HomeWorldPakistan’s 27th Amendment puts European market access at risk: Why EU must reassess GSP+

Pakistan’s 27th Amendment puts European market access at risk: Why EU must reassess GSP+

By elevating the armed forces to a constitutionally dominant position and limiting judicial independence, Pakistan has signalled that civilian supremacy is no longer central to its governance model.

November 25, 2025 / 14:14 IST
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File photo of Pakistani Army Chief General Syed Asim Munir (2L) interacting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a meeting in Rawalpindi.
File photo of Pakistani Army Chief General Syed Asim Munir (2L) interacting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a meeting in Rawalpindi.

The passage of Pakistan’s 27th Constitutional Amendment marks a decisive and troubling shift in the country’s political architecture. What has long functioned informally now stands codified in law. The military no longer merely influences civilian governance from the shadows; it has been formally positioned at the heart of the state, weakening democratic institutions and placing Pakistan on a direct collision course with the expectations tied to its GSP+ status with the European Union.

This amendment is not an ordinary constitutional tweak. It represents a systemic consolidation of power in the hands of the military establishment. By elevating the armed forces to a constitutionally dominant position and limiting judicial independence, Pakistan has signalled that civilian supremacy is no longer central to its governance model. The principle of democratic accountability, already fragile, has been further hollowed out.

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This development carries serious implications for Pakistan’s relationship with the European Union. The GSP+ scheme offers preferential access to European markets as a reward for compliance with 27 international conventions that cover human rights, labour standards, environmental protections and good governance. These are not symbolic obligations. They form the backbone of the agreement. When a state begins restructuring itself around military authority, it fundamentally contradicts the democratic governance requirements of the scheme.

Pakistan’s legal framework has now moved closer to formalising military oversight over both the executive and judicial processes. The sidelining of the Supreme Court, the expansion of military jurisdiction and the enhanced role for uniformed leadership in strategic decision-making all weaken the separation of powers. This erosion of institutional balance undermines any credible claim that Pakistan remains aligned with the core values of GSP+.