US’ cyber security strategy relegates Russian threat, makes China main target

There is a strong indication that the cyber threat posed by the Russian bear has been downgraded.

On 2nd April, styled as ‘Liberation Day’, US President Donald Trump did what he had long hinted at during his campaign in 2024 — reset the global economic order to stop the ‘ripping’ off the US by other countries.

Trump announced a universal 10 per cent tariff on all imported goods beginning 5th April in what has been called the most sweeping tariff hike by the US since the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Trump also announced ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on a number of countries, including allies such as Japan (24 per cent) and strategic partners such as India (26 per cent). The effective tariff on China is as high as 125 per cent, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal.

The markets have tanked not just in the US but also in Japan, India and elsewhere. Trillions of dollars have been wiped out in a few days. Naturally, therefore, Trump’s tariff war has dominated global headlines.

But the trade war has overshadowed another rewriting the Trump administration has been engaged in with significant implications for the global cyber landscape. For more than a decade, there was a continuity in the US on the cyber front despite there being three different presidents in power. But in just three months of Trump 2.0, the old ‘normal’ way of transacting in cyberspace is crumbling, altering how the US engages in cyber contestations.

Amid the chaos surrounding cyber operations targeting Russia and firing of the cyber czar, I argue that there are strong indications that Trump’s cyber endgame is to double down on cyber operations against China.

Downgrading the Russian cyber threat

In early March 2025, multiple news outlets reported that Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth had instructed the US Cyber Command to pause offensive cyber operations against Russia. The order reportedly did not apply to the civilian cyber organisation National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency or the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

But on 1st March, The Guardian broke a story on this issue, citing anonymous sources to claim that CISA analysts were ‘verbally informed that they were not to follow or report on Russian threats, even though this had previously been a main focus for the agency.’

Although the Pentagon and CISA have denied a change of a stance on Russia, Zi Yang in an article for The Diplomat has pointed out that major publications have stood by their stories. A more recent and detailed report by Reuters highlighted how the US has taken many steps to halt the work on the Russian cyber threat. Earlier, in February, the US had dismantled efforts to counter Russian disinformation campaigns and influence operations — which was a central pillar of the US approach to the global cyber landscape.

If there was any confusion about the US stance, it evaporated with the firing of the US cyber czar General Timothy D. Haugh. Before being fired, General Haugh was arguably the most powerful cyber official as the head of both US Cyber Command and the NSA.

General Haugh had played a key role in the US cyber operations against Russia during Trump 1.0. Far-right activist Laura Loomer calling into question General Haugh’s loyalty to Trump and asking for his removal have been cited as a reason for this move by the Trump administration.

When the above developments are seen together with Trump shifting overall policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Europe, there is a strong indication that the cyber threat posed by the Russian bear has been downgraded.

Trump’s endgame: Doubling down on combating the dragon

The US winding down offensive cyber operations against Russia should not be seen, however, as an indication of a general reluctance to engage in offensive operations. Few days before being sworn-in as the National Security Adviser in Trump 2.0, Mike Waltz had told Breitbart that the US may go on the offensive in the cyber domain to establish mutually assured destruction vis-a-vis actors such as China.

While the US has had a strategy of forward defense and persistent engagement for years, the current national security officials of Trump 2.0 may think it is not offensive enough, particularly against China.

If the choice of staffers in the National Security Council are any indication, the US may adopt a more aggressive posture. To make this possible, Trump may redirect the hitherto Russia-focused human resources in the Cyber Command and the NSA towards tackling the China threat. Unwillingness to intervene militarily in the impending Taiwan crisis, China not coming to the negotiating table over tariffs or China-based actors mounting a sophisticated cyberattack on a scale similar to that of Salt Typhoon are factors that can speed up the operationalisation of Trump’s endgame amid all the chaos — doubling down on offensive cyber operations against China.