India-US Ties | Divergent on Russia and convergent on the Indo Pacific

S Jaishankar (file pic)

There was a sense that the invisible Sword of Damocles accompanied Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on their trip to Washington for the fourth edition of the 2+2 talks. However, if at all it was there, it was rather blunt, as the bilateral discussions were deemed fruitful and productive over a range of issues pertinent to both countries’ defence and security initiatives. This despite different approaches taken by Washington and New Delhi on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Bilateral discussions between foreign and defence counterparts have become a regular affair since the inaugural 2+2 took place in September 2018, in New Delhi. This is the first edition with the Joe Biden administration.

In an unprecedented fashion, Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi ‘opened’ for their defence and foreign deputies, and reiterated their shared democratic values sacrosanct to the strength and evolution of the partnership.

While India and the US have been convergent on their ‘Quad’ priorities of securing a “free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific”, Washington has been overt in its condemnation of Moscow and played chief-architect of Western led-sanctions on the Kremlin. This as New Delhi’s approach has been viewed as muted. While Washington has stated that they understand New Delhi’s concerns, and highlighted their own, the umbrage has largely come from Capitol Hill.

During their virtual meet, both Biden and Modi touched on shared synergies and convergences on trade, energy, and security ties, both highlighted with grave seriousness the humanitarian emergencies in Ukraine. Modi emphasised India’s evacuation efforts and condemned the loss of civilian life in the town of Bucha. This was seen as overt from New Delhi, which has been perceived as reticent on Russian aggression, and refused to publicly condemn Moscow.

Emphasising diplomacy and dialogue as the way forward, both leaders touched on the global food shortages arising out of the prolonged conflict. The underlying theme was “democracies can deliver” and the four key figures to the summit, Jaishankar, Singh, and their counterparts, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, reiterated their respective leaders’ commitment and efforts in climate action, building resilient supply chains, COVID-19 vaccine delivery, and bringing to light critical and new emerging technologies in the region.

From the final frontier in space, to cyberspace, to ensuring a space free from coercion in the Indo-Pacific, the 2+2 dialogues emphasised the evolution of the partnership from five decades of estrangement to two decades of robust engagement.

Even as the press corps clamoured and mentioned the ‘S’ word (sanctions; alluding to CAATSA for India’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system), the four faces of the summit echoed the another ‘S’ word (synergy), as this summit reiterated how both countries have undertaken joint-initiatives in all areas of collaboration.

Much can change in a fortnight. Two weeks ago, in New Delhi it was Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with Jaishankar. This week it was Blinken, who explained India’s position vis-à-vis Russia. There is ennui with India, mostly from the Hill and the Western press on India’s discretion to critique Russia. The diplomatic tightrope walking has been attributed to New Delhi’s military dependence and energy reliance with Moscow.

The riposte to those questions came from Jaishankar when he said that India buys less than 1 percent of energy from Russia, and only such to secure its energy security, and if at all, there was a buyer from Russia, it would have to be Europe (EU countries) that exceed India’s monthly purchases from Russia in one afternoon.

On the military front, enough studies have showcased, India’s legacy era partnership with Soviet Union waning, and more US military purchases in lieu of Russian hardware. Blinken clarified historical oversight, stating it wasn’t as much a reliance on Russian hardware, but merely, a relationship between New Delhi and Moscow that existed and grew for five decades, this when Washington wasn’t able to be a reliable defence partner to New Delhi. Partly also because Washington had armed and grew closer to Islamabad. India-US ties have grown from sanctions of 1998 to signing a nuclear deal a few years later.

Democracies do coalesce on shared values, but they diverge on key issues, as national interests supersede any overarching democratic kindred spirit code. Washington’s dissatisfaction with New Delhi’s choice to not excoriate Moscow publicly, was similar to New Delhi’s disenchantment with Washington’s decision to withdraw from Kabul in a haste, presenting an already troubled South Asian neighbourhood with another security challenge.

Where the two sides converge the most, is in the Indo-Pacific region. The Quad at times, alludes to Beijing’s hegemony in the region, without naming it directly. However, this time, Austin named China as a revanchist power and a pernicious threat it posed in the region. The four-star general welcomed the increased military-to-military co-operation and joint-exercises between the armed forces of both nations, highlighted India’s importance as a major defence partner, and the importance of security in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia aside, there were thorny issues with mentions of human right issues in both countries, but the convergences of the bilateral ties were accentuated in what is called the biggest strength: ‘people-to-people’ ties, this over any political-military collaboration.

The fourth edition of the 2+2 dialogue is now in the books, and this serves as a good harbinger for May, the next Quad in-person meeting in Tokyo, Japan.

Akshobh Giridharadas is a Washington DC-based former journalist. 

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.