What improving border infrastructure says about India's Deterrence Posture

Having reviewed the broad border infrastructure development plan, it is worth adding an advisory.

The recent landing by a C-130J Super Hercules special ops aircraft at Kargil airfield, the first by night by any fixed wing aeroplane, brought back memories of my first touchdown in that beautiful though rugged vale – but that was in a Chetak helicopter, way back in 1978. For a helicopter it is pretty simple but when one considers the topography around Kargil airfield, the C-130J landing is noteworthy considering that it was done using night vision devices on a short airstrip (with a one-way approach only) surrounded by high hills and the LoC nearby.

The 24x7 activation of Kargil airfield is a continuation of the Government of India’s border infrastructure development plan – irrespective of the political dispensation in power. The aviation infrastructure build-up was commenced around 2008 under the Prime Minister’s North East Development programme. An Empowered Committee under the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, with members from MoD, MoD (finance), Engineer-in-Chief branch of Army HQ and the Aviation Secretary of Arunachal Pradesh was tasked to formulate the plans. Included for development were airfields at Pasighat, Tuting, Zero, Mechuka et al.

With China flexing its muscle in a more aggressive manner the government focussed on additional airfields situated all along our northern frontier – some greenfield ones like Itanagar and others that involved modernising the already existing rudimentary strips. Project Udan, which provides regional connectivity through development of air connectivity, has helped with some airports being modernised in the North East.

We have had the activation of the kuccha strips at Daulat Beg Oldie (at 17,000 feet) and Nyoma (at 13,000ft) in Ladakh and a semi-prepared one at Dharasu in Uttarakhand. The development of Nyoma to house fighter aircraft has started, and that would add to enhanced power projection for the IAF.

The proof of the pudding, as it were, of the increase in rapid deployment capability was announced clearly by the landing of a C-17 Very Heavy Transport Aircraft (VHETAC) at Tuting in Arunachal, close to the China border. While all these are data, what is it that they convey to the discerning strategic observer? There are three pointers.

First, it is no state secret that the road infrastructure in the northern borders was neglected for many decades after Independence. Thus, the connect to the outlying areas, and Army posts, was either by weeks-long treks, with loads being carried by mules or by air drops done by IAF’s transport and helicopter fleets. The coming of age of the Chinese economy in the 1990s, its rapid expansion of infrastructure with highways and radial road connections and railway lines proliferating in the Tibetan plateau gave a massive fillip to the rapid deployment capability of PLA. While ostensibly made for “peaceful” purposes, it went against a basic geopolitical axiom – “capability takes time to build but intentions can change overnight.” India had to be prepared.

Second, the “messaging game” plays a major role in geopolitics. China had to be conveyed a message after the coercive intent of its expansionist plan became clear with its activities in the South China and East China Seas, the Sea of Japan, construction of off-shore bases like in Gwadar in Pakistan, Djibouti, Myanmar and Cambodia and its Belt and Road Initiative; nearer home it was at Doklam, Galwan, Pangong Tso and Eastern Ladakh.

The message was that New Delhi would not back down from confronting Chinese hard power with a similar capability that would be brought to bear if the balloon went up – and that was done by accelerating infrastructure development, especially roads and airfields in the past two decades.

Third, in a kinetic engagement with an adversary, the civil populace forms the bulwark for the armed forces to fight on the frontlines. For long, there was a certain disconnect between the populace in the border areas and the hinterland due to lack of communications; thus, the government’s drive to improve surface connectivity and develop the telecommunication network became important cogs to augment national security.

What more needs to be done? According to media reports, there are still areas where Chinese cell phone coverage is better than our own – this is a matter that needs urgent attention as the emotional connect cannot be allowed to be diluted by Beijing’s psy warfare. And even as this is being done, there cannot be any substitute for good roads that afford all-weather and year-round surface connectivity – air maintenance is an economically unviable proposition to maintain outlying army posts and civilian populace.

Having flown extensively in the Ladakh sector, this writer is so gratified to know of many programmes that have been accelerated. To name one – the project to connect the DBO sector with a road over Saser pass. I remember doing an aerial recce in a Chetak helicopter with an officer of the Border Roads Organisation for the alignment of this road – sometime in 1979-80!

Having reviewed the broad border infrastructure development plan, it is worth adding an advisory. As these roads, bridges and airfields get developed, they become lucrative targets for the adversary. With development of air and ground launched precision weapons and coming of age of armed drones, it is imperative that their security from these threats be analysed and dovetailed in the IAF’s and Army’s defence plans. One is sure, nay confident, that this is being done.