OPINION | Supreme Court clarifies roles of Governor and President in dealing with Bills but doesn't resolve the matter entirely

It further held that the concept of “deemed assent” in the context of Articles 200 and 201 presupposes that one constitutional authority (the Court) could substitute another constitutional functionary (the Governor or the President). Such a substitution amounts to a usurpation of executive functions, which is antithetical to both the spirit of the Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers—part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

However, the judgment clarified that if the Governor causes a prolonged or unexplained delay that effectively blocks the legislative process, “the Court can issue a limited mandamus for the Governor to discharge his function under Article 200 within a reasonable time period, without making any observations on the merits of the exercise of his discretion.”

The Court concluded that, while exercising powers under Article 200, the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing among the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. It also held that the Governor’s decision under Article 200 is non-justiciable, and the Court cannot review the merits of that decision.

The Court further held that Article 361 of the Constitution “cannot be relied upon to negate the limited scope of judicial review that this Court is empowered to exercise in situations of prolonged inaction by the Governor under Article 200.”

Constitution seeks alacrity without specifying a time frame

Article 200 states that when a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, the Governor may, “as soon as possible,” choose one of three options: grant assent, return the Bill (if it is not a money Bill) for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President if the Bill, in his opinion, endangers the constitutional position of the High Court.

Constitutional silence has led to a 'pocket veto'

Although the Constitution does not prescribe a specific time limit and uses only the phrase “as soon as possible”, this silence has often allowed what functions as a form of pocket veto. In its April judgment, however, the Court held that neither a pocket veto nor an absolute veto exists in the constitutional scheme of Article 200. The absence of a specific timeline does not permit indefinite inaction, and the Court therefore proposed a reasonable time frame for the Governor’s decision-making.

The April judgment also highlighted that the expression “shall declare” in Article 200 makes it mandatory for the President to choose between the two options available under Article 201: either grant assent or withhold it.

Article 200 provides that after a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, the Governor “shall declare” either that he assents to the Bill, withholds assent, or reserves the Bill for the President’s consideration.

The constitutional question remains partially unresolved

The November verdict is a carefully balanced exercise, which does not fully resolve the underlying constitutional question. Acting under its advisory jurisdiction, the Court acknowledged that its intervention is limited to “glaring circumstances” where a Governor’s inaction becomes prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite. While the Court cannot review the merits of a Governor’s decision, it may issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to act within a reasonable time. By describing the assent process as an “advisory, persuasive, deliberative, mediative, and consultative” dialogue between State and Governor, the Court positioned itself more as a guide than an adjudicator. States may still approach the Court in cases of undue delay, but the Court’s function remains to facilitate timely constitutional functioning rather than impose rigid outcomes—an approach aimed at preserving institutional harmony.

On 28 January 1950, at the inauguration of the Supreme Court, the first Chief Justice of India, Justice Harilal J. Kania, observed: “The Constitution of India divides the legislative powers between the States and the Centre… The result is that different parts of the Constitution will act and react on each other, and the Court will have to decide questions arising from such a situation.”

That expectation—that the Court will clarify the constitutional position when different parts of the Constitution collide—remains unchanged. Yet how effectively the Court can resolve tensions continues to depend on the limits it sets for itself. In this case, the Court’s balancing act, which permits limited judicial intervention while calling the domain non-justiciable, leaves the issue partially open. It demonstrates judicial restraint, but also highlights the inherent limits of relying on the Court to resolve what are ultimately deeply political constitutional questions.

(Shishir Tripathi is a journalist and researcher based in Delhi.)

Views are personal, and do not represent the stand of this publication.