MC EXCLUSIVE 'They recognise this is Kashmiri land': Shaksgam Valley and India’s legal case against China and diplomatic options

India asserts legal claim over Shaksgam Valley

Shaksgam Valley, located near Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), has once again emerged as a point of contention in India-China relations amid Chinese infrastructure development under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Srikanth Kondapalli, professor of Chinese studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, offers a detailed analysis of why India rejects Chinese claims on Shaksgam and the legal and diplomatic tools at New Delhi’s disposal.

India’s legal claim over Shaksgam

India’s claim to Shaksgam is rooted in the 1947 Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Kondapalli explains, “Pakistan does not have legal rights. In 1947-48, China is not a member of the Security Council or even United Nations. China became a member in 1971. From 1945 to 71, Taiwan was a member. So when we look at the legal aspect, number one, China has no role. China never provided any evidence that Kashmir belongs to them. Nor the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir merged Jammu and Kashmir into China.”

The subsequent 1963 Pakistan-China boundary agreement, under which Pakistan transferred Shaksgam and other valleys such as Agil, Shimshal, and Rukhshan to China, did not negate India’s legal claim. Kondapalli notes, “Article 6 of this agreement between the two countries says that we will reopen negotiations based on the status of Kashmir then. So they recognise that this is not part of Pakistan. They recognise that this is Kashmiri land, not Chinese land.”

He adds that India had protested the agreement at the time. He said, “The Nehru government protested. They said it is an illegal agreement because Pakistan as such has no right on Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir King had given that land to India as part of the Instrument of Accession. The Pakistani Rangers went and occupied those lands. That is illegal because the Maharaja did not give these lands to Pakistan.”

International law further supports India’s position. United Nations Security Council Resolution 48 mandated that Pakistani forces withdraw from occupied Kashmir before any plebiscite could occur. Kondapalli observes, “Article 2 of this resolution says that Pakistani military, the Rangers, should withdraw first. And then there will be a plebiscite, because Nehru himself called for a plebiscite. But they did not withdraw. So plebiscite was not held. Originally, this is not Pakistani territory. Pakistan constitution has no provision for this. The reason is that they have a special vote for this Gilgit-Baltistan Northern Area.”

Thus, legally, neither Pakistan nor China holds valid sovereignty over Shaksgam, and the 1963 agreement does not confer China with any permanent claim.

Diplomatic tools and countermeasures

While legal clarity exists, Kondapalli stresses the importance of leveraging diplomacy. “Diplomatically, India can protect. India can blacken the face of China by saying, you are saying that everybody should follow legal principles and UN Charter and so on, but you yourself are violating the legal principle. Instrument of accession is a legal principle in international law. So India can diplomatically raise this issue in every forum and say that China is violating legal principles,” he said.

He elaborates that India’s diplomatic strategy is non-violent but impactful, “This is non-violent. This is gradual, reformist. It may not yield quick results, but it blackens China’s altruistic position on legal claims. So tomorrow they cannot come to you and say, please follow one China policy. You have not followed one India policy. Why should I follow one China policy?”

According to Kondapalli, India has already begun raising objections to Chinese infrastructure and territorial claims in both national and international fora. This reinforces India’s moral and legal authority, ensuring that China cannot easily portray itself as a champion of international law while simultaneously violating the Instrument of Accession and UN resolutions.

“Jaiswal's (MEA spokesperson) comment the day before, this is the first time that India is making noise on Shaksgam Valley. In 1963, we made, and on CPEC we made, but not on Shaksgam. In 1963 we made a noise on the Pakistani transfer of POK land to China, but there was no specific mention of Shaksgam. So, India is also raising this in national, international fora. So that takes the fizz out of China's position on legal claims,” said Kondapalli.

Strategic significance of the legal and diplomatic dispute

Kondapalli notes that while infrastructure projects such as the expansion of the Karakoram Highway and construction of “well-off society” settlements in POK raise strategic concerns, legal and diplomatic measures remain a key tool for India:

He said, “China’s infrastructure, which is dual-use, is increasing. They are having an underground defense network. They are having access to the Karakoram highway, which is 40 meters wide now. Forty meters wide means even aircraft can land… These are generally resided by ex-servicemen. And they have provision for school, health centers, and others, which means the Communist Party, and the state, and the military will be part of these hundred households.”

By asserting its legal position internationally, India can constrain China’s ability to normalise these territorial claims. Kondapalli explains, “If China claims Shaksgam as its own territory, and that's a public statement, now they have to reinforce with nationalism. Core interest means a war is possible if the other side does something. So they will take it up to the core interest. That way it complicates the matter.”

India’s legal and diplomatic leverage thus not only reinforces its claims over Shaksgam but also provides a peaceful, internationally recognised mechanism to challenge Chinese expansionism and assert sovereignty over disputed areas.