OPINION | Pakistan’s Taliban miscalculation 

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The collapse of Turkey- and Qatar-mediated talks between the Taliban and Pakistan, purportedly lasting 18 hours in Istanbul, demonstrates definitive estrangement. Despite reports of a potential resumption in negotiations, Pakistan Information Minister Attaullah Tarar publicly accused the Taliban delegation of using “deflection and ruses” and dismissed the outcome of a “workable solution.”

This failure is not an isolated incident; contrarily, it can be characterised as an inevitable outcome of Pakistan’s miscalculation.

The Pakistani state believed that its proxy, once in power, would remain subservient. However, the Taliban’s takeover in 2021 transformed an insurgency in need of sanctuary to a ruling administration providing it. At the core of this conflict, remains a non-negotiable sticking point - the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The rapid deterioration in ties manifested in border skirmishes, and counter-allegations. The first round of peace talks mediated jointly by Qatar and Turkey in Doha on October 18-19, resulted in an extended ceasefire along the border. The Doha talks came in the aftermath of military clashes and airstrikes by Pakistan on Hafiz Gul Bahadur group camps in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, on October 9, Pakistan conducted strikes in Kabul to target TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud; who reportedly survived the targeting.

Pakistan’s search for strategic depth

For decades, the Pakistani security establishment nurtured the Afghan Taliban as a critical element of its strategic depth policy. However, this investment has now turned into a liability. The mistrust between both traditional allies now runs so deep that the recent talks necessitated the need for a third-party mediation.

For Pakistan, the Taliban issue is here to stay.

Taliban’s ideological constraints in meeting Pakistan’s demands

Islamabad’s demand that the Taliban curtail the TTP activities is seen in Kabul as an ideological and existential impossibility. While the TTP and Afghan Taliban are distinct groups, they share deep ideological alignment, making the former an extension of the Taliban’s movement rather than a foreign outfit. For the Taliban chief Hibatullah Akhundzada, abandoning the TTP could amount to subverting his own religious authority.

This story has played out before. In 2001, the former Taliban leader Mullah Omar refused to hand over al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden to American forces invoking the tribal Pashtunwali code - especially the principle of melmastia (hospitality toward one’s guest).

Beyond theological alignment, the TTP, a predominantly Pashtun outfit, also provided sanctuary and support to the Afghan Taliban’s two-decade insurgency against the US-led NATO forces. As such, to curtail the TTP at Pakistan’s behest would risk alienating the administration’s tribal support base and possibly eroding domestic legitimacy.

ISI’s waning influence

Additionally, the Haqqani Network faction, which was long considered as a “veritable arm” of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is now increasingly asserting autonomy.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, the interim interior minister in the Taliban administration, was widely expected in the Pakistani establishment to assure security for his patrons in Rawalpindi. Today, however, the Haqqanis face a critical choice – either to remain ISI’s proxy or act as a governing faction in Afghanistan. Their influence stems from their influence in Kabul’s power structure, especially amid alleged infighting and power struggle with Akhundzada’s Kandahari faction. This was seen in Haqqani’s October 30 address at the ministry stating that if the patience and endurance of Afghans was tested again, the response would be ‘very crushing.’

As the TTP attacks persist, Pakistan is running out of options.

Decentralised TTP network offsets Pakistan’s superior military firepower

Pakistan has launched airstrikes into Afghan territory to target TTP leaders. Militarily, these strikes have done little to impede TTP’s decentralised network on both sides of the border. Politically, they are beneficial to the Afghan Taliban. To build pressure on the Taliban, Pakistan has conducted mass expulsion of over a million undocumented Afghan refugees. This has been regarded as a brutal form of collective punishment, cementing the anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan.

The Taliban administration will leverage these Pakistani actions to consolidate their own support base by posing itself as the sole defenders of Afghan sovereignty against a common external enemy, amid reported infighting in the administration. As a result, these actions are unlikely to eradicate the TTP, but likely embolden the Taliban administration.

India’s strategic move

Pakistan Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif once again accused the Taliban of being an Indian proxy, stating, "The people in Kabul pulling the strings and staging the puppet show are being controlled by Delhi." Yet, not many in the international community will find this narrative convincing today, in fact, an irony not lost on observers.

Meanwhile, India has found a strategic reopening in Afghanistan in light of deteriorating Taliban-Pakistan relations. For starters, India’s long-held position that Pakistan’s policy of distinguishing ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’ is finding its ground. With the “good Taliban” now protecting the “bad Taliban,” Pakistan’s terror ecosystem has further complicated.

The TTP’s terror activities supported by Kabul have already burdened the Pakistani security forces in the tribal provinces, compelling the country to redeploy significant resources to its western border. This may briefly relieve pressure on Line of Control (LoC) with India, which also faces a challenge on its border with China.

India will remain wary

New Delhi is likely to maintain its wait-and-watch approach while sustaining a pragmatic relationship with the Taliban administration. This would involve a limited engagement focused on humanitarian aid and development projects to project India as a reliable regional actor, while also seeking security assurances to prevent anti-India groups from using Afghan soil.

However, New Delhi will remain cautious about aligning too closely with the Taliban, especially the Haqqani Network. Over-engagement carries strategic and reputational risks. The Haqqani Network, still facing international sanctions, has perpetrated attacks on Indian assets in Afghanistan in the past. A visible engagement with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban would also risk alienating India’s traditional partners such as the Tajik, Uzbeks, and Hazara communities in Afghanistan, who may eventually hold key positions in the future political arrangement of the country. As such, India’s relationship must remain interest-driven and transactional, without giving into any political endorsement.

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication