OPINION | The Golaknath case and the evolution of the Basic Structure doctrine

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After the commencement of the Constitution, most of the Supreme Court’s major constitutional cases revolved around one central question: the scope and sanctity of Fundamental Rights.

Time and again, the Court was called upon to decide whether Parliament and the political executive possessed unfettered power to legislate and amend the Constitution, even if such amendments curtailed or diluted Fundamental Rights.

In many landmark cases, the issue of Fundamental Rights became inseparably linked with a deeper constitutional question: can Parliament, through its amending power, abridge or take away the very rights that the Constitution guarantees?

Background to the Golaknath case

One of the most significant decisions in this long constitutional struggle was I.C. Golaknath & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1967), decided on this day by an eleven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court. The judgment marked a defining moment in the evolving balance of power between Parliament and the judiciary.

The Golaknath case proved to be a crucial precursor to a far more transformative judicial innovation — the Basic Structure doctrine, through which the Supreme Court ultimately asserted its role as the final interpreter and guardian of the Constitution.

The case was centred on the Golaknath family, who challenged the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, a law that imposed ceilings on landholdings to facilitate redistribution. What began as a dispute over land reform soon transformed into a defining confrontation over the scope of Parliament’s amending power and the sanctity of Fundamental Rights

The petitioners challenged the validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, contending that it violated their Fundamental Rights, particularly:

* Article 19(1)(f): the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property,

* Article 19(1)(g): the right to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, and

* Article 14: the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.

They further challenged the validity of the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment, which had placed the Punjab Act in the Ninth Schedule, thereby seeking to immunise it from judicial review. The petitioners also questioned the constitutional validity of the First and Fourth Amendments, which had earlier curtailed property rights and expanded Parliament’s power to protect land reform laws from being struck down.

Thus, what began as a property rights dispute evolved into a far-reaching constitutional confrontation: could Parliament amend Fundamental Rights at all?

The verdict and its rationale

In a narrow 6:5 majority, the Supreme Court bench led by the then Chief Justice of India (CJI) K Subba Rao delivered a historic ruling. The Court held that constitutional amendments enacted under Article 368 are subject to Article 13(2).

In other words, Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a manner that abridges or takes away Fundamental Rights — any such amendment would be void. The dissenting judges, however, favoured a more flexible and expansive interpretation of Parliament’s amending power.

Though later modified by subsequent judgments, Golaknath proved to be a decisive precursor to the ‘Basic Structure’ doctrine articulated in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).

Austin’s interpretation of events pertaining to Golaknath

The constitutional historian Granville Austin, in his magnum opus ‘Working a Democratic Constitution’, offers deep insight into how this case unfolded and how it reflected the growing institutional tension between Parliament and the judiciary.

Austin writes that in a remarkable twist, the most significant element of the case constitutionally would prove to be not the majority decision, but the introduction in the hearings by the Golaknath’s advocates, principally M. K. Nambiar, of the 'basic structure' concept.

“Argument of fear”

What Austin writes while explaining Chief Justice Rao’s rationale behind limiting the amending power of the government is both deeply perceptive and illuminating.

He writes: “Five-judge benches in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh had upheld Parliament's power to amend the Fundamental Rights. Subba Rao expressed his primary motivation in what came to be called the argument of fear'. For him, many of the freedoms in the Fundamental Rights had been taken away or abridged since 1950. He characterised the continuance in force of the national emergency of 1962, with its suspension of Fundamental Rights Articles 14,19,21, and 22—as ‘constitutional despotism'. Commenting on an earlier Supreme Court decision that corporations were not legal 'citizens' and therefore were not protected by the Rights, he said that citizens have 'practically no right to property against legislative action ....Subba Rao feared future damage to the Rights: without Nehru, the 'brute majority', a term he had been heard to use outside the Court, might change the quality of one-party rule. Believing that a constitution is to be worked 'and not to be destroyed', Subba Rao wanted to bring the government under greater judicial scrutiny, according to senior advocates familiar with his thinking. It was in this vein that he reversed the precedents in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh—which, it will be recalled, upheld Parliament's authority to amend the constitution, including the Fundamental Rights. Justice Hidayatullah shared some of Subba Rao's fears. 'I am apprehensive that the erosion of the right to property may be practised against other Fundamental Rights,' he said. 'Small inroads lead to larger inroads. Justice Wanchoo, on the other hand, found the 'argument of fear' a political argument, not a legal argument.”

Prospective overruling

According to Austin Justice Subba Rao was fully conscious that the majority view would unsettle seventeen years of constitutional practice, cast doubt on at least three constitutional amendments, and potentially invalidate dozens of state laws protected under the Ninth Schedule. Striking all of them down at once, he feared, would create a constitutional “chaotic situation.”

To avoid such disruption, he adopted a course of calibrated judicial restraint through the doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’. Existing amendments and laws were allowed to stand, relying on earlier precedents. However, from the date of the judgment onward, Parliament would have no power to amend Part III of the Constitution in a manner that abridges or takes away Fundamental Rights.

Allegations of political bias

At the outset, the protection of Fundamental Rights appeared to be Subba Rao’s overriding concern. His reasoning in the judgment was presented as a principled effort to preserve constitutional supremacy and shield liberties from majoritarian excess.

However, subsequent events led critics to cast aspersions on his motives. The controversy deepened when he resigned from the post of CJI on 11 April 1967 to contest the presidential election. His decision after delivering such a politically charged judgment intensified suspicions among opponents, who alleged that the ruling was aligned with propertied interests. Support for his candidacy from the Swatantra Party only reinforced that narrative in the eyes of critics, even though such claims remained contested and politically coloured.

Journey from Golaknath to Basic Structure

Following the Golaknath judgment, arguably the most consequential decision in India’s constitutional history came in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. Decided by an unprecedented thirteen-judge Bench, the case marked a constitutional watershed.

In the Golaknath judgment, the Court had held that Fundamental Rights enjoyed a “transcendental and immutable” status and that Parliament could not amend them. However, in the Kesavananda Bharati judgment, the Supreme Court overruled that position and held that Parliament does indeed possess the power under Article 368 to amend any part of the Constitution — including Fundamental Rights.

Yet, while affirming Parliament’s wide amending power, the Court introduced a profound limitation: the Basic Structure doctrine. According to this principle, although Parliament may amend the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy its “basic structure” — the fundamental framework and essential features that give the Constitution its identity.

This formulation produced a subtle but powerful shift. On the surface, Parliament’s amending authority was restored and consolidated. But in substance, the judiciary entrenched its role as the ultimate constitutional sentinel. From 24 April 1973 onward, the Supreme Court asserted the authority to review and strike down not only ordinary legislation but even constitutional amendments if they were found to violate the Constitution’s basic structure.

In effect, what Subba Rao had attempted directly in Golaknath, the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati achieved through a more nuanced and enduring constitutional device.

(Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.)