.1 percent of its GDP in 2022. SIPRI data, therefore, is at variance with Reuter’s claim, since there is an increase of only 20 percent over last year’s figures. Hitherto, Russia is an autocratic, militarised state with overgrown military establishments, perpetual warfare, high-level military mobilisation and a consequential larger share for the military in resource allocation. For example, in 2022, only seven countries allocated more defex as a proportion of GDP than Russia. Further, Russia continues to monetise some portions of oil exports and, therefore, would most likely sustain the revenue model for its war activities and allocate even higher portions of GDP to defence in future.

However, Ukraine has also pushed up its defex. It moved from the 36th position in 2021 to the 11th in 2022, spending $44 billion. This was a 640 percent increase over its 2021 defex figures. A balance of fortunes would possibly emerge only if there is a huge asymmetry between the two countries. That is not happening since Ukraine was also able to raise a significant amount through military assistance and loans from NATO countries. The US, for example, has committed more than $40 billion in security assistance alone since February 2022. Another $35 billion stands committed for humanitarian and financial aid. A matching contribution has also been committed by the European Union institutions and non-US NATO members. Therefore, Russian defex increases are meaningless.

Money Just One Factor

Hitherto, money is only one of the numerous factors in warfare. For example, America’s defence budget is 39 percent of the global defence expenditure and is three times more than China, the next in the pecking order. Yet, America has not been able to win any war in recent times after the 1991 Gulf War success. Saudi Arabia is the fifth-largest military spender and is either the largest or second-largest importer of weapons in the international arms market. Yet, Saudi Arabia has failed to metamorphose itself into a recognised military power in the Gulf and West Asia region. It emerges, therefore, that there are significant non-monetary factors that decide the fate of contemporary wars.

Unfortunately, Russia has many such problems that undermine the budgetary increases. First, Russia does not have a conducive military culture for carrying out successful war activities. Years of combat experience notwithstanding, Russian soldiers are fatigued. While Russia has an advanced military-industrial complex (MIC) and has been a lead arms supplier, the personnel side of military modernisation remains in shambles. Soldiers are not getting paid in time and efforts to push up military reforms were never taken seriously. The military leadership is uninspiring, best evident in the open revolt by a private army against them some time ago.

Hurt By Sanctions

Second, Russia’s supply chain economy for delivering quantitative and qualitative military hardware is increasingly coming under challenge. From being an arms exporter, Russia is now desperate to import vital spare parts for its arsenals. Its domestic MIC is not able to produce many of those items despite liberal budgetary support and manpower training in weapons production. Part of the reason is the tightening of global economic sanctions on Russia and its extermination from all international arms markets.

Third, despite being an established military power, Russia is not able to come out with disruptive military innovations or technologies to gain a significant advantage over Ukraine. Its Air Force failed to make a decisive dent into Ukraine’s air space. The missile forces too have not made any significant damage after early impact. Russia, it seems, is a victim of overconfidence and poor strategic instincts. On the contrary, Ukraine has won back sizeable portions of territory from the Russian military. In recent times, it has taken the war to Russian territory, hitting portions of Moscow and sea ports in drone attacks from far-off distances.

Contemporary wars are protracted wars. Even great powers are not able to clinch an outright victory. In uncertain war atmospherics, overt emphasis on defence spending is more about politics and marketing than an effective tool in war economy management. Therefore, it is debatable if defex increases alone will induce favourable military fortunes for Russia. At best, it would perpetuate Russia’s military economy without ensuring a decisive outcome in the ongoing war against Ukraine.

Bhartendu Kumar Singh is in the Indian Defence Accounts Service. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.