Raising the cost for Pakistan: Lessons from the past

Demonstrating immense moral courage, Nanavatty sought to loosen the hitherto tightly held reins and gave operational freedom to even company commanders to engage and destroy targets. In his written instructions, he outlined the types of targets, the nature of weapons to be used, and the (firing) range to which targets could be engaged without seeking approval. And like the military thinker he was, Nanavatty also began preparing his units for steps up the escalation ladder – which included ‘shallow penetration’ offensive tasks across the LoC. Indeed, the General’s thinking was in line with those who planned the much-celebrated ‘surgical strikes’ decades later.

Unconventional methods of fighting, such as small-unit engagements, and superior intelligence gathering were among the highlights of Nanavatty’s nineteen-month tenure at Baramulla. It was a stint whose learnings went a long way in bringing peace back to the Valley and paved the way for a return to democratic processes. But Pakistan and its insistence on fomenting trouble remained unchanged.

Nearly three years later, Nanavatty returned to Kashmir, this time as Chief of Staff of Northern Command. Seven months later, he took over the Northern Army. For the uninitiated, Northern Command – broadly in its current shape and form – was raised in 1972, post the 1971 war with Pakistan, and looks after borders with both Pakistan and China, including the Siachen Glacier.

But the scenario had changed since Nanavatty’s Baramulla tenure. The Kargil conflict had triggered a never-before focus on the Ladakh sector, leading to the creation of 14 Corps to oversee the area. Siachen was always a challenge. In the chapters of the biography that deal with Northern Command, China is rarely mentioned. Nanavatty himself admits that China was low on his priority list, with Army HQ directly dealing with 14 Corps on matters pertaining to the eastern neighbour.

He had his hands full with Pakistan, which had once more managed to ramp up terrorist activities in Kashmir. The Non-Initiation of Combat Operations (NICO), announced unilaterally by the Vajpayee government, was clearly not working – for the simple reason that the Pakistan Army was not party to it. In fact, NICO was taken advantage of by the enemy to infiltrate more terrorists into the Valley.

In discussion with then Chief of Army Staff General S. Padmanabhan, Nanavatty prepared the plan for Operation Kabaddi. It was essentially a punitive strategy to dominate and redefine the LoC in India’s favour and would involve holding territory across the Line. Factoring in various escalations the Pakistan Army might attempt, it envisaged a limited conflict with battalion- or brigade-sized formations advancing and holding territory. Padmanabhan and Nanavatty considered October or November 2001 as a possible start date, but fate had other plans.

9/11 changed the game for anti-terror operations around the world. Armies that had backed terrorism became US allies in the War on Terror. December 2001 saw the Indian Parliament attacked. Operation Parakram followed – the largest mobilisation of the Indian Army. For nearly a year, the military awaited orders to go to war – or to take some major offensive action against Pakistan. But the orders never came.

One of the reasons was that mobilisation took time. And for that, Northern Command under Nanavatty had to shoulder a chunk of the blame. With seven of his nine infantry divisions involved in intense counter-terrorism roles, Nanavatty sought three weeks’ time for these to disengage and reorient themselves to conventional war – time that cost the Army the element of surprise and the chance to catch the Pakistan Army in a semi-prepared state. Moreover, beyond the existing 15 and 16 Corps, he had been provided 3 Corps – freshly arrived from the North-East – for an offensive role. However, with a new Corps Commander, this formation too needed time to familiarise itself. Operation Parakram ended in disappointment.

Beyond anything else, the inability to take Operations Kabaddi or Parakram to their logical conclusion indicated a weakness in political leadership and decision-making. The aspects that were discussed then were similar to those being debated now – What would be the level of escalation? What if Pakistan decides to attack air bases or industrial targets – such as refineries or ports in Gujarat – using drone swarms? What exactly would be Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, and will they resort to tactical nuclear weapons if territory is lost? Does India have the cutting-edge superiority to deal a blow whose effects last beyond the immediate? The only aspect that was more muted then than it is now is the China factor.

Long retired and in his eighties now, as Lt. Gen. Nanavatty looks on at the potential conflict brewing with Pakistan, he must wonder whether the current government will be more decisive and persistent than two decades ago. Will the government and the Indian public be able to accept the casualties of war that will be inevitable? Or will the capture of military personnel – like in 2019 – lead to a quick climbdown and de-escalation? And we, as Indians, will perhaps hope for military leadership that puts professionalism first – just as the General did in 2001–02.

Postscript: Operation Kabaddi may never have taken place, but its principle of grabbing territory via limited conflicts was applied during Nanavatty’s stint as Northern Army Commander. The case pertains to the capture of Point 5070 in the Kargil sector, taking advantage of the ongoing hostilities during Parakram. The point had not been captured during the Kargil war due to the ceasefire coming into effect.

Standing at over 16,000 feet, its capture in 2002 gave the Indian Army a commanding view of enemy positions in the Gultari Valley and dominance over those routes. Nanavatty backed the assault fully, and the loss of the peak so infuriated Pakistani General Musharraf that he sacked the military leadership of that area.