Foreign Affairs | Why a major escalation in West Asia is unlikely

Iran, too, did not close the Hormuz Strait as it had threatened to. Instead, it has been targeting US bases in Iraq and oil installations in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, through its proxies in Yemen. Even after Soleimani’s assassination Iranian attacks on US bases in Iraq occurred in a manner which did not result in any significant damage.

For its part Israel has also been targeting Iranian interests in Lebanon and Syria, even after Fakhrizadeh’s killing, but voices inside Israel have always cautioned against a major military assault.

Thus, all sides have taken care to see that no action escalates into a war.

This time around, even if the assassination was meant to provoke Iran to escalate the conflict, Tehran will all the more want to avoid such traps, waiting as it is for a Joe Biden administration to take charge of the White House with the hope that it may return to the 2015 nuclear deal which its Democratic predecessor Barack Obama had entered into, and remove the sanctions.

Iran's other regional adversary, the UAE (as well as Jordan and Bahrain) have condemned the assassination, saying it threatened West Asian stability, fragile as it is.

The US too has quelled all rumours that USS Nimitz and other warships have been deployed in the Persian Gulf in preparation for a conflict.

So what could be expected may be some more attacks on interests of Iran’s adversaries by its proxies. For instance, the Houthis claimed another vicious attack on a Saudi base after the assassination. There are also unconfirmed reports that the statement by the UAE condemning the assassination of Fakhrizadeh was made under a direct Iranian threat.

But Iran now also has to contend with the pandemic and the peace agreements between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan. The pandemic has wreaked havoc inside Iran and the ongoing sanctions have crippled the Iranian economy. Most recently the US announced fresh sanctions on China and Russian firms that were found to be aiding in Iran’s missile programme. Its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah also stands considerably weakened after the Beirut blasts. Following Fakhrizadeh’s assassination Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has gone into hiding.

Most of all, such an assassination, while it aims to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities on one hand, also seeks to weaken the Iranian regime from within. The method points to the enemy within and sows suspicion and discord within the ranks of Iranian security and intelligence, reflecting both its vulnerability and its invincibility. Coupled with economic duress, while hardliners may be strengthened, it also seeks the gradual collapse of the regime.

Hence, it may not be inaccurate to rule out any major retaliation by Iran, at least not before the Biden administration takes charge.

So, what are the implications for India? Unless tensions escalate into a war, it is improbable that India will be impacted in any major way. There may, however, be long term implications as regional realignments consolidate, complicating the delicate balancing act India has been doing in West Asia. But India should take care to see that incidents like the 2012 attack on an Israeli diplomat in Delhi, do not occur.

India too is waiting for a new administration to take over in the White House and its approach to Iran. For if the US returns to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, it would make it easier for India to continue with its plans for developing the Chabahar Port and connectivity infrastructure to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond.

Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. Views are personal.