Why China’s support to Myanmar’s Arakan Army is bad for India

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Myanmar’s concern over Chinese support to certain insurgent outfits which was articulated to a Russian state media recently is a cause of great concern for India. Among the groups that have been named by Myanmar’s Army Chief Min Aung Hlaing is Arakan Army, which is active in the country’s Chin and Rakhine states bordering Mizoram. A fierce battle has been on for the past several months in the region between the rebels and government forces with both sides suffering reverses.

The Arakan Army was founded in 2009 as the military wing of the United League of Arakan with the objective to secure ‘The Rakhita Way’ — the right of self-determination for the people of Arakan who are perceived to suffer from Myanmarese colonial rule and safeguarding their identify and cultural heritage. It was originally trained by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and currently part of the seven-member Northern Alliance. Over the past six years, the Arakan Army has steadily expanded its operations to cover most towns in the northern zone of Rakhine state.

The Arakan Army’s Beijing connection is well established and the chances are high that it would assume the same role as the United Wa State Army in Myanmar’s Shan state, which is believed to be China’s proxy. It has been China’s policy to promote rebel groups in Myanmar as a ‘carrot and stick’ policy to fulfil its strategic objectives including the vital Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the country to gain access to the Indian Ocean. A strengthened Arakan Army, on the other hand, could have adverse implications for India in many aspects.

The future of the multi-crore Kaladan Multi-Model Transit Transport Project could be rendered more uncertain with the ongoing disturbance in Chin and Rakhine states. In November, the outfit abducted five Indian employees working on the project. While four of them were released, one died in rebel custody. A month later, the Arakan Army announced that the Indian government would have to negotiate and pay ‘taxes’ to continue its flagship connectivity project considered a key element of India’s Act East Policy. Given such obstructions, it will be difficult to go ahead and complete the project in the near future.

The project will connect with Sittwe in Myanmar, but China may not prefer a formidable Indian presence in the region. Sittwe is not far from the deep seaport of Kyaukphyu that is integral to the BRI. This would mean that the plan to link the Northeast with Myanmar would have to undergo a major change, and the only option for the time being would be through Manipur’s Moreh which would eventually link up with the trilateral highway in Myanmar.

Since the Galwan Valley faceoff with China’s PLA in eastern Ladakh, some separatist rebel outfits in India’s Northeast, such as the anti-talks faction of ULFA, have become active although their immediate objectives are unclear. ULFA has compiled pro-China videos and sources revealed that its chief of staff Paresh Baruah is making serious efforts at reviving the outfit.

These groups are in need of safer locations to establish camps and training facilities after Tatmadaw’s (Myanmar military) raids early last year at Taga, in north western Hukwang Valley. The possibility of the Arakan Army allowing ULFA and the other rebel groups to establish a presence in its territory cannot be ruled out. This region will certainly not be advantageous for the groups given the long distance and terrain, but they can survive for a few more years. Already, there are rumours suggesting the presence and activities of some Manipur groups in Chin and Rakhine states.

A formidable presence of the Arakan Army could also lead to an increase in the flow of synthetic drugs into India and Bangladesh. There is speculation that the outfit is engaged in the illicit trade in narcotics and the profits diverted to sustain the armed campaign. The trend in the last couple of years in India’s Northeast would point to the inescapable conclusion that the region has emerged as the corridor of drugs. This is evidenced from the seizures made by the Border Security Force (BSF) at regular intervals, even during the lockdown, most of which are in Dhubri and Cooch Behar along the India- Bangladesh border.