Kargil 1999: Lessons learnt, unlearnt and ignored

Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh pays tribute to soldiers at the National War Memorial in New Delhi on the occasion of 22nd Kargil Vijay Diwas. (Image: Twitter/@rajnathsingh)

Twenty-two summers later, the questions come back to haunt.

Even as the country remembers with gratitude the 500 braves, who laid down their lives in the Kargil War in 1999, a closer look at the lessons learnt and gaps filled since then, merits scrutiny.

The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), headed by India’s strategic affairs czar, the redoubtable, late Krishnaswamy Subrahmanyam, (father of current Foreign Minister S Jaishankar), was appointed by the Atal Behari Vajpayee government to review events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions.

Let’s face it. Despite being grossly ill-equipped and underprepared, the Commanding Officers of Indian infantry battalions, young officers, junior commissioned officers, and valiant soldiers of the army, coupled with the close air support of the Indian Air Force, the nation won a hard-fought victory against an adversary that caught India’s political and military brass unawares and off guard.

Equally true, the valour, dedication, and professionalism of the country’s young military men stood out in stark contrast to the institutional apathy and laxity displayed by the higher echelons of the nation’s defence, intelligence, bureaucratic and political framework. 

The KRC was candid enough to observe that Indian intelligence was caught napping – which from the benefit of hindsight appears to be an understatement.

Says Brig. Rajiv Williams (retd), veteran infantryman and a hero of the earlier Siachen campaign, who served in the ‘Special Media Cell’ at the Army Headquarters during the course of the Kargil War: "The uncorroborated intelligence inputs on enemy movement along ridge lines received at 3 Infantry Division from 121 Independent Infantry Brigade were not taken seriously and remained as missing links while building the overall threat in the Sector. What amazes me is that even reports of enemy artillery shelling at regular intervals on Drass – Kargil road did not raise alarm bells at the Headquarters with higher accuracy levels. This should have been a major indicator as the shelling was becoming more accurate leading to the fact that someone from atop was directing the artillery fire."

The Kargil Review Committee forms a landmark as far as defence reforms in India are concerned. Recommending a "thorough review of the national security system in its entirety,’’ it laid out the context of the report, noting that the national security system in the country had seen very little changes since the 52-year-old framework outlined by Hastings Ismay and recommended by Louis Mountbatten just before the British departed from India, had been put into place.

While the Henderson Brooks report of the 1962 China debacle was never officially released by the government, citing security concerns, the KRC was. Experts say that while many of its recommendations have been met, the time taken to implement them has come not a day too soon, or else, the Chinese intrusion into eastern Ladakh in 2020 may not have taken place.

"Just by announcing reforms does not mean that the programmes will be implemented. It needs political backing to push through inter-ministerial standoffs for reforms to work on ground,” says Lt. Gen. Prakash Menon (retd), Director Strategic Studies, Takshashila Institution.

KRC recommendations implemented

Among the recommendations in the Kargil Review Committee report, the following have been implemented:

• A thorough review of the national security system in India, which was done by the Group of Ministers (GoM)
• A full-time National Security Advisor
• Improved aerial surveillance, which has been accomplished by setting up RISAT satellites and inducting unmanned aerial vehicle
• A centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency, which resulted in the establishment of the National Technical Research Organisation in 2004.
• A Defence Intelligence Agency
• The establishment of think tanks, which has resulted in organisations like the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies.
• The reduction of the age profile in the army

Following the Kargil Review Committee report, a Group of Ministers was set up by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on April 17, 2000, to consider its recommendations. It consisted of the Ministers of Home Affairs, Defence, External Affairs and Finance.

From among the recommendations in the GoM report, some important decisions have been followed through. The most important of these include the creation of the post for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), currently headed by Gen Bipin Rawat, which was accepted by the CCS and implemented in December 2019.

In addition, the creation of additional tri-services organisations; in particular, the Integrated Defence Staff, the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the Nuclear Command Authority, Strategic Forces Command, the Defence Technology Council and Defence Acquisition Council have been put into place.

Lessons not learnt

The foremost proposal of the Kargil Review Committee, of reforming the intelligence system in India, continues to hang in balance, as the Chinese intrusion into Ladakh appears to confirm.

Therefore, the most valuable lesson, which though learned after every conflict and yet not acted upon in all seriousness, remains ‘Intelligence’. No steps have been taken to create a credible ‘Joint Intelligence Agency’ under one individual.

This is different to the `Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)’, which analyzes intelligence data from the Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and the Directorate of Air Intelligence and is accountable to the Cabinet Secretariat.

With the appointment of CDS, some of the roles of JIC will perhaps come under the CDS. However, on ground the situation seems quite different with the National Security Council (NSC) under the PM being the key in all decision making. It is also important for timely dissemination of information and periodic review by the intelligence agency that will help in timely and appropriate action being taken at various levels.

The other crucial aspect, of acting swiftly when the situation demanded - and which was found seriously lacking in Kargil - is perhaps yet to be tested in full.

The Kargil Review Committee records that intrusions in the Kargil sector were first noticed on May 3, 1999, by shepherds. The first briefing was given to Defence and External Affairs Ministers on May 17 May and to the CCS on May 18.

Another briefing to the prime minister and defence minister was given on May 24, and the CCS met formally only on May 25, 1999. Air Power was authorised on May 26, when the Indian armed forces had adopted a deterrence posture vis-à-vis Pakistan.

"This monumental response time on the part of a security system that aspires to wield a credible nuclear deterrent deserved to have been critically and minutely analysed,” writes Air Marshal BD Jayal.

By which time, it had certainly cost many lives, allowing Pakistani forces, particularly its artillery, to run amuck in the higher reaches of the Kargil district.

Naresh Chandra Committee

In 2011, the Naresh Chandra task force reviewed the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, assessed the implementation and accordingly suggested new changes needed relating to national security.

The committee submitted its report on May 23, 2012. According to it, many of the main recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee had not been implemented till then, (but subsequently have been). Among the most important were the recommendations related to defence procurement, which still hang in balance.

The task force further suggested framing a National Security Doctrine.

The Kargil Review Committee also proposed that the government find ways to reduce the pension expenditure, which has not yet been implemented.

The example of Eastern Ladakh in 2020 is being quoted to suggest that the lessons of Kargil have not been learnt to prevent India being strategically surprised. Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) believes there are two ways to get around it.

"First, a National Security Strategy document needs to be drafted and fully discussed in Parliament, chapter by chapter, to raise the concern for military security. Second, when the political community is well-versed with military strategic affairs, the involvement of all stakeholders will rise. Bi-annual war games and model exercises for selected members of the political community is one way. The National Defence College at Delhi is tailor-made to do it and recommendations for this already exist,” he told Moneycontrol.

Ultimately, the more things change, the more they remain the same. 

Admiral Arun Prakash, former Navy chief, speaking at the USI National Security Lecture, 2012 titled National Security Reforms: Ten Years After the Kargil Committee Report said: "India’s political establishment has chosen to follow an unusual paradigm in which policy-making is assigned to the bureaucracy, while strategy is crafted by diplomats, and matters impinging on grand strategy, like nuclear deterrence or ballistic missile defence, remain in the hands of scientists and technocrats. Uniquely amongst major powers, India has not seen it fit to entrust its armed forces with any role in national security decision-making.”

A major milestone would be crossed when that happens. Perhaps, the appointment of the CDS is a step in that direction.