The fourth Quad Leaders’ Summit in Wilmington, Delaware, was closely watched in Beijing. And while it is clear that the Chinese leadership no longer dismisses the group as foam on the seas, the discourse is rather mixed.
On one hand, the Quad is seen as an essential component of a larger containment effort by the US. At times, it has even been described as an early effort to establish an Asian NATO. On the other hand, there is significant commentary dismissing the Quad as a politically fragile and fundamentally ineffective grouping. The unifying factor between both these strands of arguments, of course, is an underlying campaign to undermine and de-legitimise the Quad, particularly in the eyes of other countries within the Indo-Pacific region.
5-4-3-2 Formation
In the past, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has termed the Quad as part of the US’ bloc formation strategy in the region. Wang described the group as part of the 5 (Five eyes), 4 (Quad), 3 (AUKUS), 2 (bilateral military alliances) formation. Spokesperson Li Jian called the Quad “a tool the US uses to contain China and perpetuate US hegemony,” arguing that the “Quad tries to muster military and security cooperation under the pretext of maritime issues.”
Across the Chinese media landscape, there has been widespread criticism of the summit in Wilmington. In addition, there has been an undermining of the achievements of the group, whether it be in vaccine delivery or maritime domain awareness.
For instance, the PLA’s social media platform Jun Zhengping Studio carried a vivid cartoon, depicting Biden sitting on a rickety palanquin being drawn by a kangaroo, a Japanese soldier and a depiction of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The underlying notion, of course, is that this is a US-led grouping, and others are doing America’s bidding. The associated post attacked the Quad countries for harbouring “evil intentions” and added that: “since its establishment, the Quad has almost made no concrete progress in its claimed ‘responses to emerging technologies, climate change and other challenges’, except for repeatedly hyping up the ‘China threat theory’ and intensifying regional tensions.”
Likewise, a Global Times’ editorial called the group a “small circle attempting to contain China on security issues and exclude it on economic matters in the region”. It too made the case that on matters of substance the Quad had not delivered.
Sowing Seeds of Doubt
In his analysis, Zhou Shixin, a research fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies — a leading Chinese think tank — concurred with the above line of thought. He argued that “the Quad agenda remains overly broad, with many plans being more aspirational than actionable, lacking clear timelines and road maps, resulting in significant uncertainty and low feasibility.” Nevertheless, he views that the Quad is a “destabilizing factor in the region” that has “expansionist ambitions through cooperative language”.
In particular, Zhou’s piece pushed back against the planned Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission in 2025, describing it as a “provocative action”. He also sought to stoke the anxieties of countries that the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) initiative is assisting, arguing that the Quad countries could easily operate in their EEZs with all the data that they were collecting.
In her analysis, Su Xiaohui, a senior researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), focussed on the internal political dynamics of each of the four Quad countries. Her primary argument is that the Quad remains a politically fragile group, with “inherent flaws”. Australia, India and Japan, she contends, are concerned about the durability of the Quad under a potential Donald Trump presidency. Biden’s remarks about the Quad being “here to stay” was, therefore, an attempt at reassurance.
Australia, meanwhile, appears to be easing ties with China, with Treasurer Jim Chalmers expected to visit soon. This will be the first such visit in seven years. Su believes that the US is concerned about this normalisation. And India, she argues, seeks “more policy space” and is unwilling to simply go along with the US. The portrayal of India as an opportunistic and wavering partner of the US is a common theme in Chinese discourse.
Not all views converge
Teng Jianqun, Su’s colleague at CIIS, isn’t as dismissive about the Quad’s stickiness and utility to each party. Teng told China National Radio Military that in certain domains, the Quad had made “considerable progress.” He believes that there is a structural congruence of interests that binds all parties together. “The United States seeks to use these ‘small circles’ for ‘great power strategic competition’, while countries like Japan and Australia are attempting to ‘borrow a boat to go to sea’, making advancements in terms of military expansion and war preparedness.” Although Teng acknowledges that a Trump presidency might create challenges for the grouping, he believes that the mechanism serves US strategic needs and, therefore, it is likely to sustain.
In essence, while it is clear that Beijing views the Quad as a tool of containment, there is a rather active debate within the Chinese media and analytical community about the future and implications of Quad’s actions. However, with the implementation of the expanded maritime security agenda agreed upon at Wilmington, including IPMDA, the coast guard exercises and Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific, the criticism from China is likely to get much more shrill.
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