OPINION | China hooks up with Pakistan to challenge India’s primacy in South Asia

Pakistan COAS Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir (second from left) hosts the PLA’s 98th anniversary ceremony at GHQ Rawalpindi, with Chinese Ambassador Jiang Zaidong (center) attending as chief guest. (File)

The 7th China-Pakistan foreign ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, held in Beijing on January 4, demonstrated the expansion of a bilateral framework into a more comprehensive platform to include further geopolitical and economic interests.

Background to Pak-China Strategic Dialogue

The Strategic Dialogue, institutionalised during Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to Pakistan in 2006, was later upgraded from the foreign secretaries’ level to foreign ministers in 2019. Traditionally and consistently focusing on concerns surrounding terrorism, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the Kashmir dispute, the broadened scope of the recent dialogue merits closer analysis. 

Predictably and with unfailing consistency, these issues found a feature in the 2026 joint dialogue as well, however the language and agenda take a different direction.

Challenge to India’s subcontinental primacy

The statement emphasised the significance of a ‘South Asian regional order’ underpinned by the “UN Charter, international law, and the basic norms governing international relations reiterated opposition to any unilateral actions, and reaffirmed the significance of maintaining peace and stability in South Asia and the necessity of resolving all outstanding disputes through dialogue and consultation.”

The nuanced ‘regional order’ terming potentially reflects attempts to challenge India’s historical and geographic primacy in the subcontinent.

The subcontinent has been historically perceived through an Indo-centric hegemony. As such, the rejection of “unilateral actions” seems to be a veiled indictment of New Delhi’s policies in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) or the recent friction over the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) against shared regional legalisms.

India has refrained from actualising the river water threat

Since India’s suspension of the IWT following the April 2025 attack in Kashmir, New Delhi has fast-tracked Chenab River hydropower projects including clearances for Dulhasti Stage II (operational expansion) and new mega dams.

In return, Pakistan continues to accuse India of “weaponising water” and restricting downstream flows without notification. However, India has not stopped water flows, with continued real-time data sharing ongoing between high commission channels on humanitarian grounds.

Building India-excluded spaces

Separately, the vision of a concrete, new regional landscape for China and Pakistan was most evidently manifested in the escalation of trilateral mechanisms. The 2026 communiqué underscored goals to “deliver new outcomes” under the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan and the China-Bangladesh-Pakistan trilateral processes.

While the trilateral with Afghanistan has been ongoing since 2017, and formalisation of China-Bangladesh-Pakistan emerged in wake of political upheavals in Dhaka in 2025, their elevation likely seeks deliberate architecture-building mechanisms to build India-excluded spaces with regional nations.

Pakistan benefits from a China-supported trilateral framework to engage with Bangladesh, allowing it to dilute the historical baggage and sensitivities burdening bilateral ties. These trilateral formats, if pursued consistently, showcase China and Pakistan’s collective effort toward regional-order rebuilding. This means, lessening reliance on multilateralism and focusing on issue-specific trilateral arrangements.

Additionally, the rhetoric around Afghanistan in the latest round marked a departure from call for political inclusivity and constructive engagement to a joint call for “more visible and verifiable actions” against terror groups based in the country, gesturing to a rare, tough public stance by China against the Taliban-led administration. The accountability-laden language synchronises with Pakistan’s longstanding security-centric rhetoric against the Taliban.

CPEC 2.0 on the anvil

The joint statement further announced CPEC 2.0 version, prioritising “three key sectors of industry, agriculture and mining,” along with Gwadar Port operations, Khunjerab Pass access, and "third-party participation" under China-Pakistan modalities. Most noticeably, the mention of mining draws some attention. While Pakistan’s mineral reserves have drawn Chinese firms in Balochistan province, the statement signals Beijing’s intent to lock resource access amid Western interests.

The US’ Export-Import Bank approved $1.25 billion in financing for the Reko Diq copper-gold mining project in Balochistan in December 2025, with US President Donald Trump showing keen business interest in Pakistan. Despite temptations to call this a US-China mineral race in Pakistan’s unknown reserves, the ambiguity around Pakistan’s mineral potential only remains supported by domestic rhetoric. Additionally, the grim security conditions in Pakistan due to the operations of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baloch insurgent groups will hinder economic projects by China and the US.

A lot will depend on operationalising new mechanisms

That said, the effectiveness of these stated ambitions and intended re-order will remain contingent on the countries’ ability to operationalise these mechanisms beyond diplomatic forums. While New Delhi’s position remains one of indifference to the recent strategic dialogue, it is critical to observe the trajectory of China-Pakistan relationship.

Notwithstanding the public handshake between India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and Ayaz Sadiq, the Speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, at the funeral of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia on December 31, 2025, such gestures can hardly mask the deeply ingrained political tensions that define India-Pakistan ties.

With little expectation of official bilateral engagement in the immediate future, the rivalry between both neighbours will continue to intersect and influence the broader trajectory of the broader China-Pakistan ties and regional calculations.

(Aishwaria Sonavane is Research Analyst for Pakistan Studies, Indo-Pacific Programme, Takshashila Institution).

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.