Invisibilising Taiwan

To counter China’s influence, Taiwan has to expand its diplomatic outreach.

As Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te marks a year in office, his foreign policy agenda faces vital challenges. Two main events from the past few weeks – the rejection of the island’s allyship bid (for observer status) at the World Health Assembly (WHA), and the downgrading of the status of Taiwan’s representative office in Pretoria, South Africa – shed light on a shrinking diplomatic space for Taiwan. They also provide the global community with an opportunity to consider options for keeping the island’s international relevance intact.

Another Year, Another Failed WHA Bid

The 78th World Health Assembly opened in Geneva on May 19, 2025, and continued deliberations on important global health matters till May 27. However, despite Taiwan’s repeated applications to the World Health Organisation for securing an observer status at the WHA, the island has been denied involvement. It is obvious that China’s political and diplomatic wrangling is gaining ground, even as Taiwan’s mighty unofficial and smaller unofficial partners, including the US, the EU, Belize, and Saint Lucia, all supported its bid. Although, the US’s support was not evident in Health Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s speech at the Assembly on May 22, primarily because it was focused on reasons why the US will be vacating its WHO seat.

Taiwan was a WHA observer between 2009 and 2016. However, since 2016, its presidents have been elected from the pan-green Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Ideologically, the DPP is more sovereignty-minded than its primary opposition, the Kuomintang (KMT), which desires dialogue over deterrence with China.

From 2009-16, Taiwan’s President was KMT leader Ma Ying-Jeou, who made prominent economic and political overtures to China, and to date, continues to  publicly instruct KMT cadres to seek cooperation with the mainland. In July 2024, for example, in an interview with Malaysian newspaper Sin Chew Daily, Ma said that the KMT stands firm on its pro-unification stance, and believes President Lai Ching-te of the DPP to be “naive.”

Taiwan’s Centers for Disease Control is at the forefront of epidemic prevention, and demonstrated capability and prowess in testing, tracking, and isolating the masses during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Even in 2020, when the world was fighting the Pandemic, the WHA created hurdles for Taiwan to gain data and cooperate in global mitigation efforts. Data published by the Taiwanese foreign ministry indicated that from 2009 to 2019, Taiwan applied to attend 187 WHO technical meetings, but was invited to only 57 – a rejection rate of 70%. Further, it indicated that while Taiwan shared pandemic data and best practices with the WHO under International Health Regulations (IHR), the WHA did not share any lessons learned from the island to other parts of the world, rejecting the channel’s amplification value.

Where the Opportunity Lies

The WHO has cited its resolution WHA25.1, titled ‘Representation of China in the World Health Organization’, as the reason why it cannot invite Taiwan to participate in the WHA. As a specialised agency of the United Nations, the resolution text has drawn heavily from the contents of UN General Assembly Res. 2758 of 1971, titled ‘Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations’. Just like 2758, WHA25.1 also exploits the flawed idea that the granting of the UN’s China seat to the People’s Republic is co-terminous with Taiwan losing international representation. This interpretation continues to act as an obstacle to Taiwan’s WHA bid, even as both resolutions only expelled Chiang Kai-Shek government’s representatives from the UN and the WHO, without commenting on the island’s representation under future governments.

In this regard, the international community must critique the legal loophole that is evident in the language of WHA25.1, and make bids to the WHO to amend relevant provisions allowing Taiwan an observer status in the organisation. Due to its multilateral nature, the WHO cannot be allowed to base this decision on political factors, given that legal and technical precedent indicates that Taiwan can indeed be an observer to the WHA (as it was between 2009-16).

Fighting Deep Pockets with Resolve

Lai Ching-te’s second diplomatic challenge is his shrinking diplomatic base due to official partners either being poached by China, or unofficial partners downgrading the status of the relationship further. His predecessor, Tsai Ing-Wen, also leading the DPP, lost 10 of Taiwan’s official allies in her 8-year-long tenure, as they switched recognition to China.

Now, an important partner – South Africa – has threatened to forcefully relocate Taiwan’s liaison office from the administrative capital city of Pretoria to Johannesburg. Not only that, it has also downgraded its status to a ‘Commercial Office’, acting as an ‘international organisation’ operating out of the country. The office has a huge foreign policy task, which is to not only revitalise relations with South Africa, but also conduct diplomacy with as many as 17 other African nations, including Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Even though Taipei has lodged protests with South Africa, and is determined to undertake negotiations on the name-changing and relocation, it seems unlikely that the decision would be reversed. This is especially considering that if one looks at the sentiment expressed by South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the aftermath of the FOCAC Summit in September 2024, it is clear that the South African government is interested in leveraging Beijing's economic might to attract investment and firm operations. He even uses Xi Jinping’s language to applaud the elevation of the two countries’ relationship to an “All-Round Strategic Cooperative Partnership in a New Era.” Ramaphosa’s government, too, has used UNGA Res. 2758 as a shield for its decision, despite the fact that the Resolution does not determine Taiwan’s status or ability to enter into international relations.

Conclusion

For now, Taiwan’s relocation is stalled due to “budgetary concerns.” Moving forward, Lai’s administration has an important endeavour to undertake – challenging Chinese investments in smaller, Global South countries, and building robust unofficial relationships through multiple representative offices. For this, Taipei may need to expand the strength of its diplomatic personnel, and enhance foreign policy operations to build representative offices in cities across a particular country. Even if one office is downgraded or shut down due to Chinese pressure, others can continue operating.