OPINION | Asim Munir’s constitutional coup leaves him with a target on his back

The new amendments abolished the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) to replace it with a new position – the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). The serving Chief of Army Staff (COAS), currently held by Asim Munir, automatically occupies this expanded role, merging two influential offices and remodelling the command structure of the country.

Theoretically seeming like a bureaucratic reshuffle, in effect, it can be regarded as a structural coup. By elevating the Army Chief to CDF, the amendment formally subordinates the Air Force and Navy, reducing their chiefs to divisional-level commanders under the Army’s authority.

Strategic planning, nuclear oversight, inter-service coordination, defence procurement, and resource allocation are now consolidated within a single office - one that is historically, culturally, and structurally rooted in the land-centric ethos of Pakistan’s military. This institutional culture is influenced by the mindset focused on ground defence against India, counter-insurgency in the borders with Afghanistan and Iran, as well as internal security operations.

Where the Navy and Air Force chiefs previously retained operational autonomy within their respective domains, they now answer vertically to the CDF. Strategic planning, nuclear oversight, inter-service coordination, defence procurement, and resource allocation are all consolidated under a single military office.

Changes are designed to benefit an individual rather than an institution

These provisions, appearing to cement the position of one individual rather than the institution, go a step further by granting lifetime protections to five-star officers, including Field Marshals, and providing them legal immunity under Articles 248 and 47. In the history of Pakistan, this rank has been held only by General Ayub Khan, and now, by General Munir.

This pattern has been seen before. Ayub Khan elevated himself to Field Marshal in 1959 and revised the constitution to embed his presidential ambitions. General Zia-ul-Haq brought in the Eighth Amendment to launder a coup into constitutional legality. General Pervez Musharraf’s dual-hat arrangement, serving both as a President and COAS, further fused civilian and military authority under one single individual.

The internal gamble 

Historically, the Pakistan Army’s supremacy has been institutional, rarely personalised. As history warns, the embers of the flames may not ignite from friction between the military and civilian authority, but from within the military establishment itself.

At the peak of his power, Musharraf’s efforts to cement personal power, ultimately produced institutional fatigue. His ouster was triggered by his own establishment, which grew sceptical of a chief whose personal ambitions began to subvert the institution’s credibility.

As Munir takes a similar path, fortified by constitutional immunity, the same risks persist. The potential for dissent can arise from alienating officers from the other services and even ambitious generals within the Army, who may regard these amendments as a hindrance to the national flow of power, and promotion.

Could the amendments lead to inter-service friction?

Those in favour of the amendment argue that it aims to ‘plug holes’ in the current institutional framework, and increase integration and unification between the services. Yet, critics of the amendment believe that this may actually erode away at inter-service unity. With a concentration of power in the hands of the army, Pakistan’s Navy (PN) and Air Force (PAF) are likely to have less autonomy, a retired three-star general told an international publication. This could allow resentment to fester, potentially leading to dissatisfaction and inter-service friction between the army and the other two services.

This also comes months after the clashes between India and Pakistan in May, where Pakistan’s Air Force emerged as the most prominent actor out of the three limbs of Pakistan’s military. Pakistani leaders claimed a decisive victory after a ceasefire was declared, claiming that they downed several Indian fighter jets successfully. Undermining the decision-making power of the Air Force at this juncture raises questions about whether the decision had to do anything to do with the clashes.

Elimination of civilian oversight over nuclear weapons

The amendment also creates yet another new post– the Commander of the National Strategic Command (CNSC). The CNSC will be responsible for managing the NSC, which will be overseeing Pakistan’s nuclear forces. This effectively replaces the National Command Authority, which was previously responsible for the country’s nuclear button, assisted by the Strategic Plans Division (SPD). Although there have been speculations for a while about Munir’s oversized influence over the country’s nuclear infrastructure, the amendment formalises this, and eliminates any civilian oversight that existed through the SPD.

While the nuclear decision-making now lies squarely with the army, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are distributed within all three forces. The Air Force operates aircraft such as the JF Thunder that are capable of carrying and deploying nuclear cruise missiles. The Navy is actively developing nuclear submarines capable of carrying sea-based nuclear cruise missiles, such as the Babur-3. While these submarines are still in the testing and R&D stage, Pakistan’s navy aims to have sea-based deterrent and second-strike capabilities.

Finally, the army operates land-based nuclear delivery systems such as the Hatf-IX Nasr tactical nuclear weapon, and ballistic missiles like the Shaheen-1A that are capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The concentration of authority in the hands of the army over the entire arsenal, is also likely to lead to dissatisfaction among the Navy and Air Force. This also makes Pakistan’s nuclear signalling more concerning, even though the chances of nuclear escalation are next to zero.

As this garrison-state reality in Pakistan becomes cemented in law, the risks of internal imbalance rise. The consolidation of all military decision-making in one office risks inter-service dissatisfaction and dissent. The provision of lifelong legal immunity to the CDF also opens doors for constitutional manipulation and overreach.

While the amendment may be heralded as a way to bring about integration, the consolidation of both military and political power in the eager hands of Field Marshal Munir may come with more risks than rewards.

(Adya Madhavan is a Research Analyst at Takshashila Institution working on advanced military technologies and geopolitics.)

(Aishwaria Sonavane is Research Analyst for Pakistan Studies at the Takshashila Institution.)

Views are personal, and do not represent the stance of this publication.