Poonch 1971: India’s defence that blunted Pakistan’s push

In the days before the war officially began, Pakistani troops increased patrols and artillery practice around Indian posts (Image: Defence ministry)

In 1971, Poonch was a tricky stretch of land that jutted into Pakistani territory like a small wedge. The area was surrounded by steep ridges, narrow approaches and very limited space to manoeuvre. This meant that whoever controlled the high ground controlled almost everything that happened below. For India, holding Poonch kept the route toward the Kashmir Valley protected. For Pakistan, capturing it would have straightened their defensive line and removed a difficult bulge that had existed since the fighting of 1947-48.

The terrain and its military effect

The battlefield here wasn’t open desert or rolling plains—it was sharp ridgelines, forested slopes and narrow mountain nullahs. Even a single ridge could dominate an entire approach. Among these, Nangi Tekri and the Danna–Bedori heights were especially important because they overlooked the southern and southwestern routes into Poonch. If Pakistan managed to take these, they could watch and target almost every Indian movement.

Pakistan’s operational aim

Pakistan’s western command wanted to squeeze the Poonch bulge and push Indian troops backward into a smaller pocket. Their plan was to grab the heights that overlooked Indian supply routes, weaken the outer defences and force either a withdrawal or a fractured Indian line. If they succeeded, they hoped it would give them at least one clear achievement on the western front while the main war raged in the east.

Preparatory actions before hostilities

In the days before the war officially began, Pakistani troops increased patrols and artillery practice around Indian posts. They were trying to map weaknesses, disrupt supplies and prepare for assaults on the slopes of Nangi Tekri and nearby ridges. The idea was simple: weaken the defences before the real attacks began.

Indian defensive posture

India had placed the defence of the sector under 93 Infantry Brigade, led by Brigadier KK Singh. His plan was straightforward—hold the heights at all costs and use artillery to block every likely approach route. Engineers improved the rough mule paths that kept forward posts supplied, ammunition dumps were dispersed and observation posts were placed on sharp edges so nothing would move without being seen.

Outbreak of war and initial attacks

When the war broke out on 3 December, Pakistan opened with heavy shelling across Indian forward positions. Soon after, they launched repeated night assaults on Nangi Tekri and nearby features. These attacks came in waves over several days, aiming to break the chain of defensive posts and grab the crest before India could reinforce it.

The fight for Nangi Tekri

Nangi Tekri quickly became the centre of the entire battle. Its top gave a clear view of Pakistani assembly areas and their approach routes. Pakistani infantry managed to get close more than once, but Indian fire—machine guns, mortars and artillery—pushed them back every time. Supplies had to be carried up by hand along exposed paths, but the posts never cracked, even under near-constant shelling.

Indian limited offensives to relieve pressure

To prevent Pakistan from building momentum, Indian commanders ordered small, focused attacks on nearby spurs. These operations around the Danna area pushed back Pakistani observation posts and disrupted their artillery adjustments. It forced Pakistan to split its attention, which took pressure off Nangi Tekri and the southern approaches into Poonch.

The role of air and artillery

Indian artillery played a crucial role. Guns had already been registered onto possible approach routes, so fire could be shifted within seconds. Many Pakistani assault groups were broken up before they could gather on the ledges. The Indian Air Force also struck suspected dumps and concentration areas in depth, which made Pakistani resupply in such rough terrain even harder.

Renewed Pakistani efforts before the ceasefire

Between 13 and 15 December, Pakistan made its biggest push, hoping to take something before diplomatic efforts shut the fighting down. These night attacks came on multiple routes and were supported by heavy shelling of Indian tracks. But without observation posts, and with narrow ridges limiting troop movement, the assaults couldn’t gain ground. Indian frontline positions held firm.

Status at the time of ceasefire

When the ceasefire began on 17 December, India still held every major feature around Poonch, including Nangi Tekri. A few small Indian gains from limited offensives also remained intact. Pakistan hadn’t captured anything that could threaten Indian supply lines, and the overall defensive layout remained stable and connected.

Operational results for India

For India, the outcome meant that the Poonch bulge stayed secure through the winter. It also demonstrated that rehearsed artillery plans, well-supplied posts and determined infantry could block repeated assaults even in very tough terrain. Holding Poonch also prevented Pakistan from claiming a political or symbolic win on the western front.

Operational results for Pakistan

Pakistan’s troops fought hard and returned again and again to the attack, but they were unable to concentrate enough force on the decisive heights. Without the ability to hold captured ledges under Indian artillery fire, and with the war’s timeline tightening, their chances of turning the situation around faded quickly.

Logistics and sustainment in mountain defence

Supplying troops in this terrain depended on mules, porters and hand-carried loads. Vehicles simply couldn’t reach most forward areas. Indian preparations—pre-stocking forward trenches, dispersing ammunition and improving tracks—meant that even when shelling was intense, posts never lacked essentials.

Command, control and coordination

Strong coordination between infantry positions and artillery proved vital. Forward observation officers helped shift fire instantly to newly seen movement. Pre-planned defensive fire tasks meant reactions were quick, leaving attackers little time to regroup on exposed slopes.

Tactical lessons from Nangi Tekri

The fighting showed that grabbing a crest isn’t enough—you need immediate reinforcement and protection from artillery, or you can’t hold it. For the defender, early warning, fixed fire lines and slightly offset observation posts gave a major advantage in the final metres of steep slopes where attackers are most vulnerable.

Implications for the wider western front

By holding Poonch, India prevented a morale-boosting success for Pakistan and avoided having to divert reinforcements from other sectors. With the eastern front moving toward a decisive end, Poonch staying stable helped India conclude the war without conceding ground in the west.

Comparison with earlier campaigns in the sector

Unlike the long siege of 1947-48, the 1971 battle was sharper, more focused and marked by better artillery-infantry coordination. Improved infrastructure and lessons learnt after 1965 also contributed to how strongly India could defend the heights this time.

Post-war control and line stability

After the ceasefire, the line stabilised almost exactly as it was before the fighting began. India continued to hold the heights that mattered most, keeping observation over key routes and making any future attempt to compress the bulge just as difficult as before.

Enduring military significance of Poonch

The 1971 battle reinforced a simple truth of Himalayan warfare: a few ridges decide everything. Artillery, observation and reliable logistics mattered more than manoeuvre, and the experience continues to shape how forces are deployed and supplied in similar terrain today.