What China’s missing officials tell us about its politics

Li is believed to be under investigation for corruption committed during his tenure (2017-2022) as Director of the Communist Party Central Military Commission (CMC)’s Equipment Development Department (EDD). Now, speculations are raging on regarding the whereabouts of CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, who were both no-shows at a crucial conference on military study and the implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on September 15.

As a candidate favoured by Xi, Li Shangfu, an aerospace engineer by profession, was promoted to the post of National Defence Minister in March of this year. His appointment was controversial because of the sanctions placed on him and the CMC-EDD by the US in 2018, under the ambit of the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)’. Considering the implications this would have for Sino-US relations, in all likelihood, Xi had a direct role in Li’s appointment.

Emphasis On Probity

Now, with Li under investigation, questions arise as to why a Minister-level cadre of Xi’s choosing had to face such abrupt censure. In the quest for answers, some analysts and media have latched on to a commentary that recently appeared in the PLA Daily, the mouthpiece of the Chinese armed forces, warning political and military cadres to ‘purify their social, life, and friend circles’, and practise ‘physical isolation’ from interpersonal relationships that may pry on their stature and resourcefulness for illegitimate gains.

The commentary argues that in the past few years, investigations and handling of corruption cases have revealed that it is these personal relationships with classmates, family members and other “business” friends of cadres that have led to their downfall.

Many are looking at this as an indication of what has led to Li’s downfall. It is extremely difficult to say this definitively. But what is worth noting is that warnings about family corruption, business linkages and ‘purification’ of social circles are not necessarily new. However, a statement making this point in the PLA’s mouthpiece at this moment of flux is noteworthy.

Xi Comparable To Mao

The more interesting question emerging from Li and Qin’s downfall is about the political state of play within the Party-state system. Over the past decade, Xi has gradually cemented his position at the top of the CCP, with his stature today comparable to Mao Zedong. Moreover, his authority only appears to be strengthening.

For instance, from April 2023, the entire Party-state system has been engaged in a campaign to study Xi Jinping Thought and its implications for their work. The second phase of this education campaign is currently underway. Party-state media and senior officials have also repeatedly emphasised that Xi’s thought is the fundamental guideline for policy action that must be adhered to for a long time to come.

In other words, challenging Xi’s authority is akin to challenging the Party’s monopoly over truth and the legitimacy of its rule. The current flux in terms of personnel changes, therefore, should not be read as a sign of Xi’s weakness before opposing factions.

Factional Contestation

Instead, the system today is at a stage in which the leadership question is a settled one, at least until Xi is around or can function effectively. However, this does not mean that policy and factional contestation have ended. In the CCP system, factions are not formal or ossified groups; these are networks or loose coalitions of individuals and institutions that seek to capture greater power and influence policy.

Factions may be ideological or personal association-based, power-seeking, bureaucratic in nature, or arbitrary and fungible associations. Even though Xi has done much to undo the factional struggles of the likes witnessed under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, such interest-based coalitions seeking more authority for themselves are part of system design.

In this context, the current state of play, with the fall of Li and Qin, appears to be one in which factional struggles are intensifying, albeit without challenging Xi’s position. In this struggle, rivals at lower levels are competing for power and policy relevance and currying favour with the all-powerful leader, while undercutting their opposition.

Xi’s Dominance And Its Trade-offs

In order to do so, they are likely to align their narratives and actions with the priorities of the leader. Given Xi’s emphasis on cracking down on personal and professional corruption and achieving tangible results in key domains, such as industrialisation, emerging technologies, military capacity, and so on, it isn’t surprising that institutional changes and purges are underway. In this process, old skeletons in the closet involving interpersonal or business relationships are likely to be brought to the fore.

In fact, as things progress, there is a greater possibility of tumult and personnel purges at different levels of the system. These will be politically destabilising and hinder policy implementation. But they are unlikely to undermine Xi’s authority in the near term.

In fact, in the short run, Xi’s willingness to sacrifice Qin and Li can be seen as a sign of confidence in his position, and the expendable nature of cadres at that level. If, however, senior CMC officials and close confidants like Zhang Youxia are sacrificed, then there’s likely a deeper crisis at hand, because it will signal that nobody’s position is secure.

Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme and Research Fellow-China Studies at the Takshashila Institution. Anushka Saxena is a China Studies Research Analyst with the Takshashila Institution. Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.