Why chances are brighter for an all-inclusive Naga accord

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The ongoing parleys in the national capital on the Naga peace process have spawned conflicting indications over the past couple of weeks. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (I-M) has been reiterating its demand for a separate flag and constitution. At the same time, media reports quoted it as saying that the talks are in the final stage. That a team of the outfit headed by its chairman Q Tuccu is camping in Delhi for the talks, coupled with the government’s recent decision to exclude interlocutor RN Ravi are indications that both parties are keen to explore all options to reach a middle ground for the agreement.

A couple of months ago, the impression gained ground that the government would ink the agreement with the rest of Naga National Political Groups (NNPG) who are willing to continue the negotiation on the flag and constitution in the post-accord phase. The government changed its mind and is keen to include all the groups in an agreement that is widely accepted in the Naga inhabited region in the Northeast.

The Naga region in the Northeast is a vital cog in the government’s plan to link the region to Myanmar and South East Asia that is aimed at developing the zone as a commercial hub. It has assumed greater significance with the uncertainty over the multi-crore Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Transit Project in Mizoram due to the conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin states. Another route through Champhai that has been earmarked to connect with Myanmar may take many years before it is completed.

The government is armed with reports of the NSCN(IM)’s increased presence in certain areas of Myanmar’s Sagaing Division. The uncertainty over the outcome of the talks had reportedly prompted the outfit to transfer a large chunk of its armoury to secured locations beyond the reach of the Indian security forces. Incidentally, the NSCN(IM) has the largest number of trained cadre and most sophisticated arsenal among all the rebel groups in the Northeast.

It is extremely doubtful whether the NSCN(IM) would be able to engage in an armed conflict against the government in a manner it did in the 1980s and 90s, but it still has the resources to create trouble in the region. Its network spans across four states in the Northeast and the Tankhul inhabited zone in Myanmar. There is speculation as well that some senior functionaries of the outfit are in China.

These developments could be an incentive for China to foment disturbances in the region although its links with the rebel groups have been very covert and selective in the past two decades. The NSCN(IM) has denied links with China, but the fact remains that a Chinese intelligence agency had issued instructions to some groups such as the anti-talks ULFA faction years ago to explore the possibility of a coalition of all the separatist groups — a move which did not materialise.

Certainly, the government would like to avoid more unrest in the Northeast at a time when the pandemic shows no signs of declining, the economy in turmoil and the border row with China yet to defuse. An all-inclusive accord with the Nagas could give the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) cause to celebrate.

On the other hand, the NSCN(IM) knows that it has been marginalised in Nagaland and it no longer enjoys the clout it did a decade ago. The Nagaland Gaon Bura Federation had issued a statement expressing its disenchantment with the outfit’s rigid stance on the talks. The issues raised by the outfit have wide support, but there is also a desperate yearning for peace and an end to the extortion by the rebel groups. This is where the NSCN(IM) had erred in gauging the situation in Nagaland in the post-ceasefire phase after 1997.

There are allegations by Naga residents in Dimapur that the outfit’s functionaries turn a blind eye to the criminal activities in the town in lieu of taxes. Moreover, its general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah is not growing younger, and it could be a difficult task to keep the organisation united in his absence. There is hardly any doubt that the extortion regime would be uprooted and the designated camps dismantled in the post-accord phase even if the NSCN(IM) were to be excluded.

The NSCN(IM) knows that very well, which explains why it wants to be part of an agreement that does not appear to be dishonourable.

Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a Guwahati-based senior journalist. Views are personal.