Pakistan up for grabs: It's the prize in a US-China contest. How long before it becomes the battlefield?

ALSO READ: Trump's short-term love affair with Asim Munir: Why Washington’s Pakistan crush always ends in a breakup

This dynamic undermines the notion of a civilian-led Pakistan and strengthens the perception that the military calls the shots on key policies, especially those affecting India. For New Delhi, the optics of Munir sitting alongside Shehbaz in discussions with Trump are a reminder that its neighbour’s security establishment is being legitimised at the highest levels of US diplomacy.

Why the US is re-engaging in Pakistan

Despite years of strained ties, Washington is again trying to woo Pakistan. Several reasons seem to be behind this renewed interest. Pakistan sits at a strategic crossroads between the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Its ports, especially Gwadar, provide access to the Arabian Sea and are close to vital shipping lanes. Pakistan also possesses vast reserves of minerals, including those needed for renewable energy technologies. Trump’s administration is reportedly exploring deals for Pakistani oil imports and investment in Balochistan’s mineral sector. These resources and locations are tempting for a US eager to secure supply chains and counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

At the same time, the US views Pakistan as a potential partner for counterterrorism and regional stability, especially in Afghanistan. By drawing Pakistan closer, Washington hopes to limit China’s growing hold on the country. Yet this re-engagement comes at the cost of ignoring Pakistan’s role in fostering terror groups and destabilising its neighbours, especially India. For New Delhi, it signals a worrying willingness by Washington to overlook security concerns for strategic convenience.

China’s deepening grip on Pakistan

China, meanwhile, is already deeply entrenched in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This multibillion-dollar infrastructure and energy project has tied Pakistan’s economy to Beijing’s largesse. Chinese companies are building roads, railways, power plants and even security facilities across the country. In return, China gains a crucial overland route to the Arabian Sea and a foothold close to the Persian Gulf. It also gets access to Pakistan’s raw materials and a reliable market for its goods.

Beijing’s influence is not merely economic. China has supplied Pakistan with advanced military hardware, including fighter jets, drones and naval vessels. It has helped Pakistan build its missile and nuclear programmes. This tight relationship allows China to use Pakistan as a counterweight to India and as a pressure point in South Asian geopolitics. For India, China’s shadow over Pakistan’s security and economic policies makes the neighbourhood even more volatile.

Pakistan’s military as the gatekeeper

Asim Munir’s inclusion in the September 25 meeting highlights how Pakistan’s army controls the country’s engagement with both the US and China. The military has historically positioned itself as the ultimate arbiter of foreign policy. Whether it is seeking American weapons during the Cold War or embracing Chinese investment through CPEC, the generals in Rawalpindi have always been the gatekeepers.

Munir is consolidating this tradition. His frequent overseas visits and direct talks with foreign leaders indicate he is more than just a military commander. He is Pakistan’s chief diplomat and power broker rolled into one. This concentration of power in the army’s hands leaves little room for civilian oversight. It also means decisions about India; Afghanistan and the broader region are taken primarily with military objectives in mind. From an Indian viewpoint, the US appearing to court Munir legitimises an anti-India establishment.

What Pakistan gets out of this courtship

On the surface, Pakistan benefits from being courted by both Washington and Beijing. It can extract financial aid, investment, military hardware and diplomatic support. By playing one power against the other, Islamabad hopes to maximise its bargaining position. This strategy is not new. Pakistan has repeatedly leveraged its geographic location to secure foreign assistance, from Cold War alliances with the US to strategic partnerships with China.

However, this approach carries serious risks. Dependence on foreign powers has made Pakistan’s economy vulnerable and its policies inconsistent. Chinese loans under CPEC have added to Pakistan’s debt burden. US assistance often comes with conditions or abrupt reversals, as seen when Washington cut aid after the Bin Laden raid. Islamabad’s attempt to be indispensable to both powers may backfire if either side loses patience or sees diminishing returns. For a country already facing inflation, political instability and internal militancy, such dependence is dangerous.

Why India should be alarmed

From India’s perspective, the Trump–Shehbaz–Munir meeting represents more than just a photo opportunity. It signals that Washington might again overlook Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism in favour of strategic and economic deals. If Trump’s administration moves forward with oil and mineral agreements, it could strengthen the very institutions that direct anti-India activities. The presence of Munir at the table underlines that it is Pakistan’s army, not its civilian leadership, which will benefit from any American largesse.

China’s ongoing investments in Pakistan also threaten India. Infrastructure built under CPEC runs through disputed territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India considers its own. Chinese military cooperation with Pakistan increases the risk of a two-front security challenge for India. The combination of US re-engagement and Chinese entrenchment in Pakistan therefore heightens New Delhi’s security concerns at a time when its own trade negotiations with Washington are strained.

Risks for Pakistan

While Pakistan’s leadership may believe it is cleverly balancing two superpowers, the reality is more precarious. Over-reliance on external patrons undermines Pakistan’s sovereignty and distorts its economy. Chinese projects have raised concerns about debt traps, environmental damage and local resentment. US deals could similarly provoke backlash if they are seen as exploitative or as compromising Pakistan’s autonomy. Moreover, by allowing the military to dominate foreign policy, Pakistan risks further weakening its democratic institutions. This could fuel internal unrest and make the country even less stable.

There is also the danger of alienating one patron while courting the other. If US and Chinese interests in Pakistan collide, Islamabad could be forced to choose sides. Such a scenario might lead to sanctions, withdrawal of investment or heightened geopolitical tension on Pakistani soil. For India, instability in a nuclear-armed neighbour with a history of cross-border militancy is a nightmare scenario.

The road ahead

The September 25 meeting is likely to produce warm statements and perhaps some announcements about aid or investment. But beneath the smiles lies a troubling picture. Pakistan’s military, personified by Asim Munir, remains firmly in control of the country’s strategic direction. The United States appears ready to deal with this reality rather than challenge it, while China continues to deepen its economic and military footprint. Pakistan hopes to profit from both relationships, yet risks becoming beholden to foreign interests and losing whatever remains of its democratic credibility.

For India, this is not just a story about great-power competition. It is about the legitimisation of a security establishment that has consistently undermined regional stability. The US and China may see Pakistan as a prize, but India sees it as a source of persistent threats. Trump’s willingness to engage directly with Munir only reinforces that perception. Unless Washington takes India’s security concerns seriously, its renewed courtship of Pakistan could undo years of painstaking diplomatic progress.