US’ targeting of Baloch Liberation Army shows its layered approach to Pakistan and China

Historically, the Baloch insurgency is rooted in a deep sense of marginalization and perceived political and economic exclusion by the Punjabi-dominated establishment in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Over the years, groups such as the BLA and other factions under the broader Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) umbrella have attempted to rationalise their violent resistance in terms of resource deprivation and political marginalization. However, over time, this insurgency has increasingly escalated into more violent means.

BLA’s terrain shifted in 2018

Traditionally, the BLA’s operations were limited to guerrilla warfare in rural terrain, perpetrating ambushes on military convoys and small outposts, and targeting infrastructure such as pipelines and train tracks.

Since 2018, their modus operandi saw a shift toward urban operations, with the group targeting Pakistani cities, Chinese interests, and critical infrastructure, including hijacking trains. Notable incidents include suicide explosions on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi in 2018 and near the University of Karachi’s Confucius Institute in 2022, the 2019 assault on the Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar, the hijacking of the Jaffer Express in March, and multiple strikes against Chinese engineers working on road, rail, and energy projects; at least 21 fatalities among Chinese nationals is reported due to Baloch insurgents’ targeting.

The BLA has evolved into an organized structure with specialized factions, such as the Fateh Brigade, an elite operations bloc specializing in direct combat and guerrilla warfare, and the Majeed Brigade, a suicide unit responsible for high-profile attacks.

CPEC is in the crosshairs

In particular, the BLA views the Beijing-funded China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), connecting Gwadar Port on the Arabian Sea to China’s Xinjiang province, as both a consolidation of Pakistani state control and a vehicle for Chinese extraction of Balochistan’s resources. For China and Pakistan, however, CPEC remains the backbone of their economic partnership.

To that end, the BLA has expanded its operational scope to include highways, rail networks, and energy pipelines, seeking to undermine the arteries of CPEC. It has also attacked urban transport hubs and police officials in Karachi, recognizing that urban disruption carries greater visibility than sporadic rural ambushes.

By criminalizing support networks, whether through the diaspora in Western countries or online fundraising channels, the FTO designation will complicate the BLA’s ability to sustain its financial base. However, as seen with other proscribed outfits such as LeT, the BLA may attempt to rebrand or adopt new nomenclature to evade sanctions.

A Reset in US-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation

The BLA’s designation followed the latest round of the US-Pakistan Counterterrorism Dialogue in Islamabad, where senior officials reportedly discussed institutional support and intelligence sharing. For the US, the FTO listing likely demonstrates willingness to continue a security-based partnership with Pakistan, similar to the days of the “War on Terror,” when both countries maintained close defense cooperation.

For Pakistan, US President Donald Trump’s recent affinity toward Islamabad provides much-needed defense support and geopolitical leverage against India.

The designation also enables Pakistan to advance its rhetoric of alleged Indian support for the Baloch insurgency, while pressing social media platforms for stricter scrutiny of BLA-linked propaganda. Symbolically, the FTO listing offers Pakistan much-required international legitimacy on terrorism and strengthens the military’s narrative that the insurgency in Balochistan is less an indigenous movement and more the product of external hostile backing.

The Big Power equation 

With the US sceptical of China’s expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region, its counterterrorism approach in Pakistan straddles two imperatives. The FTO designation indirectly secures Chinese economic interests in Pakistan. By blocking BLA’s international links, Washington offers breathing space to both China and Pakistan to safeguard CPEC assets. This holds particular significance given the periodic friction between China and Pakistan over the latter’s inability to safeguard Chinese interests.

At the same time, the move enables the US to keep the Pakistani military engaged with Washington, despite Pakistan’s deep economic, defense, and diplomatic alignment with China. Overall, this duality reflects Washington’s balancing act - countering terrorism in Pakistan without directly bolstering China’s economic ambitions.

Ultimately, BLA’s designation is more symbolic, reinforcing the concern on the international stage and framing it as an imperative security concern, rather than serving as a transformative solution to the Baloch problem. 

Nonetheless, it underscores three intersecting dynamics: first, the fragility of CPEC projects amid sustained insurgent violence; second, the possibility of a modest US-Pakistan reset on counterterrorism measures; and third, Washington’s careful navigation of its broader rivalry with China in the region.

The timing of the designation, following the TRF’s designation, likely showcases Washington’s balancing act. That said, the US will avoid repeating Pakistan’s accusations against India, preferring to keep security-based cooperation with Islamabad separate from defense and trade ties with New Delhi in the foreseeable future.

(Aishwaria Sonavane is Research Analyst for Pakistan Studies at the Takshashila Institution.)

Views are personal and do not represent the stand of this organisation.