Why Pakistan sees PM Narendra Modi as 'bad news'

Prime Minister Narendra Modi turned 75 today. (Image: Reuters)

Since Narendra Modi took office in 2014, India’s engagement with Pakistan has seen a paradigm shift compared to the UPA days. In the last decade or so, India has gone from sporadic back-channel diplomacy with Pakistan to open, deterrence-driven confrontation. India's muscular foreign policy approach to Pakistan under Modi has found little acceptance in Islamabad's power corridors - be it the civilian government or the powerful military establishment. While Pakistan craves for a more dialogue-driven and diplomatic Indian leadership, PM Modi has adopted a tit-for-tat approach on terror that leaves little room for diplomacy.

Here's a look at how India under Modi has shifted to a hawkish new doctrine of retaliation vis-a-vis Pakistan:

Why Islamabad dislikes Modi: Policy over personality

Pakistan's concern over Modi being at helm of affairs stems from India's gloves-off policy on terror. Modi government has repeatedly maintained that “talks and terror” cannot coexist, and New Delhi has been quicker to use visible, punitive measures against cross-border terror infrastructure. That reduces the scope for quiet diplomacy and tactical deniability that Islamabad previously relied on. The post-Pahalgam attack retaliation by India, covered extensively by Moneycontrol, signals that India's new approach now exacts a higher toll on Pakistan — both financial and human.

Modi’s red lines: Terror, trade, Kashmir

At the heart of Modi’s policy lies a set of uncompromising conditions. Following Operation Sindoor in May 2025, launched in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack, Modi declared: “Any talks on Pakistan, if ever, can only be held on terror or on the return of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.” He has repeatedly stressed, “Terror and talks can’t go together, terror and trade can’t go together, blood and water can’t go together.”

Moreover, India's decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) further rattled Pakistan, evoking strong statements from ministers across the border.

Such actions and statements underline why Islamabad views Modi’s tenure as harmful to its own interests. By shutting the door on engagement without demonstrable action against terror networks, New Delhi has limited Pakistan’s diplomatic manoeuvring room.

The doctrinal shift

Earlier governments, from Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s outreach to elements of the UPA era, allowed for episodic engagement and back-channel management of crises. Modi’s tenure, by contrast, has been marked by overt, public military actions. The 2016 “surgical strikes” after Uri and the 2019 Balakot airstrike after Pulwama set the tone for India’s response each time terror would rear its ugly head.

The surgical-strikes are described as a turning point in India’s counterterror doctrine. It was reinforced in 2019 when India launched Balakot airstrikes deep inside Pakistan. More recently, during Operation Sindoor, India dismantled terror infrastructure at nine different locations in Pakistan as well as PoK. During the hostilities that followed, India struck strategic airbases across Pakistan, which proved to be the turning point of the conflcit.

The strongman rhetoric

On the one hand, Modi has given Indian forces a free hand to confront cross-border terrorism; on the other, he has employed evocative, symbolism-laden remarks to stir national sentiment and instill a sense of pride.

For instance, during a rally in Rajasthan after Operation Sindoor, he declared: “Jo sindoor mitane nikle the, unhe mitti mein milaya hai (Those who tried to wipe Sindoor have been turned into dust).”

In another statement, he warned that “no nuclear blackmail will be tolerated anymore.” Such remarks are designed to resonate domestically while signalling internationally that India has little patience for Pakistan’s traditional mix of diplomacy and deterrence.

26/11 and the lasting mistrust

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of 2008 remain a national trauma in India and a persistent political weapon across parties to demand accountability from Pakistan. The Modi government's approach to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is often contrasted with India's response to the Mumbai attacks under the Congress rule.

The Congress-led UPA government faced sharp criticism for its handling of the incident with critics pointing to the slow response of security forces, lack of preparedness despite prior intelligence warnings and the absence of a clear counter-terror doctrine. The decision to avoid strong retaliatory action against Pakistan-based terror outfits was seen as a sign of hesitation and weakness, allowing Islamabad to deny involvement and escape immediate consequences.

Pakistan pushback

Leaders across the political spectrum in Pakistan view Modi as harmful to Islamabad's interest. And fittingly so. Former Pakistani minister Fawad Chaudhry said that “every Pakistani wants Modi to lose the elections", capturing the prevailing sentiment vis-a-vis PM Modi. On multiple other occasions, leading Pakistani politicians — such as former foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto and sitting MPs — have harshly criticised Modi, sometimes suggesting that his departure would be positive for India-Pakistan relations. More recently, former Pakistan cricketer Shahid Afridi praised Congress MP Rahul Gandhi for his "dialogue-driven approach and positive mindset".

It is to be noted that Modi himself has promoted stronger people-to-people ties between India and Pakistan. He invited former Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif to his oath ceremony in 2014 and made a surprise stopover to Lahore in 2015. He also advised Imran Khan after the latter became the Prime Minister to work together to fight poverty in the region. However, the repeated cross-border terror activities has eroded the sense of trust and become a catalyst for India's hardline approach against its neighbour.

Timeline: Flashpoints that shaped India–Pakistan ties (2006–2025)

2006–2008: Back-channel talks during UPA years stall after the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, traced to Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives in Pakistan.

2016: Uri attack kills 19 Indian soldiers; India responds with “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control.

2019: Pulwama suicide bombing kills 40 CRPF personnel; India carries out Balakot airstrikes on terror camps inside Pakistan.

2025: Operation Sindoor launched after the Pahalgam terror attack; Modi reiterates “no talks without action on terror and PoK.”

Strategic and political implications

For Pakistan, the Modi years have translated into higher costs for escalation, shrinking avenues for backchannel diplomacy and a tougher rhetoric that echoes strongly on global platforms. Islamabad’s occasional warmth toward India’s opposition parties has little to do with ideological affinity and far more with its need to preserve some room for negotiation.

On the question of dialogue, Pakistan’s Finance Minister Ishaq Dar recently said: “We are not begging for anything. If any country wants dialogue, we are happy. … It takes two to tango. Unless India wishes to have dialogue, we cannot force it.” His remarks, made while ruling out third-party mediation, underlined that Pakistan sees the relationship as strictly bilateral and contingent on India’s willingness to engage.

Modi’s leadership, however, marks a clear doctrinal shift: visible retaliation, non-negotiable diplomatic red lines and symbolism-laden rhetoric that leave little space for compromise. For Islamabad, Modi is less the problem as a person and more the embodiment of a tougher Bharat.