Recently, the Maldives government decided to terminate a hydrography agreement with India, committing to conduct hydrographic activities independently after June next year. Separately, New Delhi has raised its objections with Malé that the Chinese survey vessel, Shi Yan 6, not be allowed to dock and pursue scientific exploration, such as deep water exploration, next year.
New Delhi is concerned that a “pro-China” government in Malé may deepen China’s influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). How concerned should India be with Maldives’ relationship with China, and Chinese activities in the IOR?
A day after President Mohamed Muizzu assumed office, the Maldivian government requested the Indian government to remove 75 Indian troops from Maldivian soil, arguing that the presence meant “foreign interference” in the country’s affairs, a move in line with Muizzu’s “India-Out” election campaign.
What Malé’s Decision Implies
Maldives’ decision to not renew the cooperation in Hydrography between the Indian Navy and the Maldives National Defence Force means that hydrographic exploration after June 2024 will be conducted by the Maldives’ National Defence Force (MNDF). Malé is concerned about India’s hydrographic activity being used as an intelligence function.
The decision to not renew the pact does not have any concrete strategic disadvantages for India, however. Hydrographic surveys by India were done at Malé’s request to aid the mapping of Maldives’ maritime domain and is a demand that comes from a wide variety of stakeholders, like marine ecologists and scientists, or military strategists and national security planners. In response to the non-renewal, India has emphasised that the initiative has catered to Maldives’ development, much like similar initiatives catered to other countries in the IOR.
The non-renewal however, does mean a downgrade in maritime cooperation between India and Maldives, including a setback for India’s ‘Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (SAGAR) policy.
Muizzu has said that his anti-India stance does not imply more Chinese involvement, categorically stating that the removal of Indian military personnel will not be replaced by Chinese military personnel. Muizzu has said that the larger idea is to not “redraw [the] regional balance by bringing in Chinese forces”, and stated he was not siding with any particular country.
Burgeoning Maldives-China Relationship
Recent meetings between the Maldivian leadership and Chinese officials indicate a burgeoning relationship for the time to come. The leadership sees the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in a positive light, with Muizzu stating he had “...very high expectations on [the BRI]”, and that the initiative “can play a crucial role in [the Maldives’] development”.
At the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in October earlier this year, Muizzu mentioned the benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework and committed to building “close and friendly” relations within the framework. Muizzu also placed Chinese global initiatives — the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) — as “conducive” to Maldives’ national security, and social and economic development. Beijing, it seems, has “reassured” Maldives that it would bolster development projects and investments in the Indian Ocean island state.
Maldives also attended the 2nd China-Indian Ocean Forum in Kunming, earlier this month, which it last year had declined to attend for unknown reasons. The forum saw Maldives’ Vice President Hussain Latheef encourage greater multilateral participation in the Indian Ocean Region and cooperation that was inclusive and “without discrimination”.
China’s policy towards IOR cooperation has centred around regional development. Its priorities include strengthening maritime development cooperation, areas such as blue economy and disaster prevention and mitigation for IOR Small Island Development States (SIDS) like the Maldives and Sri Lanka.
Spotlight On Muizzu
Muizzu’s foreign policy stance may lead to the downsizing of Maldives-India security relations. It would lead to an upswing in security engagement with China if Malé were to interpret that Maldives’ sovereignty is best interpreted if cooperation with China is ramped up. On the development front, Maldives may likely still see the prospect of increased development cooperation with both India and China, as Muizzu’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi also indicates.
An advancement in Sino-Maldives security relations would have several security implications for the IOR. First, it would normalize Chinese presence — both military and non-military — and make China’s status as an IOR player firmer.
Former President Abdulla Yameen’s government had accepted the establishment of a Joint Ocean Observation Station in Makunudhoo island, the westernmost Maldivian atoll, through the ‘Protocol on Establishment of Joint Ocean Observation Station’. However, his successor Ibrahim Solih’s government scrapped the decision in 2019. Today with Muizzu’s government in power, that prospect may return given Beijing’s interest in the proposition. The station may have dual, civilian and military uses. Scientific access to the IOR, if utilised for military means by China, will have several strategic disadvantages for India.
Second, Maldives is a member of several IOR institutions where it cooperates with India. A shift in Maldives’ priorities in the IOR security realm may disrupt the stability of the IOR, purely in terms of consensus regarding what security amounts to for numerous states in the Indian Ocean, especially SIDS, and the terms over which India cooperates with them.
The success of any institution focused on cooperation rests on the strength of consensus within that grouping regarding priority areas. Take the Colombo Security Conclave, a multilateral grouping consisting of India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Mauritius, with Bangladesh and Seychelles as observers. It recently met in Port Louis, without Maldives’ presence.
The Conclave works on bolstering IOR security by focusing on traditional and non-traditional security challenges, and other hybrid security concerns. A shift in Malé’s priorities could modify the roadmap for institutions like the Colombo Security Conclave, and alter the larger principles behind the India-Maldives maritime cooperation, especially traditional maritime security cooperation.
That being said, Maldives doesn't necessarily need to pursue pro-China policies, although a tilt towards China may very well occur. Even if there is a tilt towards China, it does not have to mean cooperation with India will cease, just like how the former Maldivian administration’s ‘India-first’ policy did not deter Maldives from deepening engagement with China across many domains.
It is not uncommon for SIDS to pursue balancing behaviour with larger states like India and China, including in the security realm. Therefore, as David Brewster writes, Muizzu may create the public perception of distance from India, but it may likely not be a radical shift in how Maldives has engaged with India and China before.
Bharat Sharma is Research Analyst, Indo-Pacific Studies Programme, The Takshashila Institution. X ID: @SBharat98. Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.
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