China is now busy navigating headwinds from the Ukraine conflict

Meanwhile,  President Xi Jinping will be meeting French president Emmanuel Macron in Paris in May, where the main agenda is again expected to be trade. Trade volumes between China and France amount to more than $100 billion, the balance favouring China. Currently, France and Russia are locked in a war of words over Macron's proposal to send troops to Ukraine.

The economic aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic, together with China’s own policies of overlending have negatively impacted the Chinese economy. Given its economic and technological dependence on the US and EU, all of whom oppose Russia's “special military operation" in Ukraine, China is thus trying to balance relations with both sides and hedge itself against the prolonged conflict in Ukraine and its close relations with Russia.

Of course, China has stood to greatly benefit from the Ukraine War. It has emerged as one of the largest buyers of discounted Russian crude – importing 107.024 million tons in 2023, its exports to Russia have increased exponentially – by 46.9 percent, in 2023 bilateral trade volume amounted to US$240.112 billion, and almost 90 percent of bilateral trade is being conducted in yuan.

China has also refused to condemn Russia’s “special military operations” in Ukraine since they began in February 2022, even blaming the West for fuelling the conflict, and on several occasions refused to vote for any anti-Russia resolution in the UN Security Council. Xi was one of the first world leaders to congratulate President Vladimir Putin on his recent electoral victory.

Ukraine War Starts Hurting China

However, as the war prolongs there are implications.  First are the sanctions on Chinese entities for "supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine". The most recent ones came in late February. Next are Chinese fears regarding North Korean defence cooperation with Russia, which may invite further US military presence in the region.

This may be why China is doubling down on efforts to get both Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table. Of course, China had in 2023 put forth its own 12-point peace formula which critics say was not a peace deal – as it put no pressure on Russia – but merely China’s own position on the war. Western countries had rejected it and in turn Beijing had refrained from attending any Western initiative for resolution of the crisis. But it did attend the Jeddah “peace talks” in August 2023 which were stillborn as Russia was not invited to it.

More recently, Li Hui, the Chinese government’s special representative for Eurasian affairs, has been engaging in shuttle diplomacy visiting Moscow, Brussels, Kyiv, and other European capitals, attempting mediation. Beijing has also been invited to participate in a Global Peace Summit on Ukraine in Switzerland scheduled to be held this year before summer. With Russia reiterating that no settlement on Ukraine is possible without Moscow’s participation, Beijing may be urged to try to get Russia to the Switzerland meet.

The most surprising evidence, however, is an op-ed piece titled 10 reasons China and Russia differ in their approach to international rules published in the South China Morning Post.  Written by Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs, at Renmin University of China, it outlined how China adheres to and navigates international rules more positively than Russia.  Since such opinion pieces by experts of state funded institutions are not simply written; it is a pointer to how China currently sees itself vis-a-vis Russia.

Aditi Bhaduri is a journalist and political analyst. Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.