Fraudster Tales: History’s Greatest Criminals and Their Catastrophic Crimes 

Vijay Narayan Govind is a finance professional, specialising in audit, fraud examination and information technology. Psychological aspects of white-collar crimes have always been an area of special interest. Presently, a senior partner in a leading assurance and tax services firm in India with global affiliations, Vijay also serves in many advisory capacities, including on the boards of major trade and industry bodies.

His earlier books include his debut novel Maze of Deceit (Bloomsbury India, 2018) and he self-published Follow the Wall (Notion Press, 2021), before publishing with Pan Macmillan India in 2024 this absolutely brilliant collection of profiles of prominent fraudsters through history called Fraudsters Tales: History's Greatest Criminals and Their Catastrophic Crimes.

Fraudsters Tales is a wonderful collection of profiles, told magnificently by Vijay Narayan Govind. He achieves the incredible balance between telling a gripping story whilst packing it with financial details of the crimes committed. Never does it seem dreary nor does a lay reader require a dictionary of economic terms to explain the crimes committed. The author flits comfortably between countries and different time periods to tell the stories. He has profiled an eclectic mix that includes William Chaloner, Hugh Cameron, Chia Treck Leng, Hegestratos, Jeanne de Valois, Kenneth Lay, Oscar Hartzell, Natwarlal, Charles Ponzi, Haridas Mundhra. Read the latter's profile that has been extracted here and you will want to read the entire book. It is excellent storytelling.

— Jaya Bhattacharji Rose

Haridas Mundhra The Great Investor

'Parliament must exercise vigilance and control over the biggest and most powerful financial institution it has created, the Life Insurance Corporation of India, whose misapplication of public funds we shall scrutinise today'

- FEROZE GANDHI, MP, during a speech in the Indian Parliament

From trader to tycoon

Haridas Mundhra, born as the eldest of three brothers into a small trading family in Calcutta (present-day Kolkata), showed little interest in academic studies. After completing basic education, he ventured into selling light bulbs. However, another prospect caught his attention early on.

In his spare time, young Mundhra would hurry off to the Lyons Range Building, home of the Calcutta Stock Exchange, and engross himself in the lively and intense dealings there.

Through these observations, he learnt the subtleties of share trading and decided to make it his profession. He helped small investors with their trades, receiving commissions for his services. All extra earnings went towards purchasing shares of his own. Although, these investments were generally made in smaller companies with low market prices. While he made reasonable gains on some of them, Mundhra knew this approach wouldn't get him far.

He realized that more than fundamentals, market sentiments often guided stock prices. Mundhra decided to exploit this factor to increase the value of his shares. He fabricated news about the companies he had invested in, touting access to confidential information. To his delight, the rumour-mill strategy was effective; other market traders and jobbers readily absorbed them, encouraging trades that suited Mundhra's plans. He also developed strategies to guide stock prices in desirable directions. Soon, his influence grew so impactful that his decisions began to shape the market.

Mundhra steadily moved on to larger investments and, systematically building his portfolio, emerged as one of the biggest players on the CSE. As he expanded his operations to other exchanges in the country, particularly the burgeoning Bombay Stock Exchange, he cemented his place among the wealthiest investors. As his wealth grew, so did his connections and social acceptability, which included politicians, bureaucrats and prominent businessmen. As significant amounts of money began to flow in regularly, Mundhra ventured into the tea export business through associates in England. Though unconfirmed, there were rumours that large investors like Bansilal Abhirchand of Nagpur and Vallabhswami, a renowned guru from Rajasthan, had decided to commit substantial sums (up to Rs 50 lakh) to him, seeing his business aptitude. Capitalizing on the events leading up to the Second World War, Mundhra made immense profits from this venture, which he opted to retain in Britain for potential future investments abroad.

Fuelled by his vast wealth, Mundhra set his sights on acquiring ownership in a few notable Indian companies. He picked up controlling stakes in some of the best-known companies of the time, such as F&C Osler (India) Ltd, the Indian arm of a reputable British lamp manufacturer, and the large engineering concerns Richardson and Cruddas Ltd and Jessop and Co Ltd. Mundhra also acquired substantial holdings in major tea companies like Assam Tea Company and Brahmaputra Tea Co. To avoid potential legal complications, he spread the ownership of the holdings among his wife and siblings.

Not just seeing himself as a prominent stock market player, but rather as a king of acquisitions, Mundhra aimed for the largest target to date: the British India Corporation (BIC). Established in the 1920s by Sir Alexander MacRobert, who had amalgamated the businesses run by five Englishmen out of Cawnpore (present-day Kanpur), BIC traditionally engaged in goods like boots and woollen blankets and had ventured into other activities, notably sugar production and project construction, which were in demand during the Second World War. Operated under a management agency system, the ongoing wars ensured BIC's good performance in most business segments. After Indian independence in 1947, operations declined, with certain businesses like steel and construction materials being hived off. However, due to its sizeable land holding, BIC was still considered one of the country's most valuable and prestigious groups.

In his quest to acquire BIC, Mundhra found himself in a bidding war with Ramkrishna Dalmia of the Dalmia Group, one of India's biggest industrialists, known for his acquisitive approach. Mundhra utilized every resource at his disposal, including buying out British shareholders with the overseas assets he'd cleverly accumulated to outbid Dalmia and gain control of BIC. Despite paying a premium price between Rs 10 and Rs 12 per share, when the market value of BIC shares hovered around Rs 6, Mundhra revelled in his victory. Continuing his acquisition spree, he seized control of another large managing agency operating several businesses, Turner Morrison and Co Ltd, cementing his status as one of India's leading industrialists.

Mundhra's astute takeover skills became well-known, with leading global magazines featuring him. To the business world, he was a self-made man who had climbed the ranks to join traditional, eminent Marwari houses like the Singhanias, Dalmias and even the Birlas. Naturally, he was also the subject of rumours, such as claims that he had received funding for his acquisitions from British entities, including an overseas insurance company, though none was proven. Mundhra designed layers of crossholdings within the ownership structure of his companies, all controlled by his managing agency, S. B. Industrial Development Company Ltd.

Though official reports from the period are scant, Mundhra's worth was estimated at around Rs 4 crore - a whopping empire by the economic standards of the era.

Whenever these developments threatened to invite regulatory attention, Mundhra managed to convince senior officials, including the finance secretary, Haribhai M. Patel, and the RBI governor, Sir Benegal Rama Rau, that there were no grounds for concern. Even the highest authorities, like Minister of Commerce and Industry T. T. Krishnamachari and Finance Minister H. D. Deshmukh were apprised of matters, and at some level, even Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru might have been briefed.

Manipulative trades

Trouble began to brew from unexpected quarters just when things were going smoothly. In business circles, most people thought that the union government would soon implement industry-friendly policies, encouraging private investments. Throughout his rampant acquisitions, Mundhra was banking on these favourable policy changes, which should have significantly boosted his share prices. But, contrary to expectations, many signals from Nehru's government appeared to be tilting towards a socialist model. To make things worse, major economic factors spurred the government toward this direction even faster.

In the aftermath of independence, many Indian businessmen had seized the opportunity to acquire industries formerly handled by Managing Agencies, a British-era corporate structure enabling a few owners to control multiple public companies, even with minor promoter holdings. However, many of these people were traditionally traders or moneylenders, with no experience in running large manufacturing entities. Consequently, they failed to see the need to spur organic growth and increase internal profitability. Instead, they expected new investments and large acquisitions to generate high returns from favourable share movements. With banks and financial institutions making funds more easily accessible, people had resorted to heavy borrowings for such investments. These trends did not auger well for the Indian industry and the country's economy, as many large factories and capital-intensive units began to fail. Banks and financial institutions were also facing the heat of increased loan defaults. All of this was threatening to increase unemployment significantly. The call to nationalize private enterprises, including banks and financial institutions, was growing louder, which the government and ruling party could not afford to ignore.

When the 1955 annual session of the Indian National Congress in Avadi passed a formal resolution signalling this direction, the message became even louder. It became clear that the government no longer favoured the erstwhile British practice of many companies being controlled under a common managing agency system and would soon introduce legislation to break this up. Predictably, the markets became jittery and stock prices fell.

Mundhra, however, knew that given the volatile nature of the markets, it would not take too long before they bounced back. But in the interim, the challenge was to ensure the large debts being used to finance the buyouts and investments were serviced on a regular basis. Unfortunately, when share prices remained low, it became impossible to liquidate the long-term positions. Many businessmen he had crossed paths with during his meteoric rise were watching like hawks to see him fail.

Mundhra decided the best course of action was to devise a strategy to address the immediate market situation. The primary issue with the market at that time was the low volume of trade. Investors and speculators were cautious, preferring to avoid risky positions during such uncertain times. Mundhra reasoned that an increase in the trading volumes of a few major companies would spark positivemarket sentiments, leading to an immediate market surge. He decided he would be the one to trigger this action.

Mundhra believed 'circular wash' trades would be the most effective option to jumpstart a price increase. Typically, these involve back-to-back deals for buying and selling the same number of shares at the same price, creating the illusion of high trading volumes. By executing such deals, Mundhra successfully reversed the declining market prices of his selected companies. Thereafter, he used a variety of strategies to capitalize on market sentiments, which included releasing stories about expansions and other profitable developments at these companies, which pushed up market prices even higher.

Given that prevailing stock exchange mechanisms were largely self-regulated, Mundhra used his knowledge of the systems to control both market volumes and prices. He planned the settlement of his transactions as well as the delivery of shares to suit his schemes, though he was always wary of delays and defaults. Deploying 'pump and dump' schemes, he would liquidate large positions in a flash when prices touched desired levels and buy back the same lots at the much lower prices his earlier selloffs triggered. 'Round-tripping' deals were used to create trading volumes by buying and selling the same shares repeatedly at predetermined prices. Through many such manipulative stunts, Mundhra kept the targeted stocks well under his control. However, with the shares held in his own companies, he employed a different tactic. Despite the fact that these were also venues for his market-fixing games, Mundhra chose not to dispose of any of these shares, mostly out of fear of losing control to wily competitors. Even when the prices of his company's shares shot up (as in the case of BIC shares, which rose sharply from Rs 5 to Rs 14 per share after his price manipulations), he could not bring himself to liquidate any part of his holding. So, as an alternative, Mundhra decided to pledge his shares as security to banks to raise loans against them.

The proposal he submitted to the banks was to sanction him loans based on the latest market value of these shares, after adjusting a margin to cover future fluctuations. Given the acceptance Mundhra commanded and his contacts at all levels, the requests were readily accepted by the banks he approached, including Punjab National Bank (prenationalization), which became one of his biggest financial supporters. Predictably, Mundhra ensured that through more market manipulations, his share prices remained at the target levels he had fixed based on his need for funds. For instance, for the largest holdings in British India Corporation, Mundhra had already set a target market rate of Rs 14, which would ensure that after the margin, the banks would grant him loans at a rate of Rs 11 per share.

The loans sanctioned were substantial, exceeding even the original cost of acquisition of these companies. But Mundhra also knew that these temporary adjustments could not go on forever, and the markets would correct themselves once they became genuinely bullish. His estimation was that this would happen soon.

Unfortunately, the overall economic picture remained gloomy, forcing the government to incessantly grapple with several major challenges. Many of these had significant financial ramifications, and stock markets remained subdued. In this scenario, Mundhra found it increasingly difficult to unwind many of the large market positions he had assumed. The only way to keep the ball rolling was by executing more such deals. And most of the recent deals became merely cover-ups for earlier ones.

Creating stocks

The tightening of funds became a major issue as Mundhra continued to create such large deals. Ensuring all outstanding deals were settled on time with counter-party brokers began to pose serious concerns, and small payment defaults started to creep in.

Mundhra tried several things to bring matters under control, but the biggest hurdle now was raising more funds to stay in the game. He no longer had any shares to offer the banks as security for new loans, and all other personal sources had dried up.

Things continued to spiral out of control, landing on the radars of regulators, with complaints being filed with the company law and foreign exchange authorities. When some of these cases reached the courts, Mundhra was heavily chastised by the irate judges and directed to regularize the positions within specified timelines.

Mundhra tried to remain unfazed and worked on all possible ways to stay afloat till the winds changed, but the challenges grew. Especially when he had virtually nothing left to pledge or play around with. This was when he decided to create shares of his own.

Mundhra forged share certificates with the help of a few trusted people to create exact replicas of the originals, which he then used as collateral to obtain additional loans from banks and institutions. He became so good at it that no one suspected anything. In fact, it was only once (in 1956) that the Bombay Stock Exchange raised queries about a few of his transactions, and Mundhra quickly allayed their fears.

No one knew he was piling up a massive debt with no assets at all, even as Mundhra continued to bank on a market revival before the bubble burst to repair everything.

However, some unexpected developments in New Delhi set the cat among the pigeons. The finance minister, C. D. Deshmukh, was an eminent civil servant who had served in many prominent roles, including as the first Indian governor of the Reserve Bank of India. He was widely regarded as one of the architects of major economic reforms in the country, including the formation of the State Bank of India (SBI) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). His abrupt decision to step down as finance minister in July 1956 over the proposed division of the Bombay State surprised the whole nation. The portfolio was handed over to the incumbent commerce and industry minister, Tiruvallur Thattai Krishnamachari (known as TTK), after Prime Minister Nehru held it for thirty-seven days.

Relationships between the Government of India and the RBI began to deteriorate soon after TTK took over as the finance minister. Following PM Nehru's strongly worded letter, the incumbent RBI governor, Benegal Rama Rau, also resigned, and a new governor, H. V. R. Iyengar, took over the central bank in March 1957.

Shortly after assuming office, the new RBI governor noticed that a large number of shares of companies were being held by banks under pledge. Even SBI, nationalized two years ago, was not immune. Inspections carried out had also raised suspicions of collusion by bank managers, especially at the Calcutta branches, in sanctioning these loans. For some reason, the matter was not pursued further at that time.

The new governor decided to order inquiries into all the loans granted by banks against the collateral of shares and learnt that such loans had skyrocketed from Rs 3.30 crore in 1956 to Rs 15.60 crore by mid-1957. It was also evident that many senior officials were parties to this, and all signs pointed to one person: Haridas Mundhra.

Shocked by the findings, RBI officials realized that the banking system of the country was now a ticking time bomb. But urgent actions that could force banks to hastily offload all the shares would also be detrimental. There was little doubt that it would create widespread panic, including the very real possibility of a major market crash that would be disastrous for the already troubled economy.

So, for the time being, RBI merely issued a directive that the banks ought to work out a repayment model with Mundhra, as per which shares held under the pledge could also be steadily released back to him.

But the banking industry took this unusual directive with a sense of foreboding and, citing regulatory insistence, pressed hard for repayments from Mundhra. Even those who had gone soft with him earlier (like PNB) suddenly insisted on an immediate settlement. Mundhra was also warned that they could not wait for too long, failing which forced liquidation of the shares under pledge would be the lone option.

Finding the heat suddenly raised on him, Mundhra could think of no way to arrange the large funds urgently needed in the current situation. It was soon clear that unless he did something unusual, the lenders would be constrained to find new buyers for his companies.

Surprising respite

Staring down an empty well, Mundhra decided the best option was to seek assistance from an influential person who could help and approached the business magnate G. D. Birla. However, the latter felt these issues were beyond his scope, advising Mundhra to directly approach the new finance minister. TTK was considered a businessman due to his experience running his own indenting agency, T. T. Krishnamachari & Co. (now TTK Group), in addition to his expertise in economics and finance.

Mundhra had met the minister a few times earlier when he was the commerce and industry minister. He had always found the man to take a pragmatic view of the difficulties of entrepreneurs and industrialists. TTK was also facing resistance to some of his new budget proposals, including the levy of a new expenditure tax, and Mundhra felt the minister would not want another controversy to erupt now.

Just as he hoped, the meeting proved to be very fruitful.

Mundhra was relieved to find that TTK was already aware of the major issues in the market and why he was unable to repay the large bank loans immediately. The minister also understood that if the banks pushed for a distress sale, it could have a significant impact on the already weak markets. So, after hearing Mundhra patiently, TTK assured his help.

But the decision thereafter surprised many people.

The Parliament had passed an Act nationalizing nearly 250 small insurance companies and societies to bring them under a common umbrella with effect from 1 September 1956, called the Life Insurance Corporation of India. It was conceived that LIC would work with the already nationalized SBI as a pillar for India's economic progress.

But TTK decided that LIC would buy all the shares held by banks under Mundhra's pledge and pay the market value as consideration to settle the bank loans.

The six entities identified for this buyout were Richardson Cruddas, Jessops & Company, Smith Stanistreet, Osler Lamps, Agnelo Brothers and the flagship British India Corporation. The consideration LIC would pay for the shares of these companies was determined to be a whopping sum of Rs 12,686,100, which would fully repay the loans Mundhra had availed from the banks.

All normal systems and procedures for making such a large investment, including the approval of the high-level investment committee of LIC, were ignored in taking this hasty decision. Well-wishers may have defended this move from the finance minister as a positive signal to the markets in order to trigger a bull rally and justify the prices paid by LIC. But the markets did not respond to the intervention as expected, and prices remained flat.

The unusual decision greatly perturbed the RBI Governor, H. V. R. Iyengar, who was not a party to it. His anxiety mounted when rumours began to float that many of the Mundhra company shares purchased by LIC could be fake, and he decided to order another confidential inquiry into the matter.

To his horror, the governor learnt that the shares purchased by LIC to settle the bank pledges were many times more than even the share capital of the companies, which was a clear signal that many of these scrips could not be real. Further inquiries confirmed the suspicion that many of the share certificates and transfer documents deposited by Mundhra as security with the banks were fraudulent and forged.

Governor Iyengar let the information be known, though confining it to select people at higher levels in the government and administration, as he realized it would be perilous to keep the lid on such a massive scam.

Based on this information, the government decided to initiate actions at multiple levels to try and reign in the damage. Management of all Mundhra companies involved in the scam was immediately brought under a court-controlled structure, and regulators including the RBI, the income tax department and the newly formed Department of Company Affairs stepped in to take charge. Investigations were also launched into the actions of institutions, including LIC, SBI and PNB in the matter.

Given the huge sensitivity, the message from the top echelons was that everything was to be handled with the utmost confidentiality and that the finance minister should be updated on all developments regularly. The government hoped at this stage to be able to quickly regain control over the situation and avoid any major economic fallout.

However, as matters progressed, it became evident that the implications of the scam would not be limited to the stock markets and financial institutions alone.

A major issue was that many of the factories and industries owned by Mundhra employed a large number of workers, and should the units be shut down, many people would be rendered jobless. The top brass watching these developments closely were also aware that this could be extremely difficult to handle with the trade unions and the political parties backing them. A major case in point was the textile mills in Uttar Pradesh under Mundhra's BIC management, which employed more than 25,000 workers. It was known that everyone, including the state's chief minister, was anxiously looking up to the union government to revive business operations and ensure that people would not lose their jobs.

Whether things could have been brought under control without anyone hearing about it, one will never know - for the news ultimately leaked out.

Ram Subhag Singh, a Member of Parliament, heard rumours about some suspicious transactions involving Mundhra. So he decided to mention the matter during the question hour in the Parliament. In his response, the finance minister admitted that the government, too, had heard these rumours, but he affirmed that the regulatory reviews and inspections had proved it all wrong.

This seemed perfectly satisfactory to the questioning member and to most others there. However, one MP present during the discussion suddenly realized that something seemed to be fishy.

Lawmaker strikes

Some say that the esteemed MP noticed the finance minister's legs shaking under the table while responding, which sparked his curiosity. Whatever the actual trigger was, the MP felt there might be a significant matter worth delving into and soon saw signs that his premonitions might be correct. In his inimitable style, he made sure to gather all pertinent facts and information before seeking to bring the issue back to the Parliament floor.

This MP was none other than Feroze Gandhi. Even as the prime minister's son-in-law, he was known for his fiercely independent stance if he found merit in an issue. Gandhi had a reputation for thorough study before presenting issues. Though generally of a gentle persona, his well-presented speeches could often make things very challenging for those targeted. Even senior members of the Treasury bench had encountered his wrath when, in 1955, he levelled strong allegations against misuse of public institutions for the benefit of certain prominent businessmen. He demonstrated how these organizations, including insurance companies, were exploited for illegal personal gains, such as for funding new acquisitions. This led to men like Ram Krishna Dalmia and Sachin Devkekar of the Times of India Group facing judicial reviews. They were later convicted and imprisoned. To a large extent, the nationalization of LIC was itself a fallout of the scam Feroz Gandhi brought to public attention.

So, when the MP questioned LIC's purchase of shares in the Mundhra-owned companies from banks, at least some people sensed trouble was on the horizon. Feroze Gandhi's Parliament-floor speech on 16 December 1957 is still considered an embodiment of autonomous, politically unaffiliated thought.

The best efforts of Finance Minister TTK and Finance Secretary H. M. Patel failed to address Gandhi's questions. Especially when the MP backed all his queries with further details, leaving many critical points unanswered. Aware he was losing ground, Mundhra resorted to various tactics, like frantic backdoor parleys with Parliament members, in hopes of influencing Feroze Gandhi to back off. But no effort prevailed.

The media latched on to the proceedings, putting everyone in the administrative machinery, up to Prime Minister Nehru, under pressure to explain why life insurance premiums collected from nearly 5.5 million policyholders in the trust of a government entity, had been so hastily redirected to futile investments in violation of prescribed protocols.

Left with few other choices, the government felt compelled to commission an independent judicial review. Honourable M. C. Chagla, the retired Chief Justice of the Bombay high court, was appointed to lead the commission in January 1958.

Marking independent India's first truly transparent scrutiny, the Chagla Commission initiated an investigation. Numerous individuals, including senior officials from the finance ministry, LIC and leading market operators, were summoned. Every hearing of the committee - spanning over twenty-four days - was open to the public and attracted large audiences. Feroze Gandhi also appeared in person to submit his findings. Members of the high-level LIC investment committee, bypassed in the investment decision, were summoned. They testified that if the matter had been presented to them, they would have objected to any dealings involving Haridas Mundhra, as he was already facing share forgery charges from the BSE.

The commission rejected the arguments of the finance secretary, who suggested that Mundhra could dump these shares in the markets out of fear, leading to a massive collapse. Finally, it was ruled that LIC had been deliberately defrauded in making these investments.

Patel, together with the LIC Chairman G. R. Kamat and Managing Director L. S. Vaidyanathan, were identified as the main perpetrators. Even though the finance minister was not explicitly implicated, strong comments emphasizing his involvement were made, as seen in Justice Chagla's statement:

In my opinion, in any case, it is clear that constitutionally, the minister is responsible for the action taken by his secretary with regard to this transaction. It is clear that a minister must take the responsibility for actions done by his subordinates. He cannot take shelter behind them, nor can he disown their action.

Following the scathing remarks of the commission, T. T. Krishnamachari resigned as the finance minister in February 1958; however, Prime Minister Nehru, presumably upset at the downfall of a trusted colleague, wrote to comfort him: 'Despite the clear finding of the Commission so far as you are concerned, I am most convinced that your part in this matter was the smallest and that you did not even know what was done.'

The findings of the Chagla Commission were presented to the Parliament and adopted as a resolution in February 1958. Subsequently, the government appointed a three-member commission headed by Justice Vivian Bose as a Board of Enquiry in May 1958 to further examine the specific charges against the finance secretary and senior LIC officials.

The Vivian Bose Commission largely ratified the findings of the Chagla Commission, including the abuse of authority by the named senior officials. Interestingly, this commission went a step further, alleging that the government's actions to assist Mundhra through LIC seemed to be quid pro quo for two substantial donations Mundhra made before the share purchase: a sum of Rs 1.50 lakh donated to the Uttar Pradesh Congress and another Rs 1 lakh to the party's central fund.

Besides the monetary contributions, Mundhra had also promised to reopen the Kanpur Mills, which employed a significant workforce, since any closure could herald trouble for the party in the upcoming Uttar Pradesh elections.

The commission recommended the immediate removal of the finance secretary and retirement of the senior LIC officials involved in the scam.

However, when the Union Public Service Commission was directed to advise the government on suitable action against the erring officials, they chose to conduct their own assessment of the events. This analysis exonerated the finance secretary and managing director of LIC, while only 'censuring' the chairman. Despite formal dissent from one UPSC member (J. Sivashunmugam Pillai), the government quickly accepted this decision.

Haridas Mundhra was apprehended from his luxury suite at the Claridges Hotel in New Delhi. After a trial, he was sentenced to twenty-two years in prison.

Once the second term of the Congress-led government ended, TTK was re-elected to the Parliament in the 1962 elections. Nehru offered to reinstate him as a cabinet minister, though not in the finance portfolio. TTK accepted and served initially as a cabinet minister without any portfolio before he was appointed as the Minister for Economic and Defence Cooperation. In 1964, he was once again reappointed as the finance minister, a position he held for another two years until his retirement.

TTK passed away later in 1974, and Haridas Mundhra, the man who brought him down, passed away in 2018. LIC, the victim, carries on.

Vijaya Narayana Govind Fraudster Tales: History's Greatest Criminals and Their Catastrophic Crimes. Pan, an imprint of PanMacmillan India, New Delhi, 2024. Pb. Pp. 290. Rs. 499