India’s Foreign Policy – will it become a pawn to a whittled down mandate?

What will be the contours of the foreign policy and the headwinds.

What was expected to be a stupendous election victory, third in a row, for Prime Minister Narendra Modi has turned into a nasty surprise for his party and his supporters in India. While he is still in pole position to cobble together a coalition, he will be hobbled by not just a strong opposition, but also coalition partners who will try and impose their own agendas, including on his foreign policy in the region and beyond. The results will certainly enthuse the legions of his detractors in the West, and India’s more inimical neighbours like China and Pakistan. The resignation and uneasiness, perhaps even some trepidation, among his deprecators in the neighbourhood after the exit polls would certainly be replaced by elation after the results which have cut Mr Modi to size. But considering he will remain Prime Minister, what will be the contours of his foreign policy and the headwinds he will have to confront.

Modi’s Foreign Policy

If the last ten years of Mr Modi are anything to go by, his foreign policy template is very clear. For one, he will continue to seek closer relations with the West, but without surrendering India’s strategic autonomy - this will become a little more difficult given that his mandate has whittled down considerably. There will be a lot more pressure to relax the funding of NGOs (many of them suspected to be conversion factories and engaging in subversive narrative building). For another, he will continue to double down on his ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy with neighbours like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and even Myanmar. Despite the occasional irritants, provocations and even hate campaigns, the Modi government is likely to follow a pragmatic and patient approach. It will provide whatever diplomatic, political and economic assistance it can, but will expect that India’s core security interests are not violated. But regional players could play spoiler in moving relations along - for instance on water issue with Bangladesh, or the unrest in Myanmar.

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Ties with China and Pakistan

The two difficult relationships in the neighbourhood that are likely to remain problematic for Modi 3.0 will be China and Pakistan. Both these “Iron Brothers” would have ideally liked to see Modi’s back and a more accommodative, less assertive, government assume office in New Delhi. But both also seemed reconciled that they will have to deal with Modi for another five years. While China viewed Modi’s continuation with a degree of equanimity, the same wasn’t the case in Pakistan. This is also because the way Modi 2.0 dealt with both adversaries was very different.

With China, despite the Galwan clash in 2020, the continuing military stand-off in Eastern Ladakh, barring the Chinese from India’s critical infrastructure and efforts to attract companies exiting China, India remained diplomatically engaged with China and didn’t sever economic relations. At the same time, India shed some of its earlier hesitations on diplomatic realignments to balance China - QUAD - and also supplied missiles to countries like Philippines.

In the case of Pakistan, relations reached their nadir after the Balakote bombing in February 2019 and the constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir in August of the same year. Although the Pakistanis downgraded diplomatic relations and severed all trade, the establishments of both countries kept lines of communication open. There was also a back channel that was operating which agreed to restore the ceasefire along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in February 2021.  But on the political, diplomatic and economic level there was a complete disengagement - virtually no trade, downgraded diplomatic relations, extremely limited travel between the two countries.

What’s the Future Policy Plan?

Going forward, there are some hints available from the interviews and speeches Modi gave on the campaign trail. While he didn’t talk much on China, he did mention the importance of ties with China but underscored the need to address the military stand-off along the Line of Actual Control to put aside the abnormality in the bilateral relations. This is something that External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar has also said on numerous occasions. India isnt going to back down from this demand. But Mr Modi’s space for manoeuvre will be limited if he has to do any kind of a deal on the LAC issue. There are also questions over whether he will be able to put in place policy measures to take decoupling from China forward and attract foreign companies to invest big time in India.

In the case of Pakistan, there will of course be a sigh of relief that Mr Modi will not be able to fiddle with secularism and will be forced to roll back some of the steps - Universal Civil Code - he was contemplating. The verdict in Kashmir where a separatist leaning candidate has won, and Punjab where two Khalistani-leaning candidates have romped home will be seen by Pakistanis as an opportunity to stir the pot in both border states. Already there are reports of China and Pakistan working in tandem to advance the Khalistan narrative in Punjab. There could also be pressure on the government to restart some trade with Pakistan and some re-engagement. Pakistanis will of course be able to rest easy on two things: one, the talk of re-taking Pakistan occupied Kashmir will remain a campaign rhetoric, and two, the government will have to restore statehood in Jammu and Kashmir which means room will open up for separatists to operate in the state once again.

But the thing about slim majorities and coalitions is that it constricts their space and forces them to respond very aggressively to any serious border violation or terrorist provocation. Pakistan knows that Modi isn’t one to turn the other cheek. Question is whether they will test him or try to smoothen things out. The same will apply to China.