Will Bangladesh Army stage a coup?

The Yunus government came to power with the military support. However, it is trying to widen and exploit the wedge amongst the military leadership - best evident in fraternizing with disgruntled generals with a radical ideology, appointment of a national security advisor, and agreeing to the so-called ‘humanitarian corridor’ to Myanmar. The Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff is apparently not happy with these developments.

The consequential divide - government and military leadership speaking in a different language, is not a healthy sign for Bangladesh, going through a tumultuous phase in the aftermath of the students’-led revolution against Sheikh Hasina Government.

A Fragile State Characterized By Weak Institutions

Bangladesh is a fragile state with weak institutions. The early generation of leadership after Bangladesh’s liberation in 1971 did not get enough time to consolidate their hold on power and institutionalise democracy as a way of governance and as a way of life.

It’s in the last decade that the Bangladesh economy had entered the ‘take-off’ stage and achieved unparalleled economic development. The state in Bangladesh was increasingly being seen as having the capacity to ‘deliver’. Nevertheless, the students’-led overthrow of the Hasina government create pangs of doubt if Bangladesh as a state is still in the ‘project stage’.

Weaknesses in the Military

Even though Bangladesh military is one of the few functional institutions, the fragility index has highly affected its rank and structure. Consequently, Bangladesh suffers from a high level of ‘politicisation of military and militarisation of politics’ syndrome, typical of many low-income countries aspiring to climb the democratic ladder. While Bangladesh military has probably the best international record in UN peacekeeping operations, it remains a relatively patrimonial organisation when compared to the expectational framework for professional armies.

Bangladesh has suffered in past from all types of military coups mentioned in writings. The 1975 coup against the then popular leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was led by a handful of junior-level officers. In May 1981, Lt Gen Zia, the then President, was killed by a group of about twenty middle-level officers. In March 1982, Lt Gen H M Ershad led the first and only top-level military coup.

‘Coup-proofing’ Bangladesh

Despite coup-proofing efforts in last three decades that included expansion of the paramilitary forces to almost double the size of the Bangladesh armed forces, the military enjoys a larger than life status.

For example, there are 3 four-star generals and equivalent (heading the army, navy and the air force), seven lieutenant generals and equivalent, and a mind-blowing 87 major generals and equivalent officers over a 227,000 strong military. Bangladesh has no hostile neighbour to contend with the sole exception of a one-time historical incident of a war-like situation with Myanmar. With a military budget of more than $4 billion, it ranks 35th in the global pecking order of military powers.

Bangladesh, therefore, has a militarised society though there is a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic regimes in last few decades and the military leadership has thwarted sporadic dissent attempts by disgruntled elements within their ranks in favour of civilian control.

When the students’-led protests toppled the Sheikh Hasina Government, the military refrained from usurping power. Instead, it honoured the students’ demand for Yunus as the caretaker government chief advisor.

Factors that Make a Military Coup Unlikely

However, in the new atmospherics, it is debatable if Bangladesh military has the same reverence for civilian control. In an ideational situation, the military may have launched a coup. However, there are numerous constraints.

First, according to several CIA country reports, the Bangladesh military always had many disgruntled officers in past and was too disorganised. That trend continues unabated. Bangladesh army, in particular, is not cohesive and discipline is poor. Internal factionalism is a continuing source of potential instability.

Second, military experts are near unanimous that any military coup attempt is a ‘coordinated military game’. Any split within the ranks may lead to a civil war. The coup dynamics, in all fairness, is not favourable. At this stage, the Bangladesh army faces tangential, if not direct, challenges from (at least) one of its own Lt Generals who was holding meetings with Pakistan’s ISI and radical elements within the country in past.

Third, any coup attempt at this stage may portray the caretaker government as a sacrificial lamb and complicate the transition efforts towards democratic elections. The hypothesis that ‘enough time was not given to the caretaker government to create conducive atmospherics for holding elections’ will gain the ground. Requisite mass support may not come and may instead lead to mobilization of radical forces.

The democratization project has been a relative failure in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the armed forces have shown deference to civilian control in last three decades and would move towards a coup only if the caretaker government becomes increasingly unpopular and they push towards a controversial theme (like the just-resolved humanitarian corridor issue). It remains to be seen how the future situation unfolds in Bangladesh.

(The author is in the Indian Defence Accounts Department.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this publication.