Trump’s MAGA agenda is clear. The question now is can it reinforce India’s own economic goal

Trump has said that he will soon bring the Russia/ Ukraine conflict to an end. Among his core supporters and the elected Republicans in US Congress, there is not much appetite for continuing the levels of economic and military support to Ukraine that had been provided in the Biden Administration, amounting to more than $100 billion.

The Trump strategy would be to try and freeze the conflict around existing lines of control. However, Ukraine would want assurances that its options for deeper European and NATO integration are not constrained, and costs are raised for Russia if it seeks to resume military action after a period of calm and rebuild. Russia, in turn, would like to ensure that the option for Ukraine to join NATO is taken off the table, and its security and historical interests related to Ukraine are recognised, the very raison d’etre advanced for the conflict that began in February 2022.

It will be easier for Trump to pressurise Ukraine than Russia, which has withstood intense US sanctions for nearly two years. In Trump 1.0, however, US Congress had moved through CAATSA (Countering American Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) to constrain President Trump’s options by mandating sanctions against other countries for any major economic and defense purchases from Russia. This time around, major European countries would be alienated from US if it is seen as abandoning their security interests in Europe. They see a major ongoing and future challenge to their own long-term security from Russia’s actions. If disappointed with US in this context, they may not fully line up behind US strategy on China, which they so far see as economic opportunity and challenge, rather than a security threat.

Trump’s Iran strategy needs watching

In West Asia, a phase one ceasefire has been reached, with some initial release of hostages and prisoners. There are uncertainties about it evolving into a phase two, with two- thirds of current Israeli hostages still present at end of phase one. Hamas, through the visible display of its armed presence at the start of the ceasefire on January 19, has signaled that it has survived as a force in Gaza, despite nearly 15 months of intense Israeli bombardment and military action.

There are the longer-term issues about continued Israeli presence in Gaza, acceptance of Hamas governance in Gaza, rebuilding of infrastructure destroyed in the conflict, and resurrecting the momentum of the Abraham accords of 2020, and potential Israeli- Saudi normalisation contingent on a credible path to a Palestinian State. Trump seeks to project himself as even more supportive of Israel than President Biden. His efforts to promote reconciliation between Israel and other countries in the region, and decisions related to Iran’s nuclear and other capabilities will now need to be watched.

Mixed signals on China

Trump’s most consequential decision, from our point of view, would be on China. In Trump 1.0, the US National Security and Defense Strategies had clearly defined China as an adversary, with predatory economic policies. He had levied higher tariffs on a range of Chinese imports into US but done a limited Phase 1 trade agreement in January 2020 with them, when he needed a commitment of Chinese purchase of farm produce from the politically sensitive mid- West US States.

This time he has nominated in his national security team persons such as National Security Adviser Mike Walz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who are seen as China hawks. But his economic team, such as Treasury Secretary Bessent and Commerce Secretary Lutnick, as well as close adviser Elon Musk are heavily invested in the China relationship.

Unusually, Trump invited Chinese President XI to attend his inauguration and spoke to him recently on phone. He is granting Tik Tok more time to continue in the US despite a US law and Supreme Court decision banning its US operations.

All these decisions and choices will have a bearing on India. If US moves positively with Russia, there will less of an adversarial gaze on the India- Russia relationship and potential sanctions on our purchases of Russian oil and defense items. A calmer West Asia will reinvigorate work on I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and US) projects, and IMEC (India Middle East Europe Corridor) for infrastructure.

Can Trump’s agenda be mutually reinforcing with India’s economic goals?

The world is grappling with the consequences of concentration of manufacturing (32 percent of global value added) in China, its buildup of excess capacities, and focus on exports (now a $ 1 trillion trade surplus) amidst an economy with structural debt and other challenges, and heavily restricted domestic consumption. US tariffs on China, restrictions on outbound investment and on technology will impact US business decisions on reordering of supply chains. Sustaining of the intense US-China technology competition on semiconductors, artificial intelligence and other emerging and critical technologies will also impact the value of the India partnership with its 1.4 billion people and acknowledged strengths in skilled tech human capital.

The India-US relationship had been strengthened in Trump 1.0, through revival of the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia), articulation by US of an Indo- Pacific strategy where it saw value in the India relationship to also deal with the China challenge, start of a 2+2 dialogue of Foreign and Defense Ministers of the two countries, and placing India on STA 1 (Strategic Trade Authorization Level 1) for highest level technology releases on par with NATO partners of US.

In Trump 2.0, there will be a need to demonstrate that Make America Great Again in economic and technology terms, and Aatmanirbhar Bharat can be mutually reinforcing.