Rage without Resolution: A year of disappointment for Bangladesh

With no end to protests and no election date in sight, Bangladesh stands at a dangerous political crossroads.

It has now been a year since the student-led July Uprising shook Bangladesh to its core, bringing an end to Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year reign. For many, this was not merely a political shift, but a “second liberation”—a hopeful new beginning for democracy. An interim government, spearheaded by Nobel Laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, was formed on 8 August 2024 following the dissolution of parliament. Tasked with restoring law and order, reforming the nation’s governance structure, and guiding Bangladesh towards a free and fair election, this interim government symbolised a breath of fresh air after years of alleged authoritarianism.

However, the reality that has unfolded since then has shattered the initial optimism. Far from ushering in stability, the nation has instead plunged deeper into political chaos, public discontent, and administrative disarray. Streets across Bangladesh remain overwhelmed by continuous protests—against both rising lawlessness and unpopular reforms. Public frustration, especially from workers and students who once hailed the change, has become louder and more visible. Political parties too have taken to the streets, demanding an immediate roadmap for national elections.

Interim government has compounded Bangladesh’s problems

This growing unrest is not due to external enemies or subversive plots, but primarily because of the interim government’s own inefficacy in fulfilling its promised role. Rather than paving the way for democratic consolidation, the government has instead sparked further polarisation.

Following Hasina’s fall, Bangladesh was left with a dangerous political vacuum. Citizens were desperate for safety, fearing further violence in the aftermath of the regime change. But rather than easing tensions, what followed was a wave of mob attacks targeting remnants of the old establishment and minority communities. Many feared Bangladesh could meet a fate similar to Afghanistan—where democratic ambitions were hijacked by radical elements. In a troubling sign, Islamist groups began emerging openly in public, demanding an Islamic state under a Caliphate system.

Cultural landmarks and institutions that represented Bangladesh’s secular identity became targets of vandalism. The violence didn’t stop in 2024—it has continued into 2025. Cases of rape, kidnapping, extortion, street crime, and politically motivated violence are rising, casting a dark shadow over the so-called “liberation”. Citizens no longer feel safe, not even in daylight. Despite public outcry, law enforcement agencies have shown either apathy or selective action. For many, the sense of insecurity is worse than before.

Yet, rather than taking responsibility, the interim authorities remain in denial. They paint an overly rosy picture of the situation, insisting that law and order is “under control”. However, official crime data tells a different story—with a significant spike in criminal activities within just ten months of the government taking office.

Moral policing and targeting minorities

One glaring example of their selective enforcement was “Operation Devil Hunt”—which was claimed to be a crackdown on criminals, but in practice, largely targeted opposition members and political dissenters. When questioned about violence against religious minorities, the authorities dismissed it as a “political matter”. In cases of moral policing, even senior officials have been found guilty of encouraging it—particularly the home advisor, who has refused to resign despite widespread public anger. The recent Mitford tragedy in Old Dhaka is a grim reminder of the deepening law and order crisis.

Amid this growing unrest, the government seems to have prioritised reforming state institutions over restoring peace. While reform is necessary, the manner and timing of these legislative changes have triggered backlash. Several controversial ordinances have been introduced—ranging from the Cyber Protection Ordinance to amendments to the International Crimes Tribunal, the Public Service Ordinance, and even plans to dissolve the National Board of Revenue (NBR). Civil society groups believe these measures threaten basic rights and freedoms. The public outcry has been immense.

Protests erupted across various sectors. Civil servants and bank workers took to the streets. The NBR protest became particularly intense, with protest leaders slapped with arbitrary “enforced retirement” and disciplinary action. Paramilitary forces, including the RAB, BGB, and SWAT units, were deployed at government buildings to stifle dissent. Despite this, the demands of these protestors remain unresolved. While the Public Service Ordinance saw partial revision, other unpopular ordinances are still in force.

The government’s failure to address these grievances has led to paralysis across various institutions. Students, educators, RMG factory workers, and even former members of Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) have all voiced their dissatisfaction with no meaningful response. In effect, what was once a nation of hope has become a state of chaos.

A country at a dangerous political crossroads

The political implications of this failure are significant. Major political parties have now started questioning the interim government’s real intentions. Many believe the delay in announcing the election roadmap indicates a lack of will to hand over power. Despite repeated calls from political stakeholders—and even subtle nudges from the Army chief—the interim regime has yet to provide a clear timeline. Debates over whether polls should be held in February or April continue, with no confirmation, adding fuel to already rising public distrust. Security forces’ inability to prevent incidents like the Gopalganj attack has further tarnished the interim government’s image. The promise of a smooth transition to democracy seems more distant than ever. What was once hailed as a historic change in July 2024 has, by July 2025, descended into frustration, anger, and repeated protests.

In conclusion, while the July Uprising removed an entrenched regime, the aftermath has revealed deeper, structural problems. The interim government, instead of unifying the country and ensuring peace, has largely contributed to the national discontent. With no end to protests and no election date in sight, Bangladesh stands at a dangerous political crossroads. Today, the narrative of “liberation” rings hollow for many. What was once envisioned as a fresh start has now become a prolonged period of unrest. The people of Bangladesh, who fought bravely for change, now find themselves trapped in a cycle of unresolved grievances, unkept promises, and an uncertain future.