Operation Rakshak, 1990s: How the counter-insurgency grid in Kashmir was built

What often gets missed in strategic discussions is how much of Operation Rakshak’s effectiveness came from battalion-level improvisation.

• Operation Rakshak formed a strong counter-insurgency grid in 1990s Kashmir.
• Battalion adaptation and intelligence were crucial to its success.
• Rashtriya Rifles enhanced counter-insurgency with continuity and local expertise.

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When large-scale militancy erupted in Jammu and Kashmir at the turn of the 1990s, the Indian Army did not walk into a textbook counter-insurgency. It walked into an intelligence vacuum, collapsing civil authority, mass intimidation of civilians, and a fast-mutating militant ecosystem backed by training camps across the Line of Control. Operation Rakshak, launched in 1990, became the Army’s principal framework for restoring control. What made it decisive over time was not a single doctrine or operation, but the gradual creation of a dense counter-insurgency grid — and the ability of battalions to adapt faster than the insurgents they were fighting.

From breakdown to deployment

By early 1990, the Kashmir Valley was witnessing targeted assassinations, intimidation of minorities, enforced shutdowns, and open calls for secession. The local police and civil administration were overwhelmed. With Governor’s Rule imposed, the Army was inducted in large numbers, initially to stabilise the situation and secure vital installations.

Unlike earlier internal security deployments, this was not a short-term aid-to-civil-authority task. Militancy was already organised, armed, and externally supported. Reports in The Hindu and Indian Express from the period describe how Pakistan-backed groups exploited porous mountain routes, local sympathisers, and fear to dominate entire pockets of the Valley.

Operation Rakshak thus began without illusions of quick resolution. What it lacked initially, however, was a granular operational template for sustained counter-insurgency in dense population centres combined with high-altitude terrain.

The birth of the counter-insurgency grid

The most consequential innovation under Operation Rakshak was the counter-insurgency grid — a layered system of area domination, intelligence collection, and quick reaction.

Instead of chasing militants reactively across large swathes, the Army divided areas into company and platoon responsibility zones. Each unit was tasked with knowing its area intimately: villages, foot tracks, orchards, rivers, seasonal movement patterns, and local power brokers. Over time, this created persistent presence rather than episodic sweeps.

The grid also linked Army units with the Jammu and Kashmir Police and, later, specialised forces like the Rashtriya Rifles. This integration was critical. Militants could evade columns, but evading an overlapping mesh of pickets, patrols, informants and checkpoints became far harder.

By the mid-1990s, this grid had extended from the Valley to the Pir Panjal belt and parts of Jammu, adapting to terrain and threat profiles.

Battalion-level learning curves

What often gets missed in strategic discussions is how much of Operation Rakshak’s effectiveness came from battalion-level improvisation.

Early on, battalions trained for conventional warfare found their instincts ill-suited to narrow lanes, civilian crowds, and intelligence-led operations. Casualties mounted, sometimes due to predictable movement patterns or over-reliance on cordon-and-search operations that tipped off targets.

Units began to adapt. Patrol timings were varied. Small teams replaced large columns. Night domination increased. Ambushes were laid not just on known routes, but on patterns identified through weeks of observation. Officers and junior leaders were encouraged to build local intelligence networks rather than rely solely on higher headquarters inputs.

These adaptations were not centrally scripted. They spread laterally, as units rotated and officers carried lessons from one sector to another.

Intelligence: From absence to advantage

In the early years, intelligence failures plagued operations. Militants often melted away minutes before cordons closed in. This was not always due to leaks; it was because intelligence structures were underdeveloped and fear silenced potential sources.

Over time, battalions realised that intelligence was not something to be “received” but built. Dedicated intelligence cells were strengthened at unit level. Relationships with village elders, shopkeepers, transporters, and former militants were cultivated patiently. Rewards were less important than trust and predictability.

By the late 1990s, many units could map militant movement corridors with surprising accuracy. The Print and Indian Express have since documented how this intelligence maturation shifted the balance, allowing forces to conduct targeted operations instead of large-scale dragnets that alienated civilians.

The role of Rashtriya Rifles

The raising and expansion of the Rashtriya Rifles marked a structural turning point. Unlike regular infantry battalions rotated in and out, Rashtriya Rifles units were designed for sustained counter-insurgency.

They brought continuity — officers and men spending years in the same region, building deep familiarity with terrain and society. This permanence reduced the learning lag that plagued early rotations and allowed institutional memory to accumulate at ground level.

Importantly, Rashtriya Rifles also refined joint operations with local police, recognising that arrests, prosecutions, and long-term stability required civilian law-enforcement involvement.

Population control versus population confidence

One of the hardest balances under Operation Rakshak was between domination and legitimacy.

Initial years saw heavy-handed measures driven by urgency and fear of losing control. Over time, commanders understood that excessive force could be tactically successful but strategically damaging. The grid had to protect civilians as much as it constrained militants.

Gradually, civic action programmes, medical camps, and support to local infrastructure became routine adjuncts to operations. While critics rightly debate their sufficiency, these efforts reflected a recognition that counter-insurgency outcomes are shaped as much by civilian perception as by body counts.

Cross-border dynamics and infiltration control

Militancy in Kashmir was never purely local. Training, weapons, and leadership flowed across the Line of Control. Operation Rakshak therefore evolved alongside strengthened counter-infiltration measures.

Battalions deployed along infiltration routes adapted to mountain warfare conditions — ambushes in snowbound passes, long-duration surveillance, and coordination with artillery and air assets when required. These measures did not end infiltration, but they raised costs and reduced success rates.

By the late 1990s, this pressure contributed to the attrition of experienced militant cadres, forcing frequent replenishment and lowering overall operational effectiveness.

Casualties, fatigue, and institutional resilience

The 1990s were costly. Soldiers operated under constant threat, often among civilians, with little margin for error. Casualties accumulated quietly, without the clarity of conventional battles.

Yet the Army’s institutional response — revised training syllabi, emphasis on junior leadership, and codification of counter-insurgency lessons — ensured that experience was not lost. By the end of the decade, India possessed one of the world’s most experienced counter-insurgency forces, forged not in theory but in sustained practice.

What Operation Rakshak ultimately demonstrated

Operation Rakshak did not deliver a dramatic victory moment. Its success lay in grinding down an insurgency through persistence, adaptation, and organisational learning.

It showed that counter-insurgency is won at platoon and company levels long before it appears in strategic assessments. That intelligence is built locally, not delivered magically. That force without legitimacy exhausts itself. And that institutional humility — the willingness to change tactics mid-fight — matters as much as firepower.

Three decades later, many of the Army’s standard counter-insurgency practices trace their lineage to those years in Kashmir. The grid, refined and adjusted, remains relevant wherever state authority must be restored without destroying the society it seeks to protect.

Operation Rakshak was not neat, fast, or clean. But it reshaped how India fights internal conflicts — and why battalion-level thinking still shapes strategic outcomes.