Biden-Xi Summit: Challenge is to continue US-China engagements despite tensions

The last meeting between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping took place in Bali in November 2022. The key outcome of that meeting was an agreement to stabilise ties by resuming broad-based dialogue. This was an important breakthrough given the disruption following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022.

China had responded to the visit by suspending talks and cooperation with the US across eight areas and intensifying its coercion targeting Taiwan. The Bali Consensus was seen as an effort to move beyond that episode. This effort, however, was derailed following the balloon-gate scandal in February 2023.

The scandal underscored how far American public and elite opinion had shifted with regard to some sort of productive engagement with China. A month later, in March 2023, at China’s annual parliamentary meeting, Xi Jinping publicly criticised the US for pursuing a policy of containment. This was a rare direct acknowledgement by the Chinese leader of a deeply-held perception of US policy. It signalled a further downward spiral.

A Series Of Fruitful Engagements

Interestingly, however, ties began to recover soon thereafter. The first signs of the ice being broken were evident in early May, as then Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang met with US ambassador Nicholas Burns. That was followed by talks between Wang Yi and US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Vienna and Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China in June.

On the heels of that, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen visited Beijing in July. During the trip, she engaged with key members of China’s economic and financial policy ecosystem, while seeking to assuage Chinese concerns around American policies and draw a distinction between decoupling and de-risking. A key outcome from the visit was the commitment to establish a joint Economic Working Group and joint Financial Working Group between the two sides. This commitment fructified in September.

Next on the flight to Beijing in September was US Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. Despite the differences between the two sides over tariffs, export controls, American semiconductor policies, subsidies, and treatment of each other’s companies, the meeting between Raimondo and her Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao yielded positive outcomes. A new commercial issues working group and an export control enforcement information exchange were established, along with a commitment to deepen engagement on technical issues related to protection of trade secrets and confidential business information.

A further indication of the willingness to stabilise bilateral ties was the resumption of Congressional visits to China after a hiatus of four years. The bipartisan delegation which consisted of three representatives each from the Democrats and Republicans landed in Beijing on October 7 and discussed issues surrounding commerce, investment, human rights, and Ukraine. In addition to the above, cultural and tourism engagement, discussions on maritime affairs and new arms control talks have also been initiated over the past few months. Clearly, as a recent article in the Communist Party’s flagship paper, People’s Daily, put it, Sino-US ties are exhibiting “positive signs”.

Fundamental And Structural Disagreements

However, given the deep and structural differences between the strategic objectives and positioning of the two countries along with the imperatives of domestic politics, it is important to temper one’s expectations.

The American position largely entails that cooperation in other areas of shared concern should not be held hostage to broader competition and issues of security. The US insists that its tech-related sanctions against China are part of its “small yard, high fence” approach, which covers only a limited number of technologies that are key to their national security.

This is not a policy of containment and leaves significant room for cooperation in other technologies and domains. Similarly, the US position on Taiwan is that it continues to adhere to its one-China policy and is abiding by past agreements, whereas it is Beijing that is eroding the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. In other words, America wants risk reduction amid sustained competition and productive cooperation on shared concerns.

On the other hand, the Chinese position emphasises the “root cause” for tensions between the two sides is the “serious deviation in the US’ perception of and positioning towards China”. It argues that American policy is motivated by a Cold War mentality, aimed at encircling, containing, and suppressing China in the name of competition.

Beijing does not buy the distinction between de-risking and decoupling. In addition, the Chinese argument is that Taiwan has become a “red line” issue between the two sides, and that by not agreeing to the one-China principle, i.e., the legitimacy of the PRC’s rule over Taiwan, the US is violating past agreements. In other words, Beijing wants the US to respect its core interests and accommodate it as a peer power.

These, along with both China and US’ differing visions of the world order and domestic political churn in the US heading into the 2024 presidential elections, imply that there exist fundamental and structural disagreements and stressors between the two sides. Therefore, it is rather fanciful for anyone to expect any major breakthroughs or a new detente or a grand bargain to come out of the Xi-Biden meeting.

What one can expect is a commitment to continued engagement, with a focus on narrow, specific and prickly issues. In this regard, if the two sides can agree to resume military-to-military dialogue, which has remained suspended for over a year, then that would be a major achievement.

Manoj Kewalramani is the Chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme and Research Fellow-China Studies at the Takshashila Institution. Amit Kumar is a Research Analyst with the Takshashila Institution's Indo-Pacific Studies Programme. Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.