Why opium cultivation is shifting from Afghanistan to Pakistan

Pakistani officials are handling the upsurge as both a domestic and foreign crisis. Balochistan chief minister Sarfraz Bugti pledged the state would not allow "one inch" of ground to be handed over to poppy, terming the drug trade a "disgrace" to the nation. The government has spent more than Rs1bn ($3.5mn) on eradication efforts this year so far, using armed squads and weedicide to burn fields. But officials do admit that each year it becomes more challenging to keep the cultivation in check, with farmers intruding into remote valleys or utilizing high-power solar-powered wells allowing poppy to bloom in arid soil.

Why Pakistan is vulnerable

In contrast to Afghanistan, where the Taliban exert central dominance, Pakistan is unable to exert control over portions of Balochistan. Insurgency and separatist violence have destabilized the province, making it possible for criminal enterprises. More than 2,000 people were murdered in violence related to militants during 2024, a figure driven further by the infusion of drug money into militant organizations. Poor governance, rugged geography, and plentiful labour have combined to create a recipe for the return of poppy cultivation.

A world and regional problem

The expansion of Pakistani production has produced mixed world impacts. It has kept heroin relatively cheap in Europe, thus preventing a steep spike in the manufacture of synthetic drugs such as fentanyl that have devastated America. However, it might brand Pakistan as a source for global drug markets, which would further blur its global reputation and complicate relationships with Europe. Experts warn that in the event of failure to eradicate, Balochistan can become the new hub of global heroin trade.

Afghan farmers turned migrant workers

The Taliban ban had rendered millions of Afghan farmers deprived of their primary source of income. Most have moved to Pakistan to work as sharecroppers on poppy farms, taking with

them the art and know-how of cultivation. Pakistani officials highlight this migration when asserting justification for their deportation campaign, which already sent back over 800,000 Afghans, with a further million to be deported by 2025. One reason for the presence of skilled Afghan labourers is how quickly the trade has increased in Pakistan.

The scale of the endeavour

David Mansfield, one of the leading authorities on the opium economy, has never seen such vast crops as those being seen develop in Balochistan—neither in Afghanistan at the height of its production in 2017. Analysts believe Pakistan's crop in 2025 will vie with Afghanistan's reduced output despite attempts by the Taliban to reduce cultivation locally. This has created an odd balance: Afghan dominance is disrupting supply, but Pakistani expansion is holding in check the type of price surges that otherwise might have driven consumers to synthetic opioids.

A fragile path forward

For Pakistan, the costs are high. The government must weigh international pressure for eradication against domestic realities of poverty, militancy, and weak rural governance. As authorities parade with brags of tens of thousands of acres of land incinerated, eradication costs money and won't last. Without long-term investment in alternative livelihoods, analysts foresee the poppy industry simply shifting once more, deeper into uncontrolled areas. Opium eradication is not just a border problem—it is an experiment in whether Pakistan can secure its nation, protect its people, and continue to exercise control over its global reputation.