HomeNewsBusinessPersonal FinanceYes to Yes, no to PMC: What gives?

Yes to Yes, no to PMC: What gives?

Normalcy returns for Yes Bank's customers, while PMC Bank's depositors continue to languish

March 23, 2020 / 13:57 IST
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The safety of depositors’ funds in a bank is vital for uninterrupted running of the economy. It is most often taken for granted, but is, to an extent, vague and subjective. For a perspective, the global financial crisis is referred to as the Lehman crisis, as Lehman was the first institution to go bust, which triggered the domino effect. To think of it, there were quite a few financial institutions in the US that were bailed out. The reason why they were bailed out is popularly believed to be the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) theory. The first biggie that was ‘allowed’ to fail was Lehman, which was the trigger.

One saved, the other allowed to fail

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When Punjab and Maharashtra Cooperative Bank (PMC) went belly up, there was a lot of heartburn, and rightfully so. The finger of accusation went towards the RBI and there was lot of criticism of RBI’s handling of the situation, most of which was logical. That the machinations practiced by PMC’s management (e.g., thousands of fictitious accounts) went past RBI’s audit was obvious: one employee cooperative federation of RBI had a deposit of Rs 100 crore-odd, which met the same fate as that of other regular depositors. The extent of bad loans at PMC was substantial, as a percentage of the total loan book size; hence, bailing out would have meant using public money for compensating for almost the entire deposits.

For Yes Bank, the situation was different. The RBI got a hint of what was coming, about a couple of years ago. They pulled up Yes Bank for under-reporting bad loans, refused the re-appointment of the MD, placed a nominee director on the Board, and ensured that a new Board is in place. Still, there was an undercurrent of diffidence and there were significant withdrawals by depositors, leading to pressure on the bank. Things came to a pass when there were more of bad loans to be recognized than disclosed, which would wipe out the capital of the bank. The RBI had to step in at that point, when the moratorium was placed and the restructuring was executed.