Yunus–Mirza meeting in Dhaka is no routine visit: Why India cannot afford to ignore the warning signs

On Saturday, Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, met Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus at the State Guest House Jamuna during his official visit to Dhaka.

According to a statement from the Chief Adviser’s press wing, “During the meeting, they discussed a wide range of issues concerning Bangladesh–Pakistan relations, including the growing importance of bilateral trade, investment, and defence cooperation.”

The statement further added, “Emphasising the shared historical, cultural, and people-to-people ties between the two countries, General Mirza expressed Pakistan’s desire to strengthen cooperation in multiple sectors. He noted the vast potential for expanding trade, connectivity, and investment between Bangladesh and Pakistan.”

General Mirza went on to declare, “Our two countries will support each other,” revealing that “a two-way shipping route between Karachi and Chittagong has already begun operations, while a Dhaka–Karachi air route is expected to open within months.”

Both sides also reportedly discussed the situation in West Asia and exchanged views on “the spread of misinformation and the role of non-state actors in destabilising regions.”

Why this meeting matters for India

For India, this meeting is not an isolated diplomatic event but part of a pattern. It comes after several steps that suggest Dhaka is attempting to recalibrate its foreign policy away from India and towards nations traditionally viewed as adversarial to Indian interests.

India’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, had already warned in July that growing alignment between Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China could pose “serious challenges for India’s security.” He said, “There is a possible convergence of interest we can talk about between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh that may have implications for India’s stability and security dynamics.”

The concern is not merely theoretical. India and Bangladesh share a 4,096-kilometre-long border, one of the longest in the world. This boundary, while mostly peaceful, remains porous and vulnerable to illegal trade, smuggling, and infiltration. Any security or intelligence cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh could therefore open new channels for destabilising India’s northeast.

This fear is not unfounded. In 2004, Indian officials seized about 1,500 boxes of Chinese ammunition, worth between $4.5 and $7 million, that were reportedly meant for the banned militant outfit ULFA. Investigations later suggested that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was involved in coordinating the shipment through Bangladeshi ports.

The idea of renewed defence coordination between Dhaka and Islamabad has revived these memories.

Yunus’s map controversy raises alarms in New Delhi

Another incident that has alarmed Indian policymakers occurred during the same meeting. Muhammad Yunus presented General Mirza with a map that depicted Assam and several northeastern states as part of Bangladesh.

Such a move, even if symbolic, carries significant geopolitical weight. It not only echoes historical territorial narratives but also challenges India’s sovereignty in its northeast.

This is not the first time Yunus has made comments perceived as undermining India’s territorial integrity. During his visit to China in April, Yunus stated that Bangladesh was the “only guardian of the ocean” for the region since “northeast India is landlocked.” Analysts interpreted this as an invitation for Beijing to expand its presence in the Bay of Bengal and enhance its strategic leverage near India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor.

Together, these remarks and gestures indicate a political realignment in Dhaka that aligns more closely with Chinese and Pakistani narratives than with India’s regional vision.

The broader context: A rebuilding of Pakistan–Bangladesh relations

The meeting between Yunus and Mirza is part of a broader thaw between Dhaka and Islamabad. Relations between the two countries, historically frosty since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, began to improve after the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024.

Since then, the two sides have taken several concrete steps:

• Signing a visa-free travel agreement for holders of diplomatic and government passports.


• Offering 500 scholarships for Bangladeshi students, 25 percent of which are for medical education.


• Announcing specialised training for Bangladeshi civil servants under Pakistan’s technical assistance programme.


• Resuming direct flights between Karachi and Dhaka for the first time since 2018.


• Establishing direct maritime links between the two countries after nearly five decades.


• Lifting Bangladesh’s import restrictions on Pakistani goods, which had previously required mandatory physical inspections.


• Pakistan is now presenting itself as an alternative regional partner to a politically fragile Bangladesh, while Dhaka appears willing to reciprocate in exchange for trade and political support.

Pakistan’s renewed engagement with Bangladesh also fits neatly into China’s regional playbook. Both Islamabad and Dhaka are beneficiaries of large-scale Chinese investments under the Belt and Road Initiative.

Beijing’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal, including investments in Chittagong and the planned deep-sea port at Payra, provides strategic depth to China’s Indian Ocean ambitions. For Pakistan, aligning itself with both Bangladesh and China serves to corner India between its western and eastern flanks.

Experts warn that this could eventually lead to intelligence-sharing, military cooperation, or coordinated diplomatic positions among the three nations -- all of which could undermine India’s regional standing.

New Delhi must treat the Pakistan–Bangladesh rapprochement as a wake-up call. While India has long counted on Bangladesh as a reliable partner in counterterrorism and regional connectivity, the Yunus government’s actions signal that such assumptions can no longer be taken for granted.