Is India overestimating Israel’s role as a trusted defence partner?  

The war with Ukraine has resulted in supply-chain trouble, with Russian production being focused on its requirements. Understandably, Delhi could have concerns about the long-term dependability of the Russian defence supply chain, which shows signs of struggling with immense internal demand.

Parallelly, Russia continues to grow closer to China both economically and strategically, as its isolation from the Western world pushes it closer to Beijing. Reports even claim that Chinese components help Russian defence manufacturing facilities produce critical technologies like drones. This raises concerns in the long run, about whether Russia will be able to remain both neutral and reliable, especially as India-China relations remain strained. Given that the reliability of defence partnerships seems intrinsically tied to the domestic conditions and international discourse surrounding the partnering countries, arguably, they are not so reliable after all.

Long military ties bind Israel and India

Similarly, India and Israel’s arms affair is not a new one, and began with India’s need for precision-guided munitions during the Kargil war. This exchange of military technology and the many exchanges that followed cemented Israel’s reputation as a ‘friend in need’, and the subsequent decades have seen many defence orders and joint-production contracts.

Israel’s perception as a reliable partner stemmed from the fact that it had a reputation for not having placed stringent political conditions on its sales to India. Israel’s advancements in cutting-edge military technology also allowed India to have access to advanced systems without becoming overtly reliant on the United States.

Although there have been declines in India’s imports from Israel in recent times, India’s arms imports from Israel grew as much as 33-fold from 2015-2024, and last year the cumulative weapons trade between the two countries was estimated at $185 billion.

Iran’s balancing role

All the while, India also balanced its ties with Iran and other West Asian countries. While Israel has proven to be a cornerstone of India’s defence imports, Iran is a significant actor in balancing India’s dynamics with Pakistan and also provides it access to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port.

On the economic front, the GCC (comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman) is India’s largest trading bloc, and also hosts some of the largest Indian diasporas. A significant proportion of Indian crude oil imports also come from the region, even if imports from Russia rose subsequent to its invasion of Ukraine. Thus far, India has been able to balance these relationships with its dependence on Israel, but today India’s silence threatens to upset some of these ties.

Given India’s tensions in the neighbourhood, especially with Pakistan and China, the desire for stable sources for its defence procurement is understandable. India appears to have taken a gamble in its effective alignment with Israel over the many months that have followed October 7th– only time will tell if this gamble has paid off.

Betting too much on the Abraham Accords

The Abraham Accords that were brokered in 2020 by Trump normalised relations between Israel and Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco and Sudan, and sidelined the Palestine issue. India’s alignment with Israel appears to have been based on the assumption that the Abraham Accords would not come under immense pressure, and the relationships between Israel and other signatories would not be strained to this extent. Their premise was that peace in the region could be achieved while bypassing Israel’s history of issues with Palestine as a fundamental hindrance to long-term stability.

Today, this central point of the accords appears to be under challenge. The UAE and Bahrain have both issued statements condemning Israel’s attack on Iran, and while Morocco has remained silent on the issue, it has condemned previous Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians. While all three states maintained a neutral position at the beginning of the conflict, they have since been vocal against Israel’s actions. Domestically, all three countries have faced pressure from their populations as well.

As was the case with Russia, Israel’s dependability, too, is likely to be subject to its own internal pressures and considerations, as well as international pressures.

While the United States continues to support Israel, there appears to be a shift in the narrative surrounding Israel, especially amongst its immediate neighbours. Moreover, as the US’ own foreign policy continues to become increasingly unpredictable as well as transactional with the current administration, India is likely to consider the US less reliable as well.

As the volatile situation continues to unfold, things could progressively deteriorate, and India may need to reassess its efforts to maintain a neutral stance on the Middle East. Perhaps the importance of having a trusted defence partner is overplayed.