HomeNewsOpinionWhy an SVB-type crisis is unlikely in India

Why an SVB-type crisis is unlikely in India

Traditional banking, the play of forbearance, funding and cash flow characteristics, all combine to make Indian banks less vulnerable than their US counterparts

May 26, 2023 / 13:10 IST
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SVB
Nearly all of SVB’s deposits came from a homogenous depositor class while CASA deposits of Indian banks are diversely owned.

The Silicon Valley Bank’s (SVB) crisis may now be passé but to the question as to how banks in India escaped the impact, we often point to their resilience and rule-based regulation that insulated them from global events. This is hard to refute, but there are some nuances to the crisis which relate to how banking works in India and the US. One, banks in the US have long moved away from traditional lending to investment, originate-to-distribute lending models and non-fund activities in their quest for higher returns. Indian banks have mostly stuck to the well-trodden path. Two, even as US banks grew non-traditionally, deposits were still their mainstay, which made them more vulnerable than when they were traditional banks.

The risk came from both sides of the balance sheets – flighty deposits and asset portfolios that were constantly revalued. Changes tended to get transmitted quickly through the stock and other asset markets adding to their vulnerability; a short seller in a bank stock, for instance, could trigger a run. Indian banks enjoyed some important differences that made them less vulnerable.

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Staying Traditional Helps

Even though its lending avenues had declined, SVB chased deposits
especially zero-interest accounts which had grown too rapidly for comfort. Its loan-to-deposit ratio was just 43 percent as it locked up the rest in long-dated securities. But with over 80 percent of its deposits repayable on demand, and by not hedging interest risk, SVB was betting on interest rates not climbing much or depositors not pulling back all at once. Neither happened and the losses it booked when it sold securities to repay deposits eroded its regulatory capital, triggering its stock to plunge and causing a run on its deposits. Chasing deposits to invest them principally in market securities was not banking as one knew it. The model failed them and a few other smaller regional banks. They were also said to be inadequately supervised, but in the end, what mattered was how depositors perceived them.