Saudi-Iran pact: China takes a bow as mediator but the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry will persist

Wang Yi, (centre) a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, Ali Shamkhani, (right) the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and Minister of State and national security adviser of Saudi Arabia Musaad bin Mohammed Al Aiban (left) pose for pictures during a meeting in Beijing, China March 10, 2023. (Image credit: Reuters)

The China-brokered thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Beijing on Friday has all the exciting and intriguing features of realpolitik. It was played out on a low key. The Sunni Saudis and Shi’ite Iranians were represented by security officials, who were high but not high enough in the political hierarchy of their respective countries.

Saudi Arabia’s national security adviser Musaed bin Mohammed al-Aiban and Iran’s secretary to the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani signed a tripartite agreement along with China’s Wang Yi, the former foreign minister who is now politically elevated in the Communist Party and in the government. The talks were held secretly for five days from March 6 to March 10.

Saudi-Iran: Differences Galore

The announcement was limited in nature: restoration of diplomatic relations, setting up of embassies and exchange of ambassadors. This is to be achieved by the foreign ministers of the two countries in a time-frame of less than two months. The joint statement issued by the three acknowledged the role played by Oman and Iraq in hosting talks between Riyadh and Tehran.

So, it is not a surprise as the Friday announcement seemed to be. It was being worked out. And it made sense that the two big countries in West Asia/Middle East should be sorting out their issues because despite their differing worldviews and economic strengths and international influence, and on these three accounts Iran is seen as a formidable player, the issue on which they broke their diplomatic ties in 2016 was an embarrassingly small one in strategic terms.

Saudi Arabia had executed a Shia cleric and protestors in Iran stormed the Saudi diplomatic offices in Tehran. The two governments should have handled it with greater restraint. If it had been over major differences, and there are quite many between the two, including Iran’s support for Houthi rebels in Yemen, for the Hezbollah faction in Lebanon, its backing of Bashar al-Asad government in Syria, and the barely-concealed role Tehran plays in supporting the Shi’ite political parties in Iraq. Israel and the US oppose Hezbollah and Assad vehemently, and the US has been working unsuccessfully for a regime change in Damascus.

On Talking Terms, But

Saudi Arabia and Iran would continue to be rivals in West Asia because Saudi Arabia considers itself the leader of the Arab countries in the Gulf and in North Africa because of the prestige it enjoys as home of Islam’s sacred places, Makka and Madina, apart from its economic clout derived from the largest oil resources in the world.

Iran’s claims to leadership is based on its sophisticated Islamic past as an intellectual leader and its strategic location, bordering the Arabian/Persian Gulf on its southern flank and the Central Asian republics and Russia in the north. However, neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran are the undisputed leaders in the region.

The 22-country Arab League is quite fractious and they pull in different directions. Iran is big but not big enough to lead a hypothetical Islamic bloc because of the sheer diversity of the Muslims countries spread from Malaysia and Indonesia in south-east Asia, Bangladesh and Pakistan in south Asia, and Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in north Africa.

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is a loose association without political and strategic power. The OIC does not have the cohesion of either the European Union (EU) or that of NATO.

Tripartite Power Rivalry

The regional scenario is complicated by the presence of Israel, and the American strategic and economic interests in the Gulf countries. The Americans have brought Israel into the Gulf Arab orbit through what is known as Abrahamic Accords, as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain set up diplomatic relations with Israel.

Arab and Muslim countries have been united by an instinctive opposition to Israel, which is still seen as an intruder in the Arab world in the form of the Jewish state. Saudi Arabia is not part of the Arab-Israeli détente. Iran, ever since the 1979 Khomeini revolution, has set itself up as the ideological opponent of the Jewish state.

The thaw effected in Beijing between Saudi Arabia and Iran will not change much the strategic and ideological tensions in the region though Saudi Arabia and Israel are opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme because they suspect that it will lead to Tehran getting an atomic bomb, which would be a security threat to Israel and Iran’s claims to be a leader in the region will grow hugely.

China’s New Role 

What has come as a surprise is the mediatory role played by China. This is the first time it has ever taken upon itself the onerous task, which has usually been performed by the big and small countries of Europe and by the Big Brother in international politics, the United States.

The world’s focus has been on the tightening of power in the hands of Xi Jinping, who has got an unprecedented third term as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and as president of the country and as the chairman of the Central Military Commission. And what kept the China-watchers busy was the economic blues of the second largest economy with its decelerated growth rate.

The Americans have already played down the significance of the Beijing agreement. But they too know that Xi’s China is redefining its role in international affairs, and it is of far greater significance than Mao’s China.

Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr is a New Delhi-based journalist. Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.