Is Agnipath the magic bullet for the armed forces?

A non-contributory life insurance cover of Rs 48 lakhs to be provided to all recruits for the duration of engagement period. (Image: News18 Creative)

Is the Agnipath scheme to recruit youth in the armed forces for four years a magic bullet to transform the military into a future-ready force? Or, as critics say, is it an ill-advised move that could potentially imperil India’s national security in the long run?

These are crucial questions being debated by the rank and file of the three services and thought leaders who ponder the practicality, or otherwise, of using Agnipath to recruit personnel below officer rank across India. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) says a computerised system will choose these ‘Agniveers’ at rallies and campus interviews using the National Skills Qualifications Framework, which organises qualifications through a series of levels of data, knowledge, aptitude, and skills. The new recruits will be picked on the basis of the same medical and physical fitness standards used for the military’s regular recruitment programme.

Agniveers need to serve only for four years, which includes a training period of six months, instead of the 15-19 year-stints of the regular soldier. Once Agniveers complete their four-year tour of duty (ToD), 25 percent of them are to be recruited again for employment in the military for 15 years, or more. Departing Agniveers may also seek positions in other government departments, or join the civilian workforce.

The MoD plans to induct 46,000 Agniveers in the age group of 17.5 years to 21 years in the Indian Army, Indian Navy, and Indian Air Force by the end of 2022. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh told a press conference in New Delhi on June 14 that this would lend a “youthful” profile to India’s military.

“The youth see the armed forces as a matter of prestige and dream of wearing the uniform,” Singh said. “The (Agnipath) scheme is being implemented to ensure the armed forces’ profile is youthful." Currently, the average age of armed forces personnel in India is 32 years — a figure that the MoD expects to bring down to 25 years before the turn of the decade.

A brainchild of the late Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat, Agnipath was intended primarily to reduce the bloated salary and pension bills of the three services so that the resulting savings could fund the country’s military modernisation plans. The military’s pension bill has had an upward trajectory as reflected in the ₹5.25 lakh-crore budget allocation for defence in 2022-23 of which defence pensions gobbled up ₹1.19 lakh-crore.

Along with bad economics, the attrition levels in the armed forces is clearly a major driver for rolling out Agnipath. It is no secret that the Indian Army is facing a manpower crunch as a result of recruitment drives being suspended in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. With no let-up in the number of soldiers leaving its ranks, the army is stretched by a shortage of around 98,000 troops, including Junior Commissioned Officers.

While this does not seriously affect the army’s operational readiness for now, it is a disturbing thought that even crash recruitment drives will not be able to balance the depleting numbers any time soon. The border tensions and the increased deployment of troops along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh do not make things easier.

Yet, in spite of all these reasons, it still begs the question if the implications of Agnipath have been thought through thoroughly before the government decided to launch it. In its hurry to address the growing pension outgo problem, has the MoD war-gamed Agnipath adequately? It is unclear, for instance, how the armed forces intend to rework training schedules for Agniveers whose intensely short turnover may impact their military effectiveness given the fact that longer terms of service — rather than short ones — are key to creating new regimental cultures.

For a soldier, it takes years of tough training before discipline becomes deeply ingrained, and it remains to be seen how well Agniveers fit into units and rub shoulders with their regular counterparts. They will have to prove themselves capable of contributing to unit cohesion in double quick time since loyalty and commitment to team mates in the face of combat stress are indispensable for accomplishing any mission.

Another concern is that most people who enlist are likely to be anxious job-seekers whose motivation will always be in doubt, especially given the lack of guaranteed employment after their ToD four years down the line. Unlike their regular counterparts who join for a minimum of 15 years, Agniveers are ineligible for pension on leaving service, and this could increase the odds of disillusionment.

As some observers point out, there is also the clear and present danger of churning out individuals with military training, minus the military discipline, who could be easy prey to national or international extremist groups scouting for hired guns. This is a sociological slippery slope yet to explored, and policymakers would do well to tread with caution here.

At the end of the day, it would perhaps be a better idea to adopt the practice followed by modern armies of enlisting troops for about 10 years with attractive pension, gratuity benefits, and severance pay packages. This will help the military manage its manpower efficiently, while bringing down its pension budget.

Prakash Chandra is former editor of the Indian Defence Review. He writes on aerospace and strategic affairs.

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.