Three messages from Washington leave Europe guessing about the alliance

Three messages from Washington leave Europe guessing about the alliance

Over the past year, European leaders have heard three very different explanations of how the Trump administration sees America’s alliance with Europe. Each message points in roughly the same direction — less automatic American protection — but the tone and reasoning have shifted dramatically.

The result, after this year’s Munich Security Conference, is confusion.

From scolding to shared heritage

Last year, Vice President JD Vance stunned the same Munich audience with a confrontational speech. He argued that Europe’s real threat was not Russia but its own political choices, particularly immigration and restrictions on far-right parties. His framing cast NATO less as a community of shared purpose and more as an arrangement Europeans were taking for granted.

This year, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a softer version of a similar theme. Instead of chastising Europe, he spoke about shared civilizational roots — Christian faith, common history, cultural heritage. He warned of “civilizational erasure” if borders were not controlled and presented the United States and Europe as heirs to a common Western legacy.

The tone was warmer. The reception was better. Rubio received applause. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called his speech reassuring.

But beneath the rhetoric, the message still raised eyebrows, the New York Times reported. Rubio spoke far more about defending Western civilization than about Russia’s war in Ukraine. Some European officials privately described his framing as ideological, even exclusionary, particularly given Europe’s diverse populations.

Interests over values

Then came a third message, delivered by Elbridge Colby, the under-secretary of defence for policy. Colby set aside talk of heritage and values and argued for a more transactional approach.

Alliances, he said, should rest on shared interests, not sentiment. Europe would increasingly need to shoulder the burden of its own conventional defence, especially as the United States focuses more on China. America’s nuclear umbrella would remain central, but Europe should not expect the same level of military presence indefinitely.

For many Europeans, Colby’s realism was easier to digest. It was blunt, but it sounded like familiar strategic logic rather than a cultural manifesto.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz put it plainly in his opening remarks: “The culture wars of the MAGA movement are not ours.”

A widening gap in expectations

European governments have already committed to higher defence spending through 2035. They know that if US support weakens significantly, they would need to replicate American military capabilities — a process that could take a decade or more and cost far more than current increases.

What unsettles them is not just the demand for more spending. It is the unpredictability of Washington’s rationale.

Is the alliance about shared democratic values? About defending a particular Western identity? Or simply about strategic interests that may shift?

Rubio’s itinerary after Munich also drew attention. He travelled to Slovakia and Hungary, both governed by populist leaders sceptical of the European Union and more accommodating toward Russia. For some analysts, that signalled that Washington may be willing to engage selectively with governments that align ideologically, even if they diverge from broader European consensus.

Europe’s dilemma

The uncertainty leaves Europe in an awkward position. Leaders publicly emphasise unity and the durability of NATO. Privately, many admit they are unsure which version of America they are dealing with.

Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist, summed up the mood bluntly: Europeans oscillate between thinking they can manage without the United States and feeling relief when Washington appears steady again.

The deeper worry is not higher military budgets. It is the sense that US foreign policy has become more openly ideological — and more willing to wade into Europe’s domestic debates.

Russia’s war in Ukraine makes the stakes immediate. Europe remains heavily dependent on American military capabilities, particularly in intelligence and nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the alliance now seems less anchored in shared assumptions.

By the end of the conference, one thing was clear: Europe heard three American speeches, but it still does not know which one truly defines the relationship.

For an alliance built on predictability, that ambiguity may be the most destabilizing message of all.