Pakistan’s 27th Amendment puts European market access at risk: Why EU must reassess GSP+

File photo of Pakistani Army Chief General Syed Asim Munir (2L) interacting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a meeting in Rawalpindi.

The passage of Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment marks a decisive and troubling shift in the country’s political architecture. What has long functioned informally now stands codified in law. The military no longer merely influences civilian governance from the shadows; it has been formally positioned at the heart of the state, weakening democratic institutions and placing Pakistan on a direct collision course with the expectations tied to its GSP+ status with the European Union.

This amendment is not an ordinary constitutional tweak. It represents a systemic consolidation of power in the hands of the military establishment. By elevating the armed forces to a constitutionally dominant position and limiting judicial independence, Pakistan has signalled that civilian supremacy is no longer central to its governance model. The principle of democratic accountability, already fragile, has been further hollowed out.

This development carries serious implications for Pakistan’s relationship with the European Union. The GSP+ scheme offers preferential access to European markets as a reward for compliance with 27 international conventions that cover human rights, labour standards, environmental protections and good governance. These are not symbolic obligations. They form the backbone of the agreement. When a state begins restructuring itself around military authority, it fundamentally contradicts the democratic governance requirements of the scheme.

Pakistan’s legal framework has now moved closer to formalising military oversight over both the executive and judicial processes. The sidelining of the Supreme Court, the expansion of military jurisdiction and the enhanced role for uniformed leadership in strategic decision-making all weaken the separation of powers. This erosion of institutional balance undermines any credible claim that Pakistan remains aligned with the core values of GSP+.

The timing is particularly revealing. Over the past few years, concerns over Pakistan’s democratic backsliding have grown steadily. The European Union repeatedly raised objections to the use of military courts for trying civilians following protests in May 2023. Despite these warnings, the Pakistani military proceeded with trials and convictions. This disregard for EU concerns set the stage for the constitutional amendment that now entrenches militarised governance even deeper.

Human rights groups have long documented a grim pattern in Pakistan. Enforced disappearances, suppression of dissent, intimidation of journalists and the use of security agencies to silence critics have become routine. These practices did not emerge overnight. They gained momentum during the Musharraf era and have since evolved into a permanent feature of the state’s apparatus. The new amendment only legitimises what was previously carried out through coercion and informal dominance.

Economically, Pakistan has benefited enormously from GSP+. Its exports to Europe rose from $2.9 billion in 2014 to $5.5 billion in 2024, largely fuelled by the textile sector enjoying duty-free access. Yet this economic windfall has not translated into democratic strengthening. Instead, Pakistan’s military expenditure surged during the same period, rising from $7.6 billion to $12.7 billion. The logic is unmistakable. Resources have been channelled toward reinforcing the military rather than strengthening legal institutions or protecting civil liberties.

This presents the European Union with a credibility test. If the EU continues to extend GSP+ benefits while Pakistan dismantles democratic safeguards, it risks turning the scheme into a hollow arrangement. It would signal that trade privileges can be retained even when the foundational standards tied to them are openly violated. That outcome would weaken the moral and institutional authority of the entire framework.

Pakistan’s leadership may argue that the amendment is meant to stabilise governance or streamline decision-making. But stability rooted in authoritarianism is not compatible with democratic obligations. When constitutional reforms place unelected institutions above elected authority, the democratic contract between citizen and state is broken. The military, already powerful, now enjoys structural dominance that is nearly immune to civilian oversight.

This shift also carries regional implications. A Pakistan whose military wields unchecked constitutional power raises concerns beyond its borders. Strategic decisions become less transparent and more insulation shields them from public scrutiny. For neighbouring countries, especially India, this reduces predictability and increases the risk of escalation driven by institutional impunity.

The core issue is not merely legal but moral. GSP+ was designed as an incentive structure that aligned economic advantage with ethical governance. Pakistan appears intent on enjoying the economic fruits while abandoning the ethical commitments. That imbalance cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged if the EU wishes to preserve the credibility of its trade governance model.

Preferential trade is not a permanent entitlement. It is a conditional arrangement grounded in mutual responsibility. Pakistan’s trajectory under the 27th Amendment indicates a state moving away from accountability and toward institutionalised authoritarianism. That direction stands in open conflict with the very principles it pledged to uphold.

If the EU continues business as usual, it sends a message that democracy is negotiable when commercial interests are involved. If it reassesses Pakistan’s GSP+ status, it reinforces the integrity of its values-based trade model. The choice, while politically sensitive, is conceptually clear.

Pakistan’s latest constitutional shift may be presented domestically as reform, but internationally it reads as regression. It reflects a system that is increasingly comfortable with the erosion of civilian authority and the normalisation of military control. For partners who once placed faith in Pakistan’s democratic evolution, this should serve as a moment of reckoning rather than quiet accommodation.

In the long run, sustainable stability cannot emerge from structures that silence dissent and bypass accountability. Pakistan’s future, as well as its standing in the global order, will ultimately depend on whether it chooses democratic renewal or entrenched military dominance. For now, the message from this amendment is unmistakable, and deeply unsettling.