From terror sponsor to peace pretender: Pakistan’s Abraham Accords gamble, its NATO dreams and why India watches closely

Pakistan, once a self-styled defender of Palestine, is now openly eyeing entry into the Abraham Accords. According to CNN-News18, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir have pitched Pakistan’s participation as a bargaining chip with the West. The benefits they seek are obvious: an economic package from Gulf states, enhanced ties with Washington, and even the prospect of NATO-linked privileges. Sources suggest Islamabad is willing to offer its geography as a base, with reports hinting that if the US wants to reclaim Bagram airbase, Pakistan could become its front-line partner. For a state crippled by debt and diplomatic isolation, the accords are seen as a lifeline.

A history of duplicity

Pakistan’s interest in the Abraham Accords exposes the hollowness of its decades-old rhetoric. For years, Islamabad demonised Israel, used the Palestinian cause to posture as a champion of the Muslim world, and attacked India for its growing friendship with Tel Aviv. Now, the same establishment is ready to abandon principle for survival. The shift reveals Pakistan’s desperation more than any realignment of ideology. By leveraging Asim Munir’s proximity to Washington and Gulf capitals, Islamabad is attempting to rebrand itself despite its track record of terror sponsorship and political instability.

Gulf skepticism

Yet Pakistan’s enthusiasm for the Abraham Accords may not be matched by Gulf capitals. The UAE and Saudi Arabia, two pillars of the accords, have grown wary of Pakistan’s chronic instability and its habit of exporting extremism. Riyadh has repeatedly clashed with Islamabad over its attempts to exploit the Palestinian issue while refusing to support Saudi-led coalitions against Iran or in Yemen. The UAE too has distanced itself from Pakistan, especially after high-profile diplomatic spats and Islamabad’s failure to deliver on promises. For many in the Gulf, Pakistan is seen as unreliable, overly dependent on bailouts, and quick to play both sides. These perceptions make it unlikely that Gulf monarchies would easily welcome Islamabad into the club of the Abraham Accords.

The problem for India

For New Delhi, the danger is twofold. First, Pakistan’s entry into the accords would give it a badly needed diplomatic facelift at a time when its credibility is at rock bottom. Second, it could embolden Islamabad to challenge India’s growing presence in West Asia. India has built a trusted network with Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia based on trade, technology, and counterterrorism cooperation. Pakistan, on the other hand, offers nothing but volatility. Allowing a terror-breeding state into the accords risks undermining their very credibility and could complicate India’s strategic calculus in the region.