What next for India-Israel ties after the recent visit of Knesset Speaker

The speaker of Israeli Knesset Amir Ohana meets Extarnal Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in Delhi. (Image source: Twitter/@AmirOhana)

The visit of Amir Ohana, Speaker of Israel’s Knesset (Parliament), to New Delhi and Mumbai from March 31 filled a curious gap, which existed in India-Israel relations since full diplomatic relations were established between the two countries 31 years ago in one of India’s historic foreign policy shifts since independence.

The visit’s curiosity was enhanced because it did not take place for over three decades: and when it did take place last week, India was the foreign destination of choice for Ohana after his election as Speaker. He emphasised before his embarkation from Jerusalem that “no sitting Knesset Speaker has ever visited India. I chose India as the destination for my first official visit as Speaker of the Knesset because I see the impressive development of this superpower in every respect.” Had Ohana not resorted to such hyperbole before arriving in New Delhi, his visit would have had a more credible start. India is not a superpower, not yet.

It is an aspiring superpower and is very likely to become one at some point in the current millennium. India is also a nation, whose people are easily prone to be pleased by sycophancy and fawning exaggerations by foreigners. Ohana’s hyperbole will very likely please the uninformed and the less informed in India. But it is wasted on those who are genuinely interested in expanding the contours of the bilateral relationship with Israel, which has exhibited remarkable dynamism since Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao upgraded it with his typical mix of subterfuge, vision and nuancing.

Resetting Relationships

Because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also prone to hyperbole, it is important that leaders of Israel must make up their minds on how they want to deal with India at this pivotal stage of building their bilateral relations. Israel, whose existence is contemporaneous with India’s own independence, has entered one of the most critical phases in its destiny. The Abraham Accords, which brought about a rapprochement between Israel and several Arab countries is slowing down. A potential accommodation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, midwifed by China, has thrown up the biggest diplomatic challenge for Israel in recent decades. India’s plurilateral engagement of Israel through fora such as I2U2 (India-Israel-United States of America-United Arab Emirates) will come under the shadows of such developments because, by the very nature of the Jewish state, it is impossible to insulate Israel from its global partners, especially the US and Israel’s neighbours in the Arab world.

Israel, therefore, has two choices in its dealings with India. One is to deepen its appeal to the Indian masses: only the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 80s has had a people-to-people relationship with Indians that is as extensive as Israel’s. For Tel Aviv, this is easier than expanding its relationship with the Indian state and its offshoots. It has rich experience in building an unbreakable accord with the American people. This supplements Israel’s ties with the organs of the US state, which are now under strain like seldom before. Israel can easily replicate its US experience in forging bridges with the Indian masses. A more difficult choice will be to weather the challenges cast on the bilateral engagement of India – in all its multiple avatars – by the increasingly unfavourable domestic and international situations facing leaders like Netanyahu and Ohana. The latter is Israel’s first openly gay Knesset speaker.

As Ohana went through the rituals of taking office last December, there were scenes in the Knesset, which sparked fears of homophobia against him. Israel’s new ruling coalition is the most far-right in its history. Opposition among some of its partners to LGBTQ+ rights was one of the many reasons, which brought normal life in Israel to a halt last fortnight in mass protests. Ohana has vowed to protect many aspects of Israel’s liberal way of life and the future of its diverse society depends on whether its people continue to receive such protection under the new coalition’s rule.

Healing Touch

In Mumbai, the Speaker had his mission cut out for him. Much more than in New Delhi. Ohana did all the right things, which endeared him immensely to those whose paths he crossed. He went to Nariman House, which has become a lasting symbol of how Mumbaikars and Israeli Jews have come to be bound by the horror of a Pakistan-inspired terrorist assault – commonly known as 26/11 because it occurred on the 26^th day of November – on the city 15 years ago. Ohana’s presence along with two other Knesset members at the site, which took heavy fatalities at that time, was timely: it happened as the events of 26/11 were beginning to slowly fade from public memory, which is notoriously short in a country as eventful as India.

Ohana played his politician’s part by furiously demanding that the perpetrators of 26/11 and their facilitators should be brought to justice. However, for a leading public figure from a theocratic state, the Speaker – along with his parliamentary delegation – brought a healing touch to an increasingly polarised India on religious lines.

On the sidelines of an event at Mumbai’s Keneseth Eliyahoo Synagogue, there was much talk that Jews and Muslims are both “people of the Book,” the common threads in their beliefs. Most surprising of all was how Tipu Sultan – who is under attack from the religious right in poll-bound Karnataka – was praised for pardoning a Jew who built a synagogue in his kingdom. Many Indian supporters of Israel do so assuming that it is all about Islamophobia. Israel’s problems are with Arabs, not with Muslims. It is important that their Speaker’s visit contributed to a better understanding within India of Jewish society and the Jewish diaspora.

KP Nayar has extensively covered West Asia and reported from Washington as a foreign correspondent for 15 years. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.