"You can't keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours. You know, eventually those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard." - Hillary Clinton's blunt message to Pakistan in 2011, has become a chillingly prescient indictment of the nation's deep-rooted love relationship with terrorism. More than a decade later, her admonition resonates with renewed urgency.
In the aftermath of the bloodbath in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam – 26 innocent lives lost – the familiar denials from Islamabad ring hollow. India and the international community have been pointing finger at Pakistan, not just a passive harbourer of terror groups, but as an active sponsor and facilitator of their operations.
In a recent interview to Sky News, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif admitted to Pakistan’s involvement in supporting and funding terrorist organisations for the past three decades, often acting on behalf of Western interests during the Cold War era. Asif's admission not only exposes Pakistan's complicity in terrorism but also highlights the enduring consequences of such policies.
It also exposes Islamabad’s double game – on the one hand, it continues to nurture and sponsor these terror outfits, and on the other hand, it plays victim card, calling itself the “biggest victim at the hands of terrorism.”
‘Snakes in the Backyard’: A Legacy of the Cold War
Hillary Clinton's warning about the "snakes in your backyard" was not an isolated admonition. It reflected a growing frustration within the international community, particularly the United States, with Pakistan's perceived duplicity in the war on terror. The roots of this complex and ultimately self-destructive relationship – utilizing terror proxies – can be traced back to the 1980s, during the Soviet-Afghan War.
The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s marked a pivotal moment in the global geopolitics. In its bid to counter Soviet expansionism, the US found a willing ally in Pakistan. Under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan became the primary conduit for funneling arms, money, and training to the Afghan Mujahideen, the Islamist guerrilla fighters who were battling the Soviet forces.
This alliance, however, came at a significant cost. The CIA, with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) as its key partner, played a crucial role in recruiting and training Mujahideen fighters from across the Muslim world. Many of these fighters were radicalized Islamists, drawn to the cause of jihad against the "godless" communists. The ISI, with its own strategic objectives, often favoured the more radical factions among the Mujahideen, including those with links to what would later become Al-Qaeda.
The conflict in Afghanistan became a breeding ground for a new generation of Islamist militants. The war provided them with combat experience, ideological fervour, and a sense of purpose. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, these fighters did not simply disappear. Many of them returned to their home countries, carrying with them a potent mix of radical ideology and military expertise. Others remained in the region, forming the nucleus of new terror organizations.
Pakistan, having played a central role in this process, found itself with a growing problem. The very forces it had helped to create and nurture during the Cold War were now turning against it. The "snakes" that had been cultivated in its backyard were beginning to bite.
In a recent conversation with Moneycontrol, Dr Shalini Chawal, Distinguished Fellow at Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), had also pointed out the decades-old strategy of Pakistan resorting to covert wars through these terrorist organisations.
Khawaja Asif's Admission: A Rare Glimpse Behind the Curtain
Asif's apparent admission that Pakistan has been "sponsoring and funding terrorism and terror groups" for the past three decades, ostensibly at the behest of the United States and the West, is a significant departure from the usual denials. His justification, citing the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s, underscores the deep-rooted nature of this policy.
This statement confirms what many have long suspected: that Pakistan's support for terror groups is not a recent phenomenon, but a long-standing strategic policy. It also reveals the cynical pragmatism that has often characterized Pakistan's foreign policy, where the ends are seen to justify the means, even if those means involve supporting violent extremism.
Asif's remarks also highlight the complex and often contradictory nature of Pakistan's relationship with the West. While officially an ally in the war on terror, Pakistan has been accused of playing a double game, providing safe haven and support to the very groups that the West is fighting. This duplicity has eroded trust and created deep fissures in the relationship.
Pahalgam Massacre: Pakistan’s Denial and the Weight of Mounting Evidence
In the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack, Pakistan, as expected, vehemently denied any involvement. Islamabad condemned the attack and reiterated its commitment to fighting terrorism. However, these denials ring increasingly hollow in the face of mounting evidence and historical precedent.
India, based on its own intelligence and past experience, has been quick to point the finger at Pakistan. New Delhi has accused Islamabad of continuing to provide safe haven, training, and logistical support to terror groups, and of using them as proxies to carry out attacks in India. The evidence presented by India, often corroborated by international sources, paints a damning picture of Pakistan's continued support for terrorism.
The survivors' accounts, as mentioned earlier, of terrorists demanding that tourists recite the Kalma to identify and selectively target non-Muslims, further exposes the sectarian and religiously motivated nature of the attack, a tactic frequently employed by groups with links to Pakistan.
Pakistan's Old Deeds Haunting It Now: The Blowback Effect
Pakistan's policies of supporting and nurturing terror groups -- which it has adopted since its inception -- are now coming back to haunt it in a phenomenon known as "blowback." The very groups that were once seen as strategic assets are now turning against the Pakistani state, carrying out attacks on its soil and destabilizing its society.
The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group with close ties to the Afghan Taliban, is a prime example of this blowback. The TTP has waged a bloody insurgency against the Pakistani state for over a decade, carrying out suicide bombings, attacks on security forces, and other acts of violence. The group's ideology and tactics are rooted in the same radical Islamist ideology that was fostered during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s.
Meanwhile, other terror groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), while primarily focused on targeting India, also pose a threat to Pakistan's internal security. These groups operate with a degree of impunity within Pakistan, often enjoying the tacit support of elements within the state apparatus. However, their very existence creates a climate of fear and instability, and their actions can have unintended consequences for Pakistan.
The economic consequences of this blowback are also significant. The security situation in Pakistan has deterred foreign investment, hampered economic growth, and created a climate of uncertainty. The country's tourism industry, once a source of revenue, has been decimated by terrorism.
Hillary Clinton’s metaphor has come full circle. Pakistan’s snakes have outgrown the backyard and are biting with impunity.
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