If the West sees endgame in Putin’s demise, that may not be realisable: Kazuhiko Togo

The Ukraine conflict is about to enter its second year. Do Ukraine and the West have an endgame in mind?

There are two prevailing views — a majority view and a minority view. The majority view has projected the Ukraine conflict as a war between the Just and the Evil. Putin is the ‘Evil’ for waging an unprovoked war against Ukraine, while Zelensky is the ‘Just’, who is defending his country heroically for a year since the invasion.

In February, Zelensky declared that he is determined to oust all Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. If that is the case and the West is going to assist Zelensky to achieve his war objectives then the endgame would be the fall of Putin’s regime. This means the end of ‘Evil’ Russia where Justice would prevail.

And the minority view?

According to this view, there is no doubt that Putin was wrong in invading Ukraine, but if the West sees the endgame in Putin’s demise that may not be realisable.

Russia may not lose easily on the battlefield. It has been increasing the deployment of its soldiers and it may well outnumber Ukrainian forces in the coming days.

NATO’s recent escalation by supplying advanced tanks and possibly jet fighters has heightened the threat perception. Russia still has a sizeable number of tanks, some of them of high quality and it also outnumbers Ukraine in terms of jet fighters. Apparently, Russia lacks high-quality semiconductors but according to recent intelligence reports, Russia is now getting some of the modern advanced semiconductors from Iran and China.

So what happens now?

In this situation, prolonged and deadly fighting on the battlefield may go on for several years. This means, the loss of human life, both soldiers and civilians in Ukraine and Russia are likely to get killed. Has the time not come for the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and the NATO countries to spare a thought for a common exit strategy?

What about the United States?

The minority view in the US was launched by the Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in a Washington Post interview in January, where he said that there is a widespread view in Washington and Kyiv that regaining Crimea by military force may be impossible. It was followed by an analytical paper by RAND Corporation published on January 27 by Samuel Charap and Miranda Priebe emphasizing that the consequences of a long war-ranging from persistent elevated escalation risks to economic damage-far outweigh the possible benefits.

What can satisfy Russia to end the war?

The minimal territorial gain that Putin needs to ensure in entering a ceasefire must be Crimea and Donbass. On February 24 2022 (when the war began) Crimea was under de facto control by Russia and there were substantial areas under Russian governance in Donbass. That reality was well recognised by Ukraine embodied in its proposal made at the peace treaty negotiations in Istanbul on March 29.

You spoke about a ceasefire where neither side is a winner. But wouldn’t that mean Ukraine ceding territory to Russia to buy peace?

So far Zelensky’s public message was exclusively related to the full recovery of Ukrainian territorial integrity and not a word on protecting Ukrainian life was mentioned. But after all, taking responsibility for ensuring Ukrainian territorial responsibility as well as Ukrainian life is a dual responsibility from which a Ukrainian president cannot escape. Is it not?

The Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, raising concerns about China said, ‘Ukraine today can become East Asia tomorrow’. Do you share that view?

I do not think so. War in Ukraine started partly by Putin’s resistance to Biden’s conviction that Putin is Evil and Ukraine is Just and partly by his arrogant and ignorant conviction that if he moves against Ukraine, he may win easily. He was completely mistaken. The US, China and East Asian countries are carefully watching these mistakes, so as not to repeat them.

Tokyo has used the Ukraine war to significantly shift from its post-World War II pacifist stand to a more proactive policy on defence and security. How is it likely to influence Japan’s thinking in future?

The proactive policy adopted on December 16 is one important step. But this is a continuation of Japan’s security and foreign policy that it was trying to get out of the post-war Constitution symbolised in Article 9 —namely, to rely its security on the goodwill of outside countries. Overcoming this irresponsible pacifism has been a continuous challenge for able and responsible prime ministers such as Nobusuke Kishi, Aisaku Sato and Shinzo Abe. But strengthening Japanese Deterrence power should be balanced by its will for dialogue. This balancing of Deterrence and Dialogue is and should be Japan’s long-standing policy direction.

Japan’s militarist past has not totally vanished from the minds of countries in the region. How will the proposed changes in its defence/security policy impact the region?

Efforts have been made by the Japanese government and people to come to harmony with Asian countries, in particular with China and Korea, to overcome the pain which Japan had caused them. These efforts need to be continued but Japan’s attempt to develop a new policy of Deterrence and Dialogue should be considered in a totally different area.

Do Russo-Japanese relations seem to have been adversely affected by Tokyo’s Ukraine policy? Can it be repaired any time soon?

The policies adopted by the Kishida government have sided entirely with Ukraine, US and G7, treating Russia as Evil, in the process alienating the Russian government entirely. For the foreseeable future, there is no hope that peace treaty negotiations between the two sides could be resumed. But if Kishida can convince Biden and Zelensky that an early ceasefire is essential for all warring parties and if this is accepted by them, the extent of recovery of Japan-Russia relations may be fast.